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THE PERILS OF LAND USE DEREGULATION

RICHARD C. SCHRAGGER†
Land use regulation and zoning have long been core functions of local governments.
Critics of local land use practices, however, assert that local regulations are too
restrictive and that “exclusionary zoning” ordinances increase housing costs, reduce
mobility, entrench racial segregation, prevent the poor from accessing jobs and services,
and reduce economic productivity. Spurred in large part by an affordable housing crisis
in popular metropolitan areas, the YIMBY (“Yes in My Backyard”) movement has
urged state and even federal action to override local land use regulations that raise
barriers to the construction of market-rate housing. The conventional wisdom is that
local governments cannot be trusted with land use policymaking and that striking down
local regulatory barriers is necessary to address a whole range of ills.
This Article challenges that conventional wisdom. It does not contest the chief
harms of exclusionary zoning, which have been recognized since the inception of
Euclidean zoning in the 1920s. Instead, the Article argues that for those who share
the goal of creating more equitable metropolitan regions, the rush to preempt local
land use regulations and adopt market-favoring statewide reforms is a mistake. The
history of centralized intervention in local land use suggests that preemptive state
laws will more likely injure lower-income persons than help them. Indeed, states
generally prevent local governments from adopting affordable housing policies. So too,
deregulating the housing market can lead to higher costs and less control over
development and displacement, often to the detriment of lower-income and minority
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communities. Though the “market” solution to housing affordability assumes that
economic growth lifts all boats, the gains of growth tend to run to skilled labor and
the already prosperous. Finally, the logic of land use preemption undermines cities’
other efforts to address economic inequality. Advocates for redistributive social
welfare policies favor expanding city power, not limiting it. That is because urbanbased economic justice efforts are regularly blocked by hostile state legislatures. Local
land use exclusion can have pernicious effects. But preemptive state laws that further
reduce or eliminate city power are not an answer.
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INTRODUCTION
Land use reform has recently become the subject of contentious debate in
the United States. Once a fairly obscure and technical topic, zoning has
become hot, spurred in large part by an affordable housing crisis in
increasingly popular cities and metropolitan areas—especially on the East and
West Coasts.1 The “Yes in My Backyard” (YIMBY) movement, most salient
1 See Benjamin Schneider, The American Housing Crisis Might Be Our Next Big Political Issue,
CITYLAB (May 16, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-16/how-to-make-americansunderstand-the-new-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/6GJQ-X98V] (describing under-production of
housing in coastal states and recent efforts to raise awareness of the crisis). The California legislature
has considered a number of sweeping land use reform proposals since 2018. See, e.g., S.B. 827, 2017–
2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (offering economic incentives and concessions for developers incorporating
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in California,2 has made the elimination of single-family zoning one of its
central goals, and some jurisdictions have done so.3 The 2020 presidential
election brought additional attention to the issue4 and the new Biden
administration has made the elimination of “exclusionary zoning” a
centerpiece of its housing agenda.5 This attention to land use has coincided
with a renewed appreciation for the role that zoning has played in reinforcing
racial segregation and exacerbating poverty, and has combined with
lower-income housing units into plans); S.B. 50, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (proposing a streamlined
approval process for multifamily housing projects); Conor Dougherty, California, Mired in a Housing Crisis,
Rejects an Effort to Ease It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/
business/economy/sb50-california-housing.html [https://perma.cc/NP5H-DZHA] (describing the latest of
three failed reform efforts, that of S.B. 50). Two additional zoning reform bills, S.B. 9 and S.B. 10, have
recently been signed by the Governor. See Nick Cahill, California Lawmakers Approve Series of Upzoning
Bills, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.courthousenews.com/californialawmakers-approve-series-of-upzoning-bills [https://perma.cc/MKC5-WW6X] (describing recent bills
S.B. 10, S.B. 15, and S.B. 447); Governor Newsom Signs Historic Legislation to Boost California’s Housing Supply
and Fight the Housing Crisis, OFF. OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSON (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.gov.ca.gov/
2021/09/16/governor-newsom-signs-historic-legislation-to-boost-californias-housing-supply-and-fight-thehousing-crisis [https://perma.cc/PTP4-MM34] (describing recent signing of S.B. 9 and S.B. 10).
2 Alana Semuels, From ‘Not in My Backyard’ to ‘Yes in My Backyard’, ATLANTIC (July 5, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/yimby-groups-pro-development/532437
[https://perma.cc/CKC4-U3JL] (profiling the movement); Erin McCormick, Rise of the YIMBYs: The
Angry Millennials with a Radical Housing Solution, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/
cities/2017/oct/02/rise-of-the-yimbys-angry-millennials-radical-housing-solution [https://perma.cc/LZ5329DW] (describing the San Francisco Bay Area as “[t]he birthplace of the yimby movement”).
3 See, e.g., Sarah Mervosh, Minneapolis, Tackling Housing Crisis and Inequity, Votes to End SingleFamily Zoning, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/minneapolissingle-family-zoning.html [https://perma.cc/MBN9-G4H3] (describing Minneapolis as the first
major U.S. city to eliminate single-family zoning); Chuck Slothower, A New, Denser Era for Housing
in Oregon, DAILY J. OF COM. (Portland, Or.), July 3, 2019, GALE GEN. ONLINE, GALE|A592634110
(describing OR. REV. STAT. § 197.758 (2020), which requires certain local governments to permit
higher densities in single-family zoned neighborhoods); Henry Grabar, You Can Kill Single-Family Zoning,
But You Can’t Kill the Suburbs, SLATE (Sept. 17, 2021, 5:38 PM), https://slate.com/business/2021/
09/california-sb9-single-family-zoning-duplexes-newsom-housing.html [https://perma.cc/UR6T-9EEJ]
(observing that California has “effectively abolishe[d] single-family home zoning”).
4 In particular, whether measures proposed by former President Trump would improve or exacerbate
the housing crisis. Compare President Donald J. Trump is Tearing Down Red Tape in Order to Build More
Affordable Housing, WHITE HOUSE (June 25, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-tearing-red-tape-order-build-affordable-housing [https://perma.cc
/A2BU-VNMA] (outlining former President Trump’s campaign plans to create more affordable housing
opportunities), with Laura Kusisto, Trump Administration Plans Roll Back of Low-Income Housing Rules,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2020, 6:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-to-roll-backrules-designed-to-boost-low-income-housing-11578351989 [https:// perma.cc/4Q4S-775K] (describing
housing advocates’ opposition to Trump’s proposed changes), and Laura Figueroa Hernandez, Donald
Trump: Fair Housing Rules Having ‘Devastating’ Impact on Suburbs, NEWSDAY (July 4, 2020, 5:37 PM),
https://www.newsday.com/news/nation/trump-housing-long-island-divided-hud-1.46344417 [https://
perma.cc/4GBG-UQS2] (describing the Biden campaign’s opposition to the proposed rollback).
5 See The Biden Plan for Investing in Our Communities Through Housing, BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT,
https://joebiden.com/housing [https://perma.cc/RGS8-ST9R] (discussing then-candidate Biden’s plan to
address the housing crisis, including the elimination of exclusionary zoning).
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regionalism advocates’ long-running distrust of local exclusionary land use
policies.
Land use regulation generally and zoning, in particular, have long been
core powers of local governments, and many land use reforms are occurring at
the local level.6 But an emerging conventional wisdom is almost uniformly
hostile to local government control of land use policy. The new land use
reformers take for granted that state (or even federal) laws are necessary to
override local parochialism and that local governments cannot be trusted with
land use policymaking and will abuse their zoning powers in predictable ways.7
This Article challenges that conventional wisdom, at least in part. It does
not contest the main criticisms of exclusionary zoning and other restrictive
housing policies—that they exacerbate troubling inequalities across our
metropolitan regions.8 Instead, the Article seeks to decouple the assumed
connection between the exercise of local power and exclusionary land use
policies. And it questions the rush to adopt state-level land use laws that
preempt local planning and zoning.9
The Article is organized around critiques of three pillars of the emerging
land use reform consensus: centralization, deregulation, and mobility. As to
the first, I argue that YIMBYism’s anti-localism is a mistake. State and federal
interventions into local land use have, at best, a mixed history.10 State forays
into local land use decisionmaking have either failed to achieve meaningful
gains or (in the case of urban renewal) have dramatically worsened the
problems of socioeconomic segregation. To be sure, exclusionary zoning in
6 John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a Housing Crisis, 60 B.C. L.
REV. 823, 825 (2019) (“Zoning is the quintessential local government power.”).
7 See infra Part II.
8 I have addressed those inequalities in prior work. See Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic
Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1115 (2008) [hereinafter Schragger,
Cities] (“The use of zoning laws to restrict entry is a common phenomenon—the relative dearth of
affordable housing in many suburbs is well-documented, as is the contribution of zoning to higher
house prices.”) (citations omitted); Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1824, 1826 (2003) [hereinafter Schragger, Consuming Government] (noting the “distributional
consequences of a political economy that gives the homevoter almost unfettered control over who
gets to move in next door” on the urban poor, racial minorities, families, and the elderly).
9 For a recent, somewhat different defense of zoning, see Christopher Serkin, A Case for Zoning,
96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 749, 752 (2020), arguing that zoning “is primarily concerned with
regulating the pace and costs of community change,” a goal which is achieved by “maintaining
community character, enhancing property values, and allocating the costs of development between
insiders and outsiders.” Other defenses of zoning include Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to
Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN.
L. REV. 739, 742-43 (1993) (arguing that protective zoning is necessary to preserve the “safety, quality
and integrity” of communities of color), and Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics,
10 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 45, 46 (1994) (“[Z]oning can be a rational and justifiable public policy
response to very real problems and can be made to work at least as well as any of the alternatives
the critics propose.”).
10 See infra Section II.A.
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the suburbs has detrimental effects, but there is no reason to believe that a
state’s land use regime—even one motivated by an affordability impulse—
will not come to reflect similar political pathologies. Suburbanites dominate
state legislatures. State-dictated policies have created the conditions under
which residential socioeconomic and racial segregation have flourished. And
state law regularly prevents local governments from adopting their own
affordable housing policies, not to mention other policies intended to address
economic inequality. Affordable, desegregated housing is a laudable—even
essential—goal. But combining it with an anti-local agenda by further
restricting cities’ already-limited powers is a strategic mistake. In light of this
history and the entrenched interests in the states, housing and poverty
advocates should be demanding more local control over land use, not less.
The second pillar of the emerging land use reform consensus is
deregulation. While supply-oriented reformers often combine land use reform
with affirmative duties to subsidize or build low-income housing, much of
current policy advocacy has a decidedly free market orientation, emphasizing
in the first instance the elimination of barriers to the construction of new
market-rate housing.11 The coincidence of centralized policymaking and
deregulation should raise concerns that state-level land use reform will mostly
redound to the benefit of investors and developers and not to those residents
with limited resources who seek to afford to remain in place. No doubt, those
in the market for housing—including middle-class families, recent college
graduates, and young families—are often priced-out of high-cost urban
housing markets. But reformers should be careful not to equate their interests
with those of the working-class and especially minority poor, who have always
struggled with unstable and expensive housing regardless of the local or
regional land use regime. Those communities have reason to be skeptical of
land use policies that encourage (and often subsidize) market-rate development;
“growth” policies have rarely worked for them before.12
11 See, e.g., Miriam Axel-Lute, YIMBYs: Friend, Foe, or Chaos Agent?, SHELTERFORCE (Feb. 19,
2019), https://shelterforce.org/2019/02/19/yimbys-friend-foe-or-chaos-agent [https://perma.cc/Y6Q7M2QX] (describing “YIMBY talking points focused on lowering housing cost by building more of
it,” and recounting the YIMBY arguments that restrictive zoning and conditional approvals “were
to blame for slow rate of new housing creation”). But see Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine
O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 25, 26 (2019)
(arguing that subsidized housing is a necessary adjunct of market-rate housing).
12 See infra Parts III–IV. For general critiques of neoliberal urban development, see JASON
HACKWORTH, THE NEOLIBERAL CITY: GOVERNANCE, IDEOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT IN
AMERICAN URBANISM 126-31 (2006) (arguing that neoliberalism has contributed to corporatized,
state-sponsored gentrification); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 88 (2007)
(discussing how neoliberalism resulted in “[c]utbacks in state welfare and infrastructural expenditures
[which] diminished the quality of life for many,” leading to “an awkward mix of low growth and
increasing income inequality”); TIMOTHY P.R. WEAVER, BLAZING THE NEOLIBERAL TRAIL:
URBAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 161
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To be sure, land use reform has been and currently is promoted as a means
to address metropolitan-area inequalities, to break down the barriers that usually
lock poorer and minority residents in neighborhoods far from jobs, in places
with weak or failing schools.13 It is notable that local land use—and single-family
zoning in particular—has become a central focus for those pursuing this equal
opportunity agenda.14 But the strategy of dispersing and deconcentrating what
would have been previously called the “ghetto” by opening up wealthier enclaves
to low-income housing—though a legitimate regional equity concern—
represents an up-by-your-bootstraps approach to poverty alleviation.
Policymakers’ emphasis on land use reform and “moving to opportunity”15
suggests that poverty alleviation is mostly about getting families out of poor
jurisdictions and into richer ones, in large part so that poor children may take
advantage of superior educational opportunities.16
This embrace of mobility is the third pillar of the new land use reform
consensus, and it too should raise concerns.17 Government efforts to address the
problem of economic inequality are badly needed, but land use reform seems

(2016) (noting that under neoliberal policies, despite “seven years of uninterrupted growth,
Philadelphia’s median household income of $30,055 had fallen by 7 percent” between 1990 and 2000);
see also Megan French-Marcelin, Doing Business New Orleans Style: Racial Progressivism and the
Politics of Uneven Development, in NEOLIBERAL CITIES: THE REMAKING OF POSTWAR URBAN
AMERICA 98, 99 (Andrew J. Diamond & Thomas J. Sugrue eds., 2020) (“[P]olicies that marshaled
public resources toward private ends—under the premise that generating growth and jobs were
commensurate enterprises—were also shaped by the willingness of liberals, white and black, to
subordinate appraisals of structural inequality to pro-growth visions of progress.”).
13 See Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti, How Local Housing Regulations Smother the U.S.
Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/opinion/housing-regulationsus-economy.html [https://perma.cc/C9U7-ABDT] (calling for federal and state intervention to “keep
municipalities from abusing land-use regulations to keep out newcomers” and to connect “high
paying job markets to areas with lower-cost housing”); John Infranca, Differentiating Exclusionary
Tendencies, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1271, 1276 (2020) (arguing that residents of urban communities are “likely
to benefit” from new development created by zoning reform).
14 See Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Cities Start to Question an American Ideal: A House with a Yard
on Every Lot, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/18/upshot/citiesacross-america-question-single-family-zoning.html [https://perma.cc/LEZ8-SVXP](cataloging recent
reform movements focused on ending single-family zoning); Farhad Manjoo, Let’s Quit Fetishizing the
Single-Family Home, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/opinion/californiasingle-family-housing.html [https://perma.cc/Y9DX-KPEE] (calling for the eradication of single-family
zoning in the name of equity).
15 See infra Section IV.A; Karen Duffin, Moving to Opportunity?, NPR: PLANET MONEY (Aug.
30, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/30/756028025/episode-937-moving-to-opportunity
[https://perma.cc/4YDZ-6NN3] (describing the mixed outcomes of the federal “move to
opportunity” program of the 1990s).
16 See David Imbroscio, Urban Policy as Meritocracy: A Critique, 38 J. URB. AFFS. 79, 80-81
(2016) [hereinafter Imbroscio, Urban Policy as Meritocracy] (“A central tenet of liberal urban policy
is the belief that, without a proper formal education during a person’s youth, her or his abilities and
talents will remain (perhaps forever) underdeveloped.”).
17 See id. at 91-92 (criticizing relocation-based anti-poverty programs).
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unlikely to meet the high aspirations set for it. Regionalists’ efforts to break
down barriers between suburbs and cities have produced little in the way of
substantive gains over the last seventy-five years.18 Perhaps that is because the
massive demographic shifts required of such a program would be politically
unpalatable, to both the poor minorities and middle-class white people forced
to move or absorb new arrivals. It is also the case that the “suburbs” are no longer
so monolithic in their whiteness and wealth; they have also not been immune to
a decades-long austerity regime that has hollowed out the public sector
everywhere.
The opportunity narrative’s focus on reducing land use barriers is misplaced
in another way. The question is not whether certain kinds of local land use
restrictions are pernicious—in many cases, they are—but why in the first quarter
of the twenty-first century, when rural, suburban, and urban inequality are all
on the rise,19 the preferred target of those seeking to address entrenched,
racialized poverty is zoning.
Geographically inscribed inequality is a problem. But the rise in economic
inequality in the last half-century may have little to do with individual families’
inability to take advantage of educational opportunities, nearby jobs, or good
public services.20 Single-family zoning did not create the gap between rich and
poor that is emblematic of this new gilded age, and access to the suburbs without
more will not reduce that gap. The emphasis on breaking down barriers to
mobility easily distracts from those substantive economic efforts like fair wage
and hours reform; health care and paid leave; eviction and tenant protections;
and labor rights—all of which can and have been pursued at the municipal level

18 See Richard C. Schragger, The Political Economy of City Power, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91,
111-14 (2017) (explaining why regional governments have had limited uptake in the U.S.). Canonical
works on regionalism include MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 42-43, 45 (1997) (promoting regionalism as a means of metropolitan
stabilization, but recognizing barriers to regional cooperation); DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT
SUBURBS 33-37 (2d ed. 1995) (arguing that centralized regional governance is essential to combat
housing and educational segregation).
19 Mike Schneider, Census: US Inequality Grew, Including in Heartland States, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/bfa51032ee27470c9f908914328eea99 [https://perma.cc/8JCHQDH2] (reporting on the rise of income inequality across the United States from 2017 to 2018).
20 See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 395-97
(Arthur Goldhammer trans. 2017) (2017) (highlighting executive compensation and wage gaps
between college and high school graduates as two primary drivers of inequality); Anna Stansbury
& Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation of the Recent
Evolution of the American Economy 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27193, 2020)
(arguing that union weakness accounts for declining worker power and economic inequality). For
another account that attributes declining growth to a lack of technological innovation, see ROBERT
L. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING
SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 605-06 (2016).
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but which in too many cases are preempted by deregulatory state laws.21 The
anti-local thrust of the new zoning reform undermines those important efforts.
In this way, the new anti-zoning movement and the opportunity agenda run
together—but at the cost of addressing some more salient features of an
increasingly unequal economy. State-level land use preemption reduces locals’
ability to extract concessions from mobile capital, undercuts local affordability
efforts, and further constrains the ability for urban-based economic justice
coalitions to exercise local power. The attraction of state-level reform is
understandable, but its costs are high, and its benefits are questionable.
Reformers would do better to focus on local policies and practices and pursue
their affordable housing agenda in place. Public policy can be effectively made
in cities, not simply to constrain them.
This Article has five remaining Parts. Part I describes the recent
“rediscovery” of exclusionary zoning. Though reformers have long bemoaned
suburban exclusion, the emerging anti-zoning consensus is a response to
metropolitan area housing demand and is thus the mirror image of the midcentury suburban housing demand that drove the previous pro-zoning
consensus.22 The combination of white, middle-class need, property rights
libertarianism, the renewed desirability of central city locations, and heightened
racial justice concerns has seeded this current anti-zoning moment.23 But this
moment is not so different from the zoning revolution that preceded it: both
zoning and anti-zoning emerge from similar demands to address housing
shortages.
Part II considers and criticizes the push for centralized control of land use,
arguing that blanket state-wide land use laws will likely do little to induce
affordable housing in the suburbs while undermining the few remaining powers
that progressive cities have to influence the type, direction, and speed of growth
in their neighborhoods. Part III considers land use deregulation, arguing that
market-favoring policies are likely to encourage displacement instead of
ameliorating it. While supply-side policies might lower prices at the high-end
of the income scale, they do not appear to be effective at providing housing
beyond the top quartile.24 And Part IV criticizes the mobility argument for land

21 Richard Briffault, The Challenge of New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1999-2002 (2018)
(describing the phenomenon of state legislatures passing legislation to preempt progressive
municipal ordinances at the behest of the business community).
22 See infra Section I.B.
23 Some have described this confluence of ideas as “liberaltarian.” See Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan
Ricks, & Christopher Serkin, Regulation and the Geography of Inequality, 70 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1770 (2021)
(using the term to describe liberals who believe “it is possible to help people who are in left-behind
places through policies that enable them to move to other, more economically vibrant, geographies”).
24 Cf. Emily Badger, A Luxury Apartment Rises in a Poor Neighborhood. What Happens Next?,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/upshot/luxury-apartments-poor-
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use reform. Dismantling land use barriers so that individuals and families can
move to more productive places sounds plausible, even essential. But a mobility
approach has its own costs: it accepts a state of affairs in which the poor chase
the rich in an endless quest for good public services; it provides little recourse
for those who are immobile because of age, personal circumstance, lack of skills,
or lack of resources; and it provides no answer to those left behind in failing
places.25
More importantly, the strategy assumes that economic growth will lift all
boats, when in fact, growth often has negative effects on the resident poor. The
YIMBY movement is a form of pro-growth politics; it is offered as an explicit
rebuke to the “Not in My Backyard” (NIMBY) politics that often characterizes
neighborhood opposition to development.26 But using state law to preempt local
NIMBY interests by reasserting the power of regional or statewide growth
interests does not seem like the best strategy for promoting inter-local or
socioeconomic equality. One might legitimately worry that market- and
mobility-oriented solutions to the housing crisis are really just suburbanization
in reverse—an accommodation to the (predominantly) white and middle- or
upper-middle class now applied to the more-recently desirable city.27
Finally, Part V argues that affordable housing and racial justice advocates
would do better to target their reforms in cities—a more promising site for
pursuing an economic equality agenda.28 Urban-based economic justice
movements have had success; the municipal living wage movement is a
model.29 Local control over land use can provide useful leverage in these
neighborhoods.html [https://perma.cc/V2B4-QUPN] (discussing various studies finding lowerincome renters may not benefit from new housing construction).
25 See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Losing the War of Attrition: Mobility, Chronic Decline, and
Infrastructure, 127 YALE L.J. F. 522, 526-29 (2017) (discussing barriers low-income residents face to
leaving their communities).
26 Timothy A. Gibson, NIMBY and the Civic Good, 4 CITY & CMTY. 381, 381 (2005) (describing the
NIMBY phenomenon); William Marble & Clayton Nall, Beyond “NIMBYism”: Why Americans Support
Affordable Housing But Oppose Local Housing Development 1-2 (Apr. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.dropbox.com/s/bdo3riekpnywgot/MarbleNall_NIMBYPaper.pdf?dl=0
[https://perma.cc/X2WF-G8CU] (exploring why homeowners’ concerns about the housing crisis in the
abstract do not lead them to support development in their neighborhoods).
27 In opposing the California legislature’s sweeping land use reform proposals, S.B. 827 and S.B. 50,
advocates for low-income and minority tenants repeatedly raised a similar concern. See Liam Dillon, A
Major California Housing Bill Failed After Opposition from the Low-Income Residents it Aimed to Help. Here’s
How It Went Wrong, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2018, 12:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-cahousing-bill-failure-equity-groups-20180502-story.html [https://perma.cc/7H9U-PTRK] (describing lowincome tenant activists’ opposition to a zoning reform bill over concerns about displacement).
28 See Richard C. Schragger, Is a Progressive City Possible? Reviving Urban Liberalism for the
Twenty-First Century, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 232-33 (2013) (advocating for local government
as a site for progressive, redistributive policies).
29 See Jared Bernstein, Making a Living: How the Living Wage Movement Prevailed,
SHELTERFORCE (May 1, 2002), https://shelterforce.org/2002/05/01/making-a-living-how-the-living-
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efforts, giving city officials and local residents a tool to force developers to
respond to affordability and anti-displacement concerns. State preemption of
local land use laws is likely to undermine those efforts to the chagrin of
reformers concerned about zoning’s effects on metropolitan-area inequality.
I. THE REDISCOVERY OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
This Part begins by describing what is meant by reformers when they refer
to “exclusionary zoning.” It also attempts to explain the emergence of the current
anti-zoning moment. Zoning emerged in the first quarter of the twentieth
century as cities were growing and housing needs were acute.30 The adoption of
zoning facilitated the suburban explosion. Anti-zoning has similarly emerged at
a moment of increasing urbanization when housing needs are again acute. Antizoning facilitates and is a response to the urban resurgence.
These two moments—of zoning and anti-zoning—are not opposed.
Although land use restrictions are often described as interventions in the
market that suppress housing development, zoning initially promoted housing
development.31 And while the ills of exclusionary zoning have been known for
some time, its recent rediscovery suggests that the anti-zoning impulse arises
out of a similar housing urgency. Both the post-war suburban growth that gave
birth to zoning and the twenty-first century urban resurgence that has given
birth to its opposite are responses to housing demand.
A. What is Exclusionary Zoning?
To what are reformers referring when they talk about exclusionary
zoning? On one possible account, all policies that increase the costs of
construction or that limit housing density are “exclusionary” because they
interfere with the market in housing.32 There are many policies, often having
nothing to do with zoning per se, that could have these effects. For example,
the cost of construction in a city might be high because of a local minimum
wage-movement-prevailed [https://perma.cc/W57H-YNBN] (discussing the history of the living
wage movement’s local focus).
30 See CHARLES M. HAAR & JEROLD S. KAYDEN, ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM:
PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 39 (1989) (tracing the history of zoning ordinances to the early twentieth
century as a response to the post-WWI housing shortage).
31 WILLIAM S. WORLEY, J.C. NICHOLS AND THE SHAPING OF KANSAS CITY 121-22 (1990)
(describing developers’ support for zoning in the early 1900s). On the history of zoning, see
generally PAIGE GLOTZER, HOW THE SUBURBS WERE SEGREGATED: DEVELOPERS AND THE
BUSINESS OF EXCLUSIONARY HOUSING, 1890-1960 (2020) and HAAR & KAYDEN, supra note 30,
at 41, describing the connection between zoning and segregation.
32 See David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J.
78, 101, 114-22 (2017) (describing a large range of policies, including zoning, that limit housing
construction and thus labor mobility).
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wage or because of labor-friendly local or state laws. Basic building,
environmental, and fire codes can increase costs and reduce density, as do setback requirements, historic preservation ordinances, impact fees, permitting
requirements, parking minimums, and nuisance laws. Tenant protections, like
rent control or anti-eviction moratoriums, similarly might affect housing
prices, if—as some economists contend—they reduce supply.33 A number of
these policies can be, and have been, criticized for raising the cost of
housing,34 though zoning reform advocates’ primary focus has usually been
classic Euclidean zoning: rules that disallow the mixing of industrial,
residential, and commercial uses and that in other ways limit the amount of
land available for multifamily construction. Single-family zoning is a
particular target of the new land use reformers.35
Zoning is sometimes understood as a limit on “normal” market
processes—a barrier to development imposed by governments on builders
and housing consumers.36 But this is a mistake. Land use rules—including
the basic rules of property law—are not independent of the housing market,
nor is it fair to assume that government regulations that affect individual
landowners’ ability to build suggest opposition to development. The most
33 Michael Hendrix, Issues 2020: Rent Control Does Not Make Housing More Affordable, MANHATTAN
INST. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/issues-2020-rent-control-does-not-make-housingmore-affordable [https://perma.cc/J9WN-2KKR] (arguing that regulating rents “does more harm than good
overall”). Other studies, however, have found that rent control measures benefit low-income households. See
FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL EST. & URB. POL’Y, RENT STABILIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY 4 (2012),
https://furmancenter.org/files/HVS_Rent_Stabilization_fact_sheet_FINAL_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/5R4EHLLZ] (finding that stabilized rent housing may be more beneficial for lower-income residents).
34 See, e.g., Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV.& RSCH., 139,
145-48 (2005) (providing overview of potential objections to impact fees); Hannah Hoyt & Jenny Schuetz,
Report: Parking Requirements and Foundations Are Driving Up the Cost of Multifamily Housing, BROOKINGS INST.
(June 2, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/parking-requirements-and-foundations-are-driving-upthe-cost-of-multifamily-housing [https://perma.cc/J65F-D7SN] (recommending localities reduce the
amount of parking required for residential developments in order to reduce building costs); REAL
EST. BD. OF N.Y., RENT STABILIZED UNITS ON LANDMARKED PROPERTIES 1 (2015), https://
www.rebny.com/content/dam/rebny/Documents/PDF/News/Research/Policy%20Reports/REBNY_
Report-Rent_Regulated_Units_in_Landmark_Districts.pdf [https://perma.cc/J65F-D7SN] (noting a
greater loss of rent regulated units in landmarked parts of New York City than in non-landmarked
parts); see also Exec. Order No. 13,878, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,853 (June 25, 2019) (identifying zoning
controls, historic preservation requirements, parking minimums, and environmental regulations as
potential targets for reform to achieve affordable housing).
35 See, e.g., Philip Kiefer, Here Comes the Neighborhood, GRIST (May 21, 2019),
https://grist.org/article/seattle-zoning-density-minneapolis-2040/ [https://perma.cc/7RM6-6N7J]
(describing recent efforts to loosen single-family zoning in Seattle and Minneapolis).
36 See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Walls We Won’t Tear Down, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/opinion/sunday/zoning-laws-segregation-income.html
[https://perma.cc/8TUK-AXVJ] (“[C]urrent exclusionary policies create an artificial scarcity of housing,
driving up prices beyond what the market would naturally dictate.”); see also Michael C. Lens & Paavo
Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan Areas More Segregated by Income?, 82 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS’N 6, 11 (2016) (finding that density restrictions lead to artificial concentration of affluence).
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basic preconditions of urban growth are government-imposed. Consider, for
example, the debate over whether a grid system of streets and lots or a less
formal system of lot demarcation facilitates economic development.37 Street
layouts, building heights, the distribution of city lands for parks and civic
buildings all limit or restrict how individual property owners use their land
and consequently the value of individual and neighboring parcels.
The housing market is at the same time a land use market. And the long
history of restrictive covenants and the more recent popularity of homeowners’
associations suggests that housing consumers are fairly enamored of restrictive
land use rules.38 Even in the absence of government intervention, millions of
housing consumers have opted for highly restrictive land use covenants.
Developers have complied enthusiastically, presumably because those rules
benefit them by providing what home seekers want. Restrictive land use rules
have not been imposed on the market but are a feature of it.
Those rules have also historically arisen during spates of urbanization when
cities and suburbs are growing. Consider the trajectory of residential racial
exclusion. Racial zoning was adopted as agricultural and rural places were
becoming more urban, initially as a mechanism to separate the races in place—in
existing housing.39 The statutes required segregation at the block level;
homeowners and renters—white or Black—were required to move out of existing
residencies to create a new status quo that would be enforced going forward.40
After de jure residential segregation was struck down by the Supreme
Court in Buchanan v. Warley,41 private racial covenants remained both legal
and increasingly popular. Those covenants too were introduced to apply to
current housing, though as cities and towns grew, restrictive covenants (racial
and otherwise) were deployed in the main to assure home buyers that new
housing developments would be congenial to their preferences. In other
37 Cf. Maureen E. Brady, The Forgotten History of Metes and Bounds, 128 YALE L.J. 872, 875
(2019) (describing the history of property boundaries in America).
38 Homeowners associations, in fact, can impose far more restrictive land controls than
governments at any level. See Ryan McCarl, When Homeowners Associations Go Too Far: Political
Responses to Unpopular Rules in Common Interest Communities, 43 REAL EST. L.J. 453, 462 (2015)
(nothing that land use restrictions imposed by homeowners’ associations “leave less room for
individual autonomy than most public land use laws.”) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Robert C.
Ellickson, Stale Real Estate Covenants 3-4 (Aug. 21, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678927 (discussing the enduring power of covenants). In a recent survey
experiment, Jessica Trounstine found that “across every demographic subgroup analyzed,
respondents preferred single-family home developments by wide margins.” Jessica Trounstine, You
Won’t Be My Neighbor: Opposition to High Density Development, URB. AFFS. REV., Dec. 6, 2021, at 1.
39 See Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN PLANNING
AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 23, 24 (June Manning Thomas
& Marsha Ritzdorf eds., 1997) (describing the use of zoning to enforce racial segregation).
40 See id.
41 245 U.S. 60, 61 (1917).
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words, restrictive covenants—whether limiting the use of property to
residential purposes, barring commercial establishments like gas stations, or
preventing occupancy by Black or other races or ethnicities—were tools used
by developers to attract buyers.42 Restrictive covenants have been and
continue to be handmaidens to development—not hindrances to it.
The purpose and history of Euclidean zoning—the division of a town or
city into separate zones for residential, commercial, and industrial uses—
reflects a similar pro-development impulse. Consider N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount
Laurel, the 1975 New Jersey Supreme Court decision that famously struck
down a township’s land use regime because it failed to provide sufficient land
for the development of low- and moderate-income housing.43 It is easy to
forget that the restrictive zoning ordinance at issue in Mount Laurel was a
byproduct of, and facilitated, growth.44 In the early 1970s, Mount Laurel was
growing.45 As the Philadelphia metropolitan area expanded, formerly rural
communities across the Delaware River in New Jersey were rapidly being
turned into bedroom suburbs. Mount Laurel’s growth (and the growth of
central New Jersey as a whole) was a response to the demand for more housing.
In other words, zoning accompanied increased supply. Between 1950 and
1960, Mount Laurel’s population had increased by over 86%; over the next
decade, the township’s population grew by another 114%.46 Meanwhile, the
state’s population as a whole grew by 48% between 1950 and 1970.47 Housing

42 See RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 48-49 (2013) (noting the use of
racially-exclusive covenants as a means of making a neighborhood attractive to buyers).
43 S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975)
[hereinafter Mount Laurel I]. The case was followed in 1983 with a second challenge to Mount
Laurel’s exclusionary ordinance. S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d
390, 409-10 (N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II].
44 See What is the Mount Laurel Doctrine?, FAIR SHARE HOUS. CTR., https://fairsharehousing.
org/mount-laurel-doctrine [https://perma.cc/6374-PARB] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (describing the
rapid growth in Mount Laurel as a result of planned development as “fiscal zoning at its best, aimed at
attracting the highest tax rateables, which translated into excluding the poor”).
45 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, LEN ALBRIGHT, REBECCA CASCIANO, ELIZABETH DERICKSON,
DAVID N. KINSEY, CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING
AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 32-33 (2013) (noting that Mount Laurel nearly
quadrupled in population between 1950 and 1970); J. Peter Byrne, Are the Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85
GEO. L.J. 2265, 2270 (1997) (reviewing CHARLES HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE AND
AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996) and DAVID L. KIRP, JOHN P. DWYER, & LARRY A. ROSENTHAL, OUR
TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)) (describing Mount Laurel as a
“nondescript expanse of truck farms rapidly converting to pricey subdivisions”).
46 N.J. DEP’T OF LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., LABOR PLANNING AND ANALYSIS
APPLICATIONS: 1990 CENSUS tbl.6, https://www.nj.gov/labor/lpa/census/1990/poptrd6.htm
[https://perma.cc/YZQ2-HVMT].
47 U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHANGE IN RESIDENT POPULATION OF THE
50 STATES, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND PUERTO RICO: 1910 TO 2020 (Apr. 26, 2021),
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supply was increasing across New Jersey. (Indeed, today New Jersey ranks first
among all states in population density.48) The problem for the Black plaintiffs
in the Mount Laurel case was not that they were barred from moving into the
jurisdiction—a robust Black community had been in the rural township for over
one hundred years.49 Rather, the problem was that developmental pressures
were pricing them out of their own community. Without access to rental
properties for people of modest means, they would slowly lose their homes to
dilapidation and higher taxes and be forced to move elsewhere. Housing costs
in Mount Laurel were being driven up by demand. Mount Laurel is a case about
the negative effects of development; it is a gentrification case.
Mount Laurel involved classic “fiscal zoning,” which is well described in
that case. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, each locality “acts
solely in its own selfish and parochial interest” to keep costs down and
property values up.50 To be sure, fiscal zoning is a growth control: the reason
that the township limited multi-family housing and less expensive rentals was
not because it was opposed to development, but because it sought
development that would “pay for itself.”51 This desire to attract and retain
certain land uses is a byproduct of local government finance. To the extent
that schools and other public services are mainly paid for through the local
property tax, it is necessary to align the users of municipal services with their
capacity to pay. That means that a local government is inclined to attract
relatively wealthier residents and limit higher-cost users of municipal
services—like large families with children.52 Fiscal zoning is a rational
strategy for local government officials seeking to keep taxes low and services
high—which is why the township was quite candid in defending this strategy
before the New Jersey Supreme Court.53
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/dec/popchange-data-text.html [https://perma.cc/DH9FREX3] (showing an increase from 4.8 million in 1950 to 7.2 million in 1970).
48 Population Density in the U.S., by State 2020, STATISTA (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.statista.
com/statistics/183588/population-density-in-the-federal-states-of-the-us [https://perma.cc/Y4HB-YM2W].
49 David L. Kirp, John Dwyer, & Larry Rosenthal, A Suburb at Odds: The Epic Battle of Mount
Laurel, in DAVID L. KIRP, ALMOST HOME: AMERICANS LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH
COMMUNITY 60, 61 (2000).
50 Mount Laurel I, supra note 43, at 723.
51 Id.; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Essay, Saving Mount Laurel?, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 161418 (2013) (explaining how municipalities used exclusionary zoning to reduce the risk of “fiscal,
political, and social costs” to the community).
52 See Eric A. Hanushek & Kuzey Yilmaz, Land-Use Controls, Fiscal Zoning, and the Local
Provision of Education, 43 PUB. FIN. REV. 559, 560 (2015) (“If . . . various zoning devices can be
employed, it may be possible to exclude the households that create the fiscal burdens.”).
53 Indeed, theorists of local government finance and public goods, building on the famous
Tiebout hypothesis, have argued that zoning is an essential feature of a competitive intergovernmental system of public goods provision. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 424 (1956) (“[If] consumer-voters are fully mobile, the
appropriate local governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are adopted by the
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One can distinguish fiscal zoning from “public goods zoning,” though they
are related. While fiscal zoning is concerned with the residents’ ability to pay,
public goods zoning is focused on the use of public services, regardless of who
is paying. Congestion is a standard example. A local amenity like a beach
loses its value if it is overcrowded—as do local roads, parks, swimming pools,
or schools.54 Local governments might also be concerned about how the
quality of a certain amenity is affected by its users.55 The quality of primary
and secondary education, for example, might turn in part on the types of
students consuming that education.56 To the extent that those kinds of
services are restricted to local residents, there is an incentive for local
governments to adopt entrance controls in the form of land use restrictions
that serve as proxies for “quality” users.57
By the early 1970s, the Mount Laurel court was well-aware that this
strategy, coupled with white flight, was contributing to the decline of the
post-industrial city. Mount Laurel was growing, but Camden—an industrial
city a short drive away—was fast becoming depopulated and destitute.
Indeed, the Mount Laurel court articulated most if not all of the current
consumer-voters.”); see also THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN
HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 1, 11-14 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) (describing modern
applications of the zoning to the Tiebout model); Bruce W. Hamilton, Tiebout Hypothesis, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 640, 640 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, &
Peter Newman eds., 1987) (describing Hamilton’s model, which builds on Tiebout’s model and
postulates that “[c]itizens of a rich jurisdiction could safely tax themselves sufficiently to finance
their demanded level of public services, secure in the knowledge that the zoning code would protect
them from free riders.”). Zoning, they argue, is a necessary complement to the efficient provision of
public services insofar as it permits housing consumers—consumer-voters—to select the bundle of
taxes and services that most reflects their preferences. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 39 (2001) (arguing that zoning is crucial
to motivating homebuyers to “vote with their feet” because it advances capitalization).
54 The beach is Tiebout’s well-known example. See Tiebout, supra note 53, at 419 (calculating
the optimum population for a beach of any given size based on the ideal amount of space allocated
to each family).
55 William A. Fischel, Public Goods and Property Rights: Of Coase, Tiebout, and Just Compensation 6
(Dartmouth Coll., Working Paper No. 00-19, 2000), https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.dartmouth.edu/
dist/6/2312/files/2021/03/00-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/869C-FQUA] (describing the impact of congestion).
56 See, e.g., Mary A. Burke & Tim R. Sass, Classroom Peer Effects and Student Achievement, 31 J.
LAB. ECON. 51, 78 (2013) (“[T]he distribution of student ability may influence teaching strategies
in ways that benefit some students but not others . . . .”).
57 Fischel, supra note 55, at 8-9 (describing zoning as a means to exclude “free riders”). I have
been critical of both fiscal and public goods zoning because of their exclusionary effects. See
Schragger, Consuming Government, supra note 8, at 1836 (“Local government works for the homevoter
only because she has been empowered to keep lower-income, higher-cost newcomers out of her
neighborhood: her incentives are explicitly defensive and separationist.”). I have also argued that
Tiebout has been misapplied to support a competitive account of city or regional growth and decline,
which it never was intended to be. RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE
IN A GLOBAL AGE 29-32, 34-43 (2016).

140

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 125

arguments against suburban-style fiscal zoning: the desperate need for
moderate- and low-income housing throughout the state,58 the effect on
lower-income job seekers of being shut out of suburban development,59 the
racially discriminatory aspects of zoning,60 and the effects of sprawling
suburban development on nearby declining industrial cities.61 These effects
were well known in 1975, as they were when the concept of zoning was first
introduced in the early part of the twentieth century. Fifty years before Mount
Laurel, the trial court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. had made a
similar observation about zoning’s segregative effects, stating that “[i]n the
last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the people and
segregate them according to their income or situation in life.”62 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision in 1926, upholding the
“Euclidean” single-family zoning that thereafter became ubiquitous
throughout the United States—and which is now a chief target of the new
land use reform movement.63
The important point is that when Mount Laurel was decided, the problem
was not that there was too little housing being built, but rather that there was
too much—of a certain kind. Housing costs were low enough in Mount Laurel
to permit the middle-class to leave Camden—indeed, minimum lot sizes were
relatively modest and the average price of a home was $32,50064—but certainly
not so low as to allow every poor person to leave. Mobile housing consumers
had new options in the suburbs; immobile ones did not. The Levittowns of the
1950s,65 and then the numerous Mount Laurels of the 1970s, were a “successful”
58 Mount Laurel I, supra note 43, at 716 (“There is not the slightest doubt that New Jersey has
been, and continues to be, faced with a desperate need for housing . . . suitable for low and moderate
income families.”).
59 Id. at 723 (“One incongruous result is the picture of developing municipalities rendering it
impossible for lower paid employees . . . to live in the community where they work.”).
60 Id. at 736 (Pashman, J., concurring) (“[E]xclusionary zoning practices are also often
motivated by fear of and prejudices against other social, economic, and racial groups.”).
61 Id. at 724 (noting the decline of Camden).
62 Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 365
(1926). Despite striking down the ordinance, the district court was aware of and seemed to embrace
the racial purpose of zoning. See Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 597, 605 (2001) (“It was so obvious to Judge Westenhaver that ‘colored’ people and certain
groups of immigrants were nuisances that the Supreme Court’s refusal to approve racial zoning
made it impossible to validate zoning for other purposes.”).
63 For a historical account of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., see Maureen E. Brady,
Turning Neighbors into Nuisances, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1609, 1611-13 (2021).
64 Mt. Laurel Homes Carry High Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 1975), https://www.nytimes.
com/1975/03/25/archives/mt-laurel-homes-carry-high-prices-zoning-prevented-purchase-by-less.
html [https://perma.cc/36HM-WKX6] (providing pricing data for 1971). On the zoning scheme at
issue in Mount Laurel more generally, see Mount Laurel I, supra note 43, at 718-24.
65 Crystal Galyean, Levittown, U.S. HIST. SCENE, https://ushistoryscene.com/article/levittown
[https://perma.cc/FP56-S24T] (describing the development of “Levittown” planned communities).
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response to the post-war housing shortage across the United States—just not
for those worst off, and generally not for Black people or other minorities.66
The lesson for today’s anti-zoning moment is both historical and analytical.
First, land use reform—whether zoning or anti-zoning—is driven by demand
and generally accompanies economic growth. Euclidean zoning helped
facilitate urbanization on a massive scale, just not in the city center. Second,
both zoning and anti-zoning are creatures of the “market”—not departures
from or exceptions to it.67 Opposition to zoning is opposition to a certain form
of market-driven development, not to interference in the market simpliciter.
B. What Explains the Rediscovery of Exclusionary Zoning?
That both zoning and anti-zoning can be understood as facilitating
housing development suggests an explanation for exclusionary zoning’s
recent rediscovery. Critics have regularly bemoaned exclusionary land use
policies, from zoning’s inception in the 1920s to the lead-up to Mount Laurel
and since.68 But the political energy for attacking those policies has only
reached a critical mass recently. The most obvious explanation for this
attitudinal shift is the renewed popularity of certain city centers and the
increasing concentration of the U.S. population in sprawling metropolitan

66 James Wolfinger, “The American Dream—For All Americans”: Race, Politics, and the Campaign to
Desegregate Levittown, 38 J. URB. HIST. 430, 431-32 (2012) (describing the racial homogeneity of new
suburbs and tactics like lending discrimination used to maintain it); Bruce Lambert, At 50, Levittown
Contends with Its Legacy of Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/28/
nyregion/at-50-levittown-contends-with-its-legacy-of-bias.html [https://perma.cc/J3HZ-MDN3] (noting
the legacy of racial exclusion in Levittown, NY).
67 YIMBY discourse contrasts the state with the (free) market, implicitly criticizing the former,
but the state/market distinction tends to collapse on close inspection. See David Imbroscio, Race
Matters (Even More Than You Already Think): Racism, Housing, and the Limits of The Color of Law, 2 J.
RACE, ETHNICITY, & CITY 29, 33-34 (2020) (questioning the “over-emphasis on public policies as
the cause of segregation” when government policies were simply following the demands of preexisting
racist market principles). See also LaDale C. Winling & Todd M. Michney, The Roots of Redlining:
Academic, Governmental, and Professional Networks in the Making of the New Deal Lending Regime, 108 J.
Am. Hist. 42, 44 (2021) (“[G]overnment redlining was private redlining and vice versa.”).
68 Critiques predating Mount Laurel include: Robert L. Lineberry, Mandating Urban Equality:
The Distribution of Municipal Public Services, 53 TEX. L. REV. 26, 30 (1974) (“Exclusionary zoning has
become the principal target of liberals and civil rights groups who want to open the suburbs to all
racial and economic groups.”); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 798-99 (1969) (advocating an equal-protection
challenge to exclusionary zoning); Note, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 1251, 1256-57 (1966) (proposing a method to determine whether a challenged zoning
ordinance has a harmful regional impact). For critiques after Mount Laurel, see Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part II – Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 419 (1990) [hereinafter
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II]. See generally Byrne, supra note 45.
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areas.69 That growth has been accompanied by rising housing costs and
housing shortages—though mostly concentrated in coastal cities and some
specific in-land metropolitan areas.70 Sometimes described as a “demographic
inversion,”71 core cities are now increasingly desirable places to live. This
“urban resurgence” is a global phenomenon; housing costs are high and rising
in many metropolitan areas throughout the world.72
The present anti-zoning moment requires some further explanation,
however, for two reasons. First, metropolitan-area housing pressure is not
new. Returning GIs faced a severe housing shortage after World War II,73 and
there are many ways to respond to housing shortages and high housing costs.
Depression-era and post-WWII housing development was made possible by
the invention of the 30-year mortgage, federal support for mortgage finance,
massive highway building, federal and state support for the American auto
industry, the mortgage interest deduction, and many other policies that
encouraged Americans to become homeowners.74 The construction of public
housing both during the New Deal and the War on Poverty was also a
somewhat less successful effort to house the country.75 As already noted,
zoning facilitated these efforts, though it was arguably less important than
these other forms of government fiscal and political support.
Second, the problems with exclusionary zoning had been well-known
before Mount Laurel was decided and certainly in the decades since, though
reformers’ efforts to do much about those problems usually failed. The Mount
Laurel decision itself instigated a decades-long battle over affordable housing
69 See Richard C. Schragger, Federalism, Metropolitanism, and the Problem of States, 105 VA. L.
REV. 1537, 1545-47 (2019) (tracing recent academic and policy emphases on cities and urbanization
to the ongoing “urban resurgence”).
70 Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Lee E. Ohanian, & Edward C. Prescott, Tarnishing the Golden and
Empire States: Land-Use Restrictions and the U.S. Economic Slowdown 2-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 23790, 2017) (noting housing shortages in New York and California); Robert C.
Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing: Evidence from Silicon Valley, Greater New Haven, and
Greater Austin 4-6 (Jan. 14, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3472145
(describing “astronomic” housing prices in Silicon Valley).
71 See, e.g., ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE
AMERICAN CITY 3-4 (2013) (“Demographic Inversion is . . . the rearrangement of living patterns
across an entire metropolitan area, all taking place roughly at the same time.”).
72 See Richard Florida & Benjamin Schneider, The Global Housing Crisis, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(Apr. 11, 2018, 9:35 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-11/the-housing-crisisextends-far-beyond-superstar-cities [https://perma.cc/RAG2-MBR2] (“Cities around the world are
more economically powerful and essential than ever. This creates tremendous demand for their land,
leading to escalating housing costs and competition.”).
73 Alexander von Hoffman, History Lessons for Today’s Housing Policy: The Politics of Low-Income Housing,
HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 321, 331 (2012) (describing the postwar housing crisis and the federal response).
74 See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 176-77, 191, 248 (1985).
75 Hoffman, supra note 73 at 322-28 (describing the New Deal); id. at 340-52 (describing the
War on Poverty).
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in New Jersey, a battle that at best has had marginal effects on state-wide
affordability or integration.76 The decision did nothing to revive distressed
New Jersey cities, nor was the New Jersey Supreme Court’s approach
emulated elsewhere to any significance.77 Single-family zoning continued
much as it had before. And the exodus to private homeowners’ associations
with their own even more restrictive land use rules has only accelerated.78
So, why land use reform now? Certainly, the housing crisis and return to
the cities is a precipitating cause. But the deregulatory thrust of the new land
use reform is also occurring at a moment of heightened awareness of the
spatial and geographical features of inequality. Here, three strains of thought
have coalesced around the idea that local land use barriers are the cause of a
plethora of ills that can be addressed through zoning reform.
The first strain is a renewed appreciation of the effects of the dual housing
market on the long-term economic fortunes of Black people.79 It is wellknown that over the course of the twentieth century, the government’s
housing policies created one housing market for Black people and another for
white people.80 Racially restrictive covenants, redlining, urban renewal,
limited access to credit, and segregated public housing policies limited the
housing supply for Black people, concentrated poor Black people in certain
parts of the city, and in this way “built” the ghetto.81
76 See Prentiss Dantzler, Exclusionary Zoning: State and Local Reactions to the Mount Laurel
Doctrine, 48 URB. LAW. 653, 660-64 (2016) (discussing the shortcomings of Mount Laurel I); Alan
Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment,
63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851-56 (2011) (documenting the political turmoil and eventual
marginalization of the fair housing entities created in the wake of Mount Laurel); Daniel Meyler,
Note, Is Growth Share Working for New Jersey?, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 251-52 (2010)
(concluding that the New Jersey affordable housing framework is not working).
77 Mallach, supra note 76, at 860-61, 865 (describing alternative legislative approaches used in
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and noting the “grim” future prognosis for the Mount
Laurel doctrine).
78 See Gordon MacLeod, Walling the City, in CITIES & SOCIAL CHANGE: ENCOUNTERS WITH
CONTEMPORARY URBANISM 135-45 (Ronan Paddison & Eugene McCann eds., 2014) (discussing
the growing practice of building planned, exclusive communities); Barbara Coyle McCabe,
Homeowners Associations as Private Governments: What We Know, What We Don’t Know, and Why It
Matters, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 535, 536 tbl.1 (2011) (noting a roughly thirtyfold increase in the
number of HOAs between 1970 and 2011).
79 How Public Policy Intentionally Segregated American Homeowners, NISKANEN CTR. (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.niskanencenter.org/how-public-policy-intentionally-segregated-american-homeowners
[https://perma.cc/QC3H-TM8X] (noting increased discussion over redlining and “durable material,
racial inequality”).
80 NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 10, 13 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER REPORT] (noting that
federal policies had failed to provide housing to the disadvantaged, and warning of a “permanent
. . . division of our country into two societies” should existing policies be continued).
81 See generally, MITCHELL DUNEIER, GHETTO: THE INVENTION OF A PLACE, THE
HISTORY OF AN IDEA (2016) (describing the intellectual history of the term “ghetto” and the origins
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What might be called the reparations argument against zoning considers
the continuing effects of that dual housing market. Recent academic and
popular writing on racial injustice has pointed to the history of housing
discrimination as an important cause of Black people’s comparative failure to
build wealth and transmit it to future generations.82 Recent arguments for
reparations have highlighted the history of land use policies that excluded
Black people and, to a lesser extent, led to the expropriation of Black people’s
land.83 And recent work seeks to connect the legacy of the dual housing
market up with current ostensibly race-neutral land use policies, like singlefamily housing—arguing essentially that single-family zoning has
perpetuated racial segregation despite fair housing laws.84
A second strand of thought that has raised the profile of land use reform
also focuses on housing and the spatial determinants of inequality. Recent
literature on the disparate life outcomes of those raised in poor places
compared to those raised in richer ones has generated startling headlines
about the life expectancies and differential economic attainments of children
born only a few miles apart.85 In the 1970s, reformers were well-aware that
of policies meant to address it); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (describing how federal
policy enforced housing segregation); BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: HOW THE
STRUGGLE OVER RACE AND REAL ESTATE TRANSFORMED CHICAGO AND URBAN AMERICA 46 (2009) (connecting the policy of redlining to the decline of black neighborhoods through the
mechanism of contract selling). For a classic account of racial politics in Detroit and the origins of
the city’s economic decline, see THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE
AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 181-207 (1996).
82 Cf. Charisse Jones, Race Matters: Gap Between Black and White Homeownership is Vast, New Report
Finds, USA TODAY (June 29, 2020, 3:09 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/06/29/blackhomeownership-lags-whites-fueling-wealth-gap-report-finds/3244738001 [https://perma.cc/J3D9-9MBK]
(“Homeownership is critical to the accumulation of wealth and a factor in the stark difference between the
net worth of white families . . . versus Black families . . . .”).
83 Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631 [https://perma.cc/3SRZ-5RR5] (citing
“[t]hirty-five years of racist housing policy” among other justifications for reparations).
84 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 81; JESSICA TROUNSTINE, SEGREGATION BY DESIGN: LOCAL
POLITICS AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN CITIES 205-08 (2018) (arguing that once racist policies
are in place, they reinforce the interests of those who benefit irrespective of the racial animus of
those individuals); Jessica Trounstine, The Geography of Inequality: How Land Use Regulation Produces
Segregation, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 443, 443 (2020) (“[E]ven facially race-neutral land use policies
have contributed to racial segregation.”).
85 David Brooks, Who is Driving Inequality? You Are, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/opinion/income-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/KRY5-6QBB] (describing
a study showing disparate incarceration and mobility rates in demographically similar neighborhoods
of Los Angeles); Harriet Torry, Where You Live Could Determine How Long You Live, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 11, 2016, 7:32 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/04/11/where-you-live-coulddetermine-how-long-you-live [https://perma.cc/953J-CX3R] (“[G]eographic location plays an
outsized role in life expectancy for lower earners.”); Esther Yoon-Ji Kang, Chicago Owns America’s
Widest Racial Gap in Economic Mobility, WBEZ CHICAGO (Sept. 26, 2019, 3:16 PM), https://
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where one lived determined the quality of services—and education in
particular—that one received. The Mount Laurel decision was decided against
the backdrop of a failed (or failing) busing movement, state law challenges to
unequal education funding—some of which succeeded and some of which did
not—and constitutional efforts to recognize poverty as a suspect class.86 The
equality agenda of the time was focused on local housing and educational
inequality, but it was turned back by a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
that rejected cross-jurisdictional integration remedies,87 equal educational
funding as a federal right,88 or fair share housing89—at least as a matter of
federal law. States sought to fill the gap—as the New Jersey court did in
Mount Laurel—but the political will to remedy segregation and place-based
inequality had mostly dissipated by the late-1970s (and certainly by the
Reagan revolution of the 1980s).90
Recent work on the effects of “moving to opportunity,” however, is reviving
the rhetoric of geographical unfairness.91 Examining outcomes for children
living in different neighborhoods, economists make the case that life outcomes
are being predetermined by place of birth, thereby undermining the American
myth of mobility.92 Single-family zoning appears to be a barrier to mobility
www.wbez.org/stories/chicago-owns-americas-widest-racial-gap-in-economic-mobility/dd2077492d7a-4d45-9eda-cc0df967f79c [https://perma.cc/E8WS-HHGT] (interviewing researcher Raj
Chetty on his findings regarding spatial inequality in Chicago).
86 See generally ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT,
WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 20-21 (1997) (describing the
Supreme Court’s rejection of a constitutional right to welfare).
87 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974). More recently, the Court continued its retreat
from (some would say its attack on) integration remedies by invalidating race-conscious integration
strategies. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709-11 (2007)
(rejecting school district’s plan which used race as a criterion to determine which school a child
attends). On the long-term effects of the Milliken decision, including ongoing white flight and
suburban resegregation, see Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62
UCLA L. REV. 364, 428-41 (2015).
88 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973).
89 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1977).
90 See RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970S 4 (Bruce J.
Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008) (explaining the impact of the political conservatism
movement of the 1970s that influenced conservative social values and regulatory oversight in the
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s). For a description of the waning political will to desegregate since the 1960s,
see Matthew Delmont, The Lasting Legacy of the Busing Crisis, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-boston-busing-crisis-was-never-intendedto-work/474264 [https://perma.cc/6ND9-T9KF].
91 The most well-recognized study in the “moving to opportunity” literature is the Chetty
study. See Raj Chetty, The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from
the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855 (2016) (researching long-term
impacts of a move to a lower-poverty neighborhood on young children in poor communities).
92 Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, Emmanuel Saez, & Nicholas Turner, Is the
United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational Mobility, 104 AM. ECON.
REV. 141, 141 (2014) (“[T]he consequences of the ‘birth lottery’ . . . are larger today than in the past.”).
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from low-income places to higher-income places, and so has become a central
target for reformers.93 Fair housing advocates in previous eras had, of course,
sought to “open up” the suburbs for similar reasons—the Mount Laurel court
certainly understood the relationship between housing restrictions and
inequitable public services. The moving to opportunity argument against zoning,
however, seems to have gained increased traction recently.94
These two spatial inequality concerns intersect with a third set of ideas, again
led by economists, who argue that land use laws—by limiting in-migration to
high-housing-cost metropolitan areas—are responsible for reducing overall
economic growth.95 These claims can be quite dramatic. Some theorists have
argued that zoning has cost the economy over 50% in lost aggregate growth.96
These numbers are large and have led policymakers to place land use reform at
the center of debates over economic growth and wealth creation.
This productivity argument against zoning is grounded in a renewed
appreciation for the benefits of agglomeration economies. Agglomeration
theorists assert that co-location in physical space is a chief source of economic
innovation and growth.97 The concept is as old as cities themselves:
agglomeration provides an explanation for both cities’ existence and
urbanization’s positive relationship to economic development. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, claims about the productivity gains attributable to agglomeration
have coincided with the global urban resurgence. The literature serves as both
an explanation of and justification for the return to the cities and underwrites a
celebration of increased urban development. Because land use restrictions like
zoning seem to be hostile to agglomeration, they are immediately suspect: by
limiting density and raising the cost of housing, zoning reduces spatial proximity
and therefore the productivity of regional economies.98 Fixing land use by
See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Gareth Cook, The Economist Who Would Fix the American Dream, ATLANTIC (July
17, 2019, 3:47 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/08/raj-chettys-americandream/592804 [https://perma.cc/RL2L-YZ6P] (describing recent research by Raj Chetty seeking to
validate the moving to opportunity experiment, and discussing the government’s dilatory approach
to relocating families to opportunity-rich neighborhoods).
95 Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation, AM. ECON. J.:
MACROECONOMICS, Apr. 2019 at 1, 2 (“Instead of increasing local employment, productivity growth in
housing-constrained cities primarily pushes up housing prices and . . . lowers aggregate output . . . .”).
96 Id. at 2; see also Schleicher, supra note 32, at 103 n.101 (collecting different articles studying
the effects of land use regulations on national economic growth).
97 See generally EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL
EQUILIBRIUM (2008).
98 Herkenhoff et al., supra note 70, at 3 (describing land use policies which “reduce[] factor
reallocation and depress[] output and productivity”); Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 95, at 1
(“Misallocation arises because the constraints on housing supply [due to land use restrictions]
effectively limit the number of workers who have access to such high productivity.”); Joseph Gyourko
& Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply 1, 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 20536, 2014) (examining land use regulation as “the single most important influence on the
93
94
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eliminating zoning and lifting other restrictions on housing development would,
on this account, be a boon to the national economy.99
The productivity argument against zoning has combined with the moving
to opportunity and reparations arguments, linking land use reformers with freemarket inclinations to those who are interested in remedying historic spatial
inequality.100 The resulting coincidence of racial justice and libertarianism,
spatial redistribution and market freedom, has found a ready target in land
use and developmental restrictions of all kinds. Indeed, combined with
existing critiques of zoning, it would appear that restrictive land use laws are
responsible for almost every conceivable social ill: racial segregation,
intergenerational inequality, gender inequity, sprawl, climate change, and
reduced or stagnant economic growth.101
To be sure, this seemingly universal distaste for land use restrictions
among reform-minded scholars and policymakers is ultimately being given
political momentum by housing need. In this way, the current anti-zoning
consensus mirrors the pro-zoning consensus that obtained in the Progressive
Era and for generations thereafter. The realization of zoning’s adverse effects
was not enough to eliminate it during another period of reform in the late
1960s and early 1970s. In large part that is because in 1975, when Mount Laurel
was decided, the political energy of the middle class pointed squarely in the
direction of suburban development. By contrast, today, though suburbanstyle development still dominates in many places, the middle class’s political
energy is starting to point toward the central city instead of away from it—
especially in coastal cities.

supply of homes”); Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S.
Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76, 89-90 (2017) (concluding that restrictions in housing supply
explains the decline in income convergence across states); Robert C. Ellickson, The Zoning StraitJacket: The Freezing of American Neighborhoods of Single-Family Houses 3-6 (Jan. 30, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507803 (describing a “zoning strait-jacket”
that impairs “attainment of agglomeration efficiencies”).
99 See Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Michael Storper, Housing, Urban Growth and Inequalities: The
Limits to Deregulation and Upzoning in Reducing Economic and Spatial Inequality, 57 URB. STUD. 223, 225
(2020) (describing this consensus as the “housing-as-opportunity” view of inter-regional inequality).
100 See David Imbroscio, Rethinking Exclusionary Zoning or: How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to
Love It, 57 URB. AFFS. REV. 214, 216-17 (2019) (describing this convergence of socioeconomic inequities).
101 See Kahlenberg, supra note 36 (racial and economic segregation); RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM
HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IS LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE
DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 96-106 (2017) (intergenerational
inequality); Noah M. Kazis, Fair Housing for a Non-Sexist City, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1683, 1735-45 (2021)
(gender inequity); William A. Fischel, The Evolution of Homeownership, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1503, 1525
(2010) (reviewing LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND
PROPERTY LINES (2009)) (urban sprawl); Scott Wiener & Daniel Kammen, Why Housing Policy Is
Climate Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/opinion/californiahome-prices-climate.html [https://perma.cc/H5X9-LECH] (climate change).
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Multiple other factors contribute to inequality and therefore housing
insecurity at the turn of the twenty-first century. The hollowing out of the
middle class, deindustrialization, a set of social welfare, tax, and anti-union
policies since the 1970s and 80s that slowly (and then more quickly)
redistributed income from the bottom to the top are arguably more responsible
for inequality.102 But land use reform responds to an immediate concern that
is widely shared, especially by the white middle class: affordable housing.
In this way, the anti-zoning movement is predictably responsive to
emerging political forces. Certain metropolitan-area housing markets are
equally out of reach for middle-class white people and poor Black people.
Eliminating development barriers fits into a political space that can be
increasingly occupied by both the political left and the right: removal of barriers
to entry, increasing opportunity, and freeing the market for development.103
This confluence suggests that the current anti-zoning moment may be an
example of what Derrick Bell famously described as “interest convergence.”104
Bell claims that Black people only obtain rights or reforms when those rights or
reforms also serve the interests of white people. Anti-zoning rhetoric often
sounds in the register of racial equality—and rightly so—but what is driving land
use reform is, unsurprisingly, middle-class white people’s desire for housing.
The historical arc of land use reform supports this hypothesis. Well before
Mount Laurel was decided, policymakers were aware that discriminatory
housing policies restricted Black people to overcrowded and underserved
neighborhoods. The Kerner Commission Report was clear-eyed about the
effects of segregated housing policies on Black opportunity. But the land use
project that could have been sparked by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
decision never materialized. As long as there was plentiful cheap housing in
the suburbs, the land use reform project stalled. As Bell observes, the scope
102 Much research has detailed reasons for middle-class decline. See Edward N. Wolff, Household
Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered? 37-38 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24085, 2017) (middle-class debt levels following the great
recession); PIKETTY, supra note 20, at 382 (identifying education and technology mismatch);
Anderson, supra note 25, at 526-27 (highlighting the opioid crisis and predatory landlords); Stansbury
& Summers, supra note 20, at 9 (attributing the decline to weakened union power).
103 This may explain conservative support for removing barriers to development. See, e.g.,
Emily Badger, Trump Wants to Cut Regulations That Block New Housing, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/upshot/trump-regulations-build-new-housing.html [https://
perma.cc/Q8PA-97RV] (“[T]he case for building more housing is bipartisan . . . .”); Charles
Marohn, It’s Time To Abolish Single-Family Zoning, AM. CONSERVATIVE (July 3, 2020, 12:01 AM),
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/urbs/its-time-to-abolish-single-family-zoning [https://
perma.cc/VYN5-K699] (“[T]he conservative thing for suburban leaders to do here is to . . . show
those progressives running the big cities that we live by our principles, that we embrace vibrant
markets and free people, by preemptively repealing single-family zoning.”).
104 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
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and nature of racial justice reforms are always limited by the degree of
convergence with white people’s interests.105 That is an important lesson
when considering the limitations of the anti-zoning reform project.
II. THE LIMITS OF CENTRALIZATION
The current zoning reform project makes two main claims: first, that
eliminating barriers to construction will lower housing costs (the “build,
build, build”106 imperative); and second, that such reforms are likely to be
resisted by local governments and therefore should be undertaken statewide
or nationally. Anti-zoning reformers are willing to pursue reform locally. But
most are skeptical that NIMBY homeowners and their NIMBY local
governments will act anything other than parochially. Local land use
restrictions must be policed by a higher-level entity—either by a court
striking down land use restrictions or by the state legislature preempting
them—or the politics of local exclusion will invariably prevail.107
This Part and the next critiques these two arguments, starting with the
argument for centralization.108 While reformers should not, of course, “stop
worrying and learn to love [exclusionary zoning],”109 they should be realistic
about the limits of state land use reform and the significant downsides of the
105 Id. Notably, the political limits of that convergence were evident in the defeat of California’s
first attempt at a sweeping land use reform bill in 2018. S.B. 827 was opposed by numerous
progressive groups representing low-income and minority tenants. See Dillon, supra note 27
(describing the debate around the bill).
106 The phrase has been made famous by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his
government’s promise to “build, build, build.” Finn Williams & David Chipperfield, Opinion, Boris
Johnson Is Wrong to Blame the Housing Crisis on Overregulation, GUARDIAN (July 11, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/11/boris-johnson-wrong-housing-crisisoverregulation [https://perma.cc/SK2N-FSEY].
107 This claim has become conventional wisdom among reformers. See, e.g., Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Beyond the Double Veto: Housing Plans as Preemptive Intergovernmental Compacts, 71
HASTINGS L.J. 79, 129-30 (2019) (proposing intergovernmental compacts to preempt restrictive land
use laws); Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of States in Liberalizing Land Use Regulations, 97 N.C. L. REV.
293, 345-48 (2019) (arguing that pro-development groups will be more successful at the state level);
Kenneth Stahl, Home Rule and State Preemption of Local Land Use Control, 50 URB. LAW. 179, 209-12
(2020) (cautioning against a California ballot measure to preserve local control against preemption);
Kenneth A. Stahl, “Yes in My Backyard”: Can a New Pro-Housing Movement Overcome the Power of
NIMBYs?, 41 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Mar. 2018, at 1, 8 (2018) (suggesting YIMBYs focus reform
efforts at the state level); Ezra Rosser, The Euclid Proviso, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 48) (on file with author) (advocating state or regional regulation of local zoning).
108 For a brief but relevant related critique arguing that centralized anti-poverty efforts are a
mistake, see Gerald E. Frug, Against Centralization, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 31, 33-34 (2000).
109 See Imbroscio, supra note 100 (paying homage to Dr. Strangelove: Or, How I Stopped Worrying
and Learned to Love the Bomb). For critical responses to Imbroscio’s essay, see generally Urban
Colloquy on Exclusionary Zoning, 57 URB. AFFS. REV. 214, 252-97 (2021). For Imbroscio’s replies to
the critiques in the Colloquy, see Stop Worrying (So Much) About Exclusionary Zoning and Fight Our
Real Enemies: A Reply to my Critics, 57 URB. AFFS. REV. 298, 299-311-311 (2021).
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broader anti-localism of a state-led land use reform project. That is because,
first, state-led land use reform is likely to disappoint, and second, it will
undercut important city-based efforts to pursue economic equality.
A. The Inherent Limitations of State Land Use Reform
At the outset, it is important to note that most states have not adopted
any significant affordable housing or fair share housing mandates. A few
states—New Jersey, California, and Oregon are examples—adopted statelevel housing or land use provisions in the 1970s and early 1980s, but these
remain outliers.110 So, too, despite decades of advocacy meant to advance
regional government and encourage city-county consolidation—in large part
to limit the effects of exclusionary zoning—there are relatively few true
regional governments in the United States.111 States are much more likely to
preempt local affordable housing efforts rather than to encourage them.112 As
a result, any headway on affordable housing in most states will have to take
place at the local level.
The fact that most states are absent from or affirmatively hostile to
policies targeting exclusionary zoning is meant to illustrate a larger point. For
decades—and certainly since Mount Laurel was decided in 1975—land use
reformers have argued that local governments are unable and unwilling to
jettison exclusionary zoning practices and that state intervention is therefore
necessary, for two reasons. First, local governments are trapped in a collective
action problem: because they are each competing for high-paying, low-cost
residents, they cannot forgo exclusionary policies without risking their fiscal
health.113 But each local government’s exclusionary policies exacerbate
regional housing shortages, leading to reduced welfare overall. Second, local
governments—especially suburban local governments—are dominated by
homeowners, whose investment in residential real estate makes them wary of
development that might lead to a decline in their property values.114 Without
110 See John R. Nolon, Golden and Its Emanations: The Surprising Origins of Smart Growth, 23
PACE ENV’T L. REV. 757, 812 (2006) (noting that “New Jersey’s aggressive, state-mandated fair share
housing policy has been emulated timidly in just a few states” and that in most states neither
regionalism nor reform movements have succeeded in controlling local planning outcomes); Jessie
Agatstein, The Suburbs’ Fair Share: How California’s Housing Element Law (and Facebook) Can Set a
Housing Productions Floor, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 219, 219-20 (2015) (describing how fair share programs
have only been “implemented in a half-dozen states around the country”).
111 See Schragger, supra note 18, at 112 (“American localism is deeply entrenched and the idea
of regional government has never been popular.”).
112 See infra Section II.B and sources cited in note 141.
113 See Hills, supra note 51, at 1614-18 (“Exclusionary zoning is a rational way for individual
municipalities to reduce the risks of these fiscal, political, and social costs.”).
114 See Lemar, supra note 107, at 346 (“Because most homeowners concentrate their wealth in a
single asset, their home, they are extremely motivated to oppose any development that might decrease
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state intervention, there is no way to generate the local political will to
increase construction, especially of low- to moderate-income housing.
These arguments are well-rehearsed in the literature. But few have sought
to explain why, if local governments are unwilling to jettison their exclusionary
tendencies, state elected officials would do it for them.115 State legislators do
not represent separate “state” citizens nor a government apparatus detached
from the local political economy. Just like local officials, state officials
represent their “local” citizens—who are often single-family homeowners
residing in suburban jurisdictions.116 To the extent that suburban homeowners
dominate local politics, they are also likely to dominate state politics.
The general unwillingness of state legislatures to entertain land use
reform suggests that the politics of exclusion are powerful at the state level.117
New Jersey is a case in point. Unconstrained by electoral demands, the New
Jersey Supreme Court struck down exclusionary zoning by fiat. But it could
not turn that ruling into the necessary administrative and legislative
momentum because it could not gain more than the begrudging cooperation
of the state legislature.
Indeed, the saga of land use reform in New Jersey is a cautionary tale.
Resistance immediately followed the Mount Laurel court’s initial decision;
ensuing decades of litigation and legislative bargaining repeatedly undercut
its force. In the last decade, Governor Chris Christie attempted to completely
dismantle the state’s affordable housing regime, though the courts resisted.118
Although some amount of affordable housing has been produced in New
the value of that asset . . . .”); FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 39 (“Local voters need to feel the financial pain
or gain of local decisions.”); cf. Katherine Levine Einstein, Maxwell Palmer, & David M. Glick, Who
Participates in Local Government? Evidence from Meeting Minutes, 17 PERSPS. ON POL. 28, 29 (2019) (noting
that participation in land use processes can amplify the voices of those who feel “concentrated costs”).
115 An exception is Anika Singh Lemar, who describes the willingness of state legislatures to
override local opposition to family day cares, manufactured housing, group homes, and alternative
energy infrastructure. See Lemar, supra note 107, at 305-45 (“[Housing] manufacturers and employers
are highly persuasive lobbies in state capitols.”).
116 Richard Florida, The Politics of Homeownership, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Aug. 28, 2018, 9:52
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-28/how-homeownership-contributes-topolitical-divides [https://perma.cc/CDW9-9C4B] (“[T]he political clout of homeowners goes
beyond local NIMBYism and zoning politics, extending to politics at the national level.”).
117 See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 1 (describing the defeat of multiple zoning reform bills in
California). The recently adopted Connecticut land use reform package, which fell significantly short of
YIMBY advocates’ expectations and has been described as “tame” and of limited threat to local land use
autonomy, is an example. See Cate Hewitt, Few See ‘Win,’ as House Approves Less Far-Reaching Housing Law,
CONN. EXAM’R (May 21, 2021), https://ctexaminer.com/2021/05/21/few-see-win-as-house-approves-less-farreaching-housing-law [https://perma.cc/P5B5-CSDH] (noting lukewarm reactions to the reform package).
118 Maddie Hanna, 40 Years Later, N.J. Courts, Towns Still Wrestling with A
‘ ffordable’ Housing, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/40-years-later-n-j-courts-towns-stillwrestling-with-affordable-housing-20171013.html [https://perma.cc/Z8JZ-N9Q9] (recounting the aftermath
to and recent developments in the Mount Laurel doctrine).
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Jersey after almost half of a century,119 it seems likely that the political cycling
will continue. There is no reason to believe that New Jersey suburbanites will
not push back on housing mandates should they begin to chafe too tightly,
especially if critics are right about the amount of land-based wealth that
zoning laws appear to protect.120
Other states, too, have seen few gains from state-wide land use reform
efforts, many of which began in the 1970s. In California and Oregon, statelevel land use regimes have been in place since the mid- to late-1970s,121 but
housing prices have continued to increase dramatically over that period.122
And despite a long history of progressive state politics and a forward-looking
regional government, metropolitan Minneapolis/St. Paul has moved
backwards in terms of integration and affordability.123 Zoning reform seems

119 The number of affordable units that have actually been constructed is difficult to determine,
but it is estimated between 30,000-80,000. See Laura Denker, At Stake in Hearing: How Many
Affordable Houses N.J. Must Provide, FAIR SHARE HOUS. CTR. (June 22, 2016),
https://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/at-stake-in-hearing-how-many-affordable-houses-n.j.-mustprovide [https://perma.cc/4U2H-5E6X] (“New Jersey has built about 80,000 housing units for lowand middle-income households since 1985, [Fair Share Housing Center Executive Director Kevin]
Walsh said.”); Richard H. Chused, Mount Laurel: Hindsight Is 20-20, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 813, 823
n.42 (2011) (noting claims that 40,000 units have been built that, while significant, are “only a small
fraction of the actual need for such housing in New Jersey”); John M. Payne, The Paradox of Progress:
Three Decades of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 5 J. PLAN. HIST. 126, 134 (2006) (estimating that the
Mount Laurel doctrine has accounted for 30,000 units). During that period the state’s population
increased by over 2.1 million. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., supra note 47 (recording a population of 7.1
million in 1970 and 9.2 million in 2020).
120 At the extreme end, some economists have attributed upwards of 75% of land values across
the country to restrictive land use ordinances. Others have argued that this percentage is grossly
overstated. For the debate, see infra Part IV. If true, however, eliminating those land use restrictions
would eliminate trillions of dollars of property wealth, something no level of government would
ever be inclined to do.
121 See Randal O’Toole, The Planning Tax: The Case Against Regional Growth-Management
Planning, POL’Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., D.C.), Dec. 6, 2007, at 5-6, https://www.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-606.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ5K-L9VY] (describing regional
growth-management schemes in Oregon and California).
122 See FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, All-Transactions House Price Index for California,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CASTHPI [https://perma.cc/UT9T-UYD4] (showing a sevenfold
increase in house prices in California since 1975); FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, All-Transactions
House Price Index for Oregon, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ORSTHPI [https://perma.cc/63JABMJ3] (showing a sixfold increase in house prices in Oregon since 1975).
123 See UNIV. MINN. L. SCH., INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, WHY ARE THE TWIN
CITIES SO SEGREGATED? 1 (2015), https://www.minnpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/
files/attachments/WhyAretheTwinCitiesSoSegregated22615.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YZV-E5DP]
(“Since the start of the twenty-first century, the number of severely segregated schools in the Twin
Cities area has increased more than sevenfold; the population of segregated, high-poverty
neighborhoods has tripled.”).
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likely to do just enough to assuage some relevant constituencies, but not
enough to produce real gains.124
The troubled history of state and federal involvement in local land use
provides another reason for centralization skepticism. Even when seemingly
well-intentioned, state and federal policies have often caused more harm than
good. Indeed, central governments have done affirmative damage with their
land use and development policies—at least to minority and poor
populations. Euclidean zoning itself was a product of a national law reform
process.125 While implemented locally, zoning was developed and promoted
centrally. So, too, as already noted, the suburban century was underwritten
by massive federal dollars: federal highway funds, mortgage guarantees, urban
renewal monies, and federal public housing, all of which were administered
in discriminatory and suburb-favoring ways.126 Redlining of poor and Black
communities was a result of federal lending standards, not local ones.127
Urban renewal monies that financed the displacement of thousands of Black
citizens were spent locally and with local input, but federal monies provided
the means for redevelopment.128 And federal place-based investment tax
incentives continue to be designed to foster gentrification instead of poor
relief, as Michelle Layser has pointed out.129

124 To be sure, states sometimes override local exclusionary ordinances that target vulnerable
populations, see Lemar, supra note 107, at 305-31, though the circumstances in which legislatures are
willing to do so have thus far been fairly narrow. Connecticut’s 2021 effort at wholesale land use
reform, which resulted in comparatively modest changes to local zoning rules, is instructive. See
Hewitt, supra note 117 (describing the law as “a compromise that satisfied neither housing advocates
. . . nor opponents of state-mandated zoning”).
125 See Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st Century,
22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895, 916-17 (2016) (describing the development of the model zoning code);
Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent
Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 13-19 (2003) [hereinafter Public Menace] (describing how the
national rhetoric around “urban blight” facilitated urban renewal and the use of eminent domain by
national planning organizations).
126 See supra Section III.B.
127 See Tracy Jan, Redlining Was Banned 50 Years Ago. It’s Still Hurting Minorities Today., WASH.
POST (Mar. 28, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/28/
redlining-was-banned-50-years-ago-its-still-hurting-minorities-today [https://perma.cc/AEY3-ZXE6]
(“The Federal Housing Administration institutionalized the system of discriminatory lending in
government-backed mortgages, reflecting local race-based criteria in their underwriting practices
and reinforcing residential segregation in American cities.”).
128 Cf. Public Menace, supra note 125, at 47 (“In cities across the country, urban renewal came
to be known as ‘Negro removal.’”) (internal citation omitted).
129 See Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives
and a Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019 WISC. L. REV. 745, 771-84 (highlighting the role
of place-based incentives in gentrification).

154

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 125

Moreover, pro-market housing policies cannot readily address the
structural factors that have led to the fiscalization of land use.130 State law
dictates the boundaries of local jurisdictions, limits the ability for cities to
annex adjoining territory and expand their tax base, provides that local
schools will be funded with predominantly local dollars, constrains cities’
taxing authority by imposing tax and expenditure limitations, and provides
distressed municipalities with little support in providing for the basic
municipal needs of their citizenry.131 Land use has become a chief instrument
of local fiscal policy because local governments often have few other ways to
generate revenue. Local officials must be attentive to their tax base, which is
entirely a product of what taxable entities happen to reside in the jurisdiction.
Attracting those taxable entities and keeping them thus becomes local
governments’ central fiscal mission. These structural state-created forces
push against inclusionary housing, but they are rarely on the table when
legislatures consider zoning reform.
All of which is to say that centralization of land use authority is unlikely
to produce fairer outcomes than what can be obtained in particular cities.
Advocates of state reform either romanticize state majoritarianism or seek to
take advantage of the supposedly superior deal-making opportunities
available in the state legislature. Both approaches treat local lawmaking as
inferior, but as compared to what and for whom?
Consider first the suggestion that state lawmaking is more representative
than local lawmaking. Studies of local government land use processes
document the disproportionate participation of white and relatively wealthier
citizens, who have the time, inclination, and resources that enable them to
attend local meetings and influence outcomes.132 But the disproportionate

130 Hanushek & Yilmaz, supra note 52, at 560 (detailing how zoning laws can be used to
segregate lower-income residents from wealthier neighborhoods); Christopher Serkin, Divergence in
Land Use Regulations and Property Rights, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1085 (2019) (noting that market
forces in land use fail to account for other positive externalities); Robert W. Wassmer, Fiscalisation
of Land Use, Urban Growth Boundaries and Non-Central Retail Sprawl in the Western United States, 39
URB. STUD. 1307, 1308 (2002) (“[A] purely market-based approach to defining excessive spatial
growth ignores the institutional environment in which economic actors in a metropolitan area make
land-use decisions.”).
131 Schragger, supra note 69, at 1564-77 (describing the conflict between state and city land
use policies).
132 See, e.g., KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN, DAVID M. GLICK, & MAXWELL PALMER,
NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDERS: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS AND AMERICA’S HOUSING CRISIS
95-114 (2020) (explaining how the active participants in neighborhood meetings present an
unrepresentative sample of the city’s residents as a whole); Emily Badger, The Pandemic has Pushed
Aside City Planning Rules. But to Whose Benefit?, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/07/20/upshot/pandemic-city-planning-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/QQN9RQCK] (“The people who show up for such meetings, thus shaping what kind of housing is built,
tend to be older, whiter, higher-income and homeowners.”).
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influence of educated or moneyed interests is not confined to local
governments. State and national politics are equally, if not more, afflicted by
an imbalance between those who have the means to exercise influence and
those who do not.133 State legislatures’ political pathologies—including
minoritarian control, capture by corporate interests, and failures of statewide
plebiscitary processes134—are by now well-known. Yet, as Miriam Seifter
argues, state legislatures are still often viewed as majoritarian correctives to
local parochialism, when in fact state legislatures are in many ways “the least
majoritarian branch.”135
Taking advantage of these state-level political process failures, however,
might be the point for market-favoring land use reformers. A second view
holds that state legislatures are better sites for legislative deal-making than
are local governments. Affordable housing advocates can and should therefore
form strategic statewide alliances with developers, large landowners, real
estate investors, and the building trades, as those groups predictably enjoy
significant influence in state capitols and may have the resources and interests
to overcome local homeowner/NIMBY resistance.
This strategy, however, has a substantial flaw—the resulting state
legislation will reflect the interests of those powerful groups. Any
convergence with the goals of low-income housing advocates seems likely to
be limited and temporary, if not destructive.136
Indeed, the outcome of a strategic state land use reform process will likely
result in legislation that does little to encourage low-income housing in
exclusionary suburbs while providing developers significant power to
override opposition in newly popular cities and in the lower-income
communities that are under significant development pressure. As the history

133 On plutocratic governance in states, see generally ALEX HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, STATE
CAPTURE: HOW CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISTS, BIG BUSINESS, AND WEALTHY DONORS
RESHAPED THE AMERICAN STATES—AND THE NATION 10-15 (2019).
134 See generally id. at 12; JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF
THE URBAN-RURAL POLITICAL DIVIDE 2-3 (2019). For a recent treatment, see Miriam Seifter,
Countermajoritarian Legislatures, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, 3, 8, 21) (“[M]any
state legislatures either are under minority party control or afford bare majority parties significant
(even supermajority) cushions. Both of these distortions are on prominent display in many states
today, where patterns of geographic settlement and deliberate gerrymandering exacerbate the
inherent skews of districted elections.”).
135 Seifter, supra note 134, at 32.
136 Consider mobile homes. As Lemar notes with approval, supra note 107, at 318, the
manufactured housing industry has successfully lobbied to preempt restrictive local zoning bans in
thirty states. But tenant protections for mobile home residents are also extremely weak. As one
commentator has observed, “The vulnerability of these residents is part of the business
model. . . . This is a captive class of tenant.” Sheelah Kolhatkar, Trailer-Park Trades, THE NEW
YORKER, March 15, 2021, at 32, 33. See generally ESTHER SULLIVAN, MANUFACTURED
INSECURITY: MOBILE HOME PARKS AND AMERICANS’ TENUOUS RIGHT TO PLACE 10-30 (2018).
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of Euclidean zoning illustrates, developers are not opposed to zoning, in large
part because housing consumers in suburban locales are generally in favor of
it. What developers tend to disfavor are mandates: local inclusionary zoning
ordinances, rent control, and other tenant-based protections are a popular
target of developers and market-oriented land use reformers,137 so one might
predict that statewide preemptive legislation will bar local governments from
adopting those types of ordinances.
Centralization of decision-making is theoretically a solution to
spillovers—the assumption is that enlarging the sphere prevents local antidevelopment factions from foisting costs onto their neighbors.138 But the fact
is that internal neighborhood interests and political divisions are always
present, no matter how large the unit. Regional governments, for example,
still spend less on certain neighborhoods within the jurisdiction and still
locate less desirable land uses in politically weaker communities.139 State
governments still compete with other states to attract desirable mobile capital
and deflect undesirable and costly users of state services. Indeed, in larger
political units, minority interests are often less likely to prevail.140 While one
might technically solve the spillover effect of certain policies across
jurisdictions by extending the political sphere, the problems inside the
borders still remain. Exclusion can happen just as easily inside the gates of
the jurisdiction as it does between jurisdictions.
B. The Problem of Preemption
The denigration of local power has another effect: it countenances state
preemptive intervention of those cities that would otherwise adopt
progressive housing policies. Many more states preempt local affordable
housing efforts than permit them—and even fewer mandate such policies.
But this is part of a more widespread trend in state-local relations. State
hostility to local policymaking, especially policies intended to address

137 See Benjamin Schneider, CityLab University: Inclusionary Zoning, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (July 17,
2018, 4:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-17/inclusionary-zoning-everythingyou-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/2JNL-NDGU] (noting that “While builders and developers express
a range of opinions on IZ, they are usually the primary opponents of these policies.”).
138 See Been et al., supra note 11, at 26 (suggesting that a “potential localized spillover effect[]
from newly constructed housing” could be that “new housing will increase rents and trigger
displacement” in surrounding neighborhoods) ; John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 113-20 (2014) (“Increasing supply in high-demand, high-cost neighborhoods . . .
will reduce demand and moderate housing cost increased in outlying lower-cost neighborhoods.”).
139 Schragger, supra note 18, at 111-14 (explaining how wealthy suburban communities use their
political capital to steer desirable land uses away from politically weaker communities).
140 See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
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economic inequality, has been increasing.141 Skepticism of localism in the land
use arena easily morphs into state dominance across all fields, and that
exercise of state power is increasingly anti-redistributive.
Consider the epidemic of state preemption. State legislatures have been
keen to preempt local laws across large swaths of public policy. Recent
examples include bans on local minimum wage ordinances, sugary soft drink
taxes, plastic bag regulations, fracking restrictions, LGBTQ antidiscrimination laws, employment and labor regulations, green building codes,
police defunding, and sanctuary city provisions.142 State officials have
preempted local mask ordinances, eviction moratoria, and business closing
laws, as well.143 In many states, local affordable housing regulations of various
kinds are also barred by state law, including rent control, inclusionary zoning,
and affordable housing impact fees;144 the eviction crisis has highlighted the
many ways in which state law prohibits local efforts to protect vulnerable
tenants.145

141 There is an already large literature on the rise of hostile and punitive state preemption. For
a sample of the literature, see Briffault, supra note 21, at 1997-99; Paul A. Diller, The Political Process
of Preemption, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 343 (2020); Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering
of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469 (2018); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on
American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018); Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, Preempting Politics:
State Power and Local Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361 (2020); and Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption,
Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 133 (2017). For cases and commentary, see
RICHARD BRIFFAULT, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & LAURIE REYNOLDS, THE NEW PREEMPTION
READER (2019).
142 See Schragger, supra note 141, at 1163 (“State-city conflicts over the municipal minimum
wage, LGBT antidiscrimination, and sanctuary city laws have garnered the most attention, but these
conflicts are representative of a larger trend toward state aggrandizement.”).
143 See, e.g., Scott Neuman, Georgia’s Governor Issues Order Rescinding Local Mask Mandates, NPR (July
16, 2020, 3:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/07/16/891718516/georgiasgovernor-issues-order-rescinding-local-mask-mandates [https://perma.cc/7J68-CBQ2] (discussing how
Georgia’s governor is overruling local mask mandates in favor of the state’s guidelines, which are more relaxed).
144 See Press Release, Nat’l League of Cities, State Preemption of Local Authority Continues
to Rise, According to New Data From the National League of Cities (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.nlc.org/article/state-preemption-of-local-authority-continues-to-rise-according-tonew-data-from-the [https://perma.cc/8SLS-FKD4] (“As preemption proliferates, local leaders are
prevented from keeping people safe, expanding rights, building stronger economies, and promoting
innovation.”); State Preemption of Local Equitable Housing Policies, LOC. SOLS. SUPPORT CTR.,
https://www.supportdemocracy.org/equitablehousing/ [https://perma.cc/WN36-J872] (discussing
four types of state preemption policies that interfere with local laws).
145 On evictions, see Jessica Lussenhop, Coronavirus: Why US Is Expecting an ‘Avalanche’ of
Evictions, BBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53088352
[https://perma.cc/M83A-PWJE]. On state preemption of eviction and tenant protections, see LOC.
HOUS. SOLS., JUST CAUSE EVICTION POLICIES, https://www.localhousingsolutions.org/act/housingpolicy-library/just-cause-eviction-policies-overview/just-cause-eviction-policies [https://perma.cc/2X6NZ7KY] (last visited Sept. 18, 2021); Nestor M. Davidson & Kim Haddow, State Preemption and Local Responses
in the Pandemic, AM. CONST. SOC’Y: ACS BLOG (June 22, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/statepreemption-and-local-responses-in-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/L4EM-F83S].
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This explosion of state preemptive laws has been driven by a number of
factors: the increasing policy distance between cities and state legislatures;
gerrymandered state legislative districts that reduce urban representation; the
aggressive preemptive efforts of corporate and industry interests; the
nationalization of state and local political cultures; and the rural/urban cultural
and political divide.146 While sometimes attributed to the red-state/blue-city
divide, with Republican-dominated state governments seeking to “rein-in”
Democratic-leaning cities, preemption is also common in states that do not fit
that pattern. Deregulatory preemption—in which the state simply bars locals
from regulating without adopting its own statutory framework—has become
more widespread. Punitive preemption is also on the rise, as states seek not
only to override local laws but to punish local officials with removal from office
and local communities with loss of state funding.147
State legislators have long used local governments—and cities in
particular—to advance their own political, financial, and personal aims. State
legislative overreach in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often
involved state laws that committed city funds to particular franchises,
monopolies, and utilities.148 These abuses generated Progressive Era efforts
to protect a local sphere of “home rule” from corrupt state intervention.
Constitutional reform was aimed at protecting cities from state-level political
machines. Once freed from state machines, the idea was that cities could at
least tackle their own problems of internal governance without interference.
The rise of hyper-preemption149 in the states—which most often targets
city governments—suggests that jettisoning home rule is both premature and
unwise. In an era of urban decline, home rule may have protected exclusionary
suburbs from redistributive efforts. But suburban decline and the urban
resurgence have switched the balance of regional power in many places. Cities
now enjoy more economic clout. The spike in preemptive state laws is in part
a reflection of this new urban assertiveness and the gap between city and state
interests. That gap suggests that a significant threat to affordable housing
policymaking is state legislative overreach.

146 See Schragger, supra note 141 (discussing various forms of cultural and political antiurbanism). See generally HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 133 (describing how corporate interest
groups have captured the state legislative process); RODDEN, supra note 134(ascribing city-state
conflict to the concentration of Democratic votes in urban areas).
147 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 21, at 1997 (“Several states have adopted punitive preemption
laws that do not merely nullify inconsistent local rules—the traditional effect of preemption—but
rather impose harsh penalties on local officials or governments simply for having such measures on
their books.”)
148 Cf. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2281-85 (2003) (discussing
the role of city governments in raising and distributing revenues during the nineteenth century).
149 Scharff, supra note 141, at 1494 (formulating the concept of hyper-preemption).

2021]

The Perils of Land Use Deregulation

159

Preemptive state land use laws have a number of concerning effects. First,
by definition, they limit or eliminate city leverage in regulating and
negotiating with property owners, creating by-right development baselines
that cannot be avoided. Nestor Davidson and Timothy Mulvaney have
recently cataloged the panoply of state restrictions on the exercise of local
property regulation.150 Those limits include liability for regulations that
reduce the value of property, absolute bans on the exercise of eminent
domain, restrictions on local impact fees, limits on development moratoria,
and constraints on local historic preservation or environmental protection
ordinances.151 Davidson and Mulvaney argue that the balance between local
democratic control of development and individual property rights protection
is currently and already distorted in favor of the latter.152
Second, and relatedly, preemptive land use laws can make it difficult for
locals to address racially discriminatory siting. As already noted, low-income,
minority communities tend to be underrepresented in land use decisionmaking processes.153 They are also the cheapest to harm because they often
occupy the least expensive land.154 But it is no solution to the problem of local
underrepresentation to give property owners by-right entitlements. The lack
of zoning in places like Houston, for example, has not benefited low-income
communities, who have no effective means to protect themselves from the
discriminatory siting of undesirable land uses.155
Third, developer-favoring preemptive land use laws will make local
affordable housing regulations even more difficult to adopt. As Davidson and
Mulvaney observe, states already place limits on local rent control or affordable
housing linkage ordinances, impact fees, and other policies that protect low-

150 See Nestor M. Davidson & Timothy M. Mulvaney, Takings Localism, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
215, 218 (2021) (“[S]tate statutes impose significant procedural burdens on local governments . . . .”).
151 See id. at 231 (“[L]ocal governments play[] the primary regulatory role not only on questions
of zoning, subdivision regulation, development permitting, and other foundational matters of landuse law, but also—more controversially—in housing law, rent regulation, environmental protection,
historic preservation, and the like.”).
152 Id. at 221.
153 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
154 See EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 149 (observing that low-income communities are
under-represented in the land use process and that they “receive a disproportionate share of housing
development” in high-demand markets).
155 See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate
Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1403-06 (1994) (noting the disproportionate siting of
landfills and garbage incinerators in Black neighborhoods in Houston and suggesting the siting
process as a partial cause).
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income populations156 or that seek to drive land values downward.157 The push
to build more and faster will only further undercut those efforts.
Finally, the denigration and dilution of the principle of local autonomy
will further expose the city to hostile state control across a range of policies—
many of which would otherwise be redistributive. The virulent anti-city
posture of the Trump administration—mimicked in many cases by hostile
governors and legislatures—resulted in federal orders that purported to
control city decisions across a range of areas, including immigrant sanctuary,
Confederate monument removal, and violence prevention.158 The Biden
administration has moved to revisit or rescind these orders. But the point
remains: the inevitable political cycling in state and national governments
means that they are unreliable partners in pro-equity land use reform.
Indeed, the deregulatory thrust of current preemption trends coupled
with the history of state interference in city affairs suggests that statewide
land use legislation would be used to further weaken the already limited
influence of minority and poor urban constituencies in favor of large-scale
business or corporate capital.159 Those effects are especially acute during
periods of city growth when developer interests are particularly keen to gain

156 Davidson & Mulvaney, supra note 150, at 215; cf. State Preemption of Local Equitable Housing
Policies, supra note 144 (“But, just as cities are innovating, some states have been passing legislation
that takes away—’preempts’—local authority over critical areas of equitable housing policy.”); Maria
Diss, Bill Prohibiting Inclusionary Zoning Becomes Law, NBC MONTANA (Apr. 21, 2021), https://
nbcmontana.com/news/local/bill-prohibiting-inclusionary-zoning-becomes-law
[https://perma.cc/GY3W-DCY5] (“Inclusionary zoning refers to municipal ordinances that require
a given share of new construction be set aside for people with low to moderate incomes.”); Celine
Castronuovo, Iowa Governor Signs Law Allowing Landlords to Refuse Section 8 Vouchers, HILL (May 1,
2021, 1:10 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/551315-iowa-governor-signs-law-allowinglandlords-to-refuse-section-8-vouchers [https://perma.cc/GJ2C-38KG] (describing Iowa’s efforts to
subvert a HUD housing program for low-income renters).
157 See, e.g., PATRICK M. CONDON, SICK CITY: DISEASE, RACE, INEQUALITY AND URBAN
LAND 100 (2d ed. 2021) (“Municipal taxes on land already exist and can be used to lower land [r]ents.”).
158 See Protecting American Monuments, Memorials, and Statues and Combating Recent Criminal
Violence, Exec. Order No. 13,933, 85 Fed. Reg. 40,081 (June 26, 2020) (protecting monuments during
riots); Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg.
8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (condemning sanctuary jurisdictions); cf. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2017) (barring local jurisdictions and officials from adopting any law, rule, or practice that limits
enforcement of federal immigration law).
159 HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 133, at 13 (describing corporate influence in state
capitols); cf. EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 97 (concluding that poor minorities are
underrepresented in local land use decision making). Notably, in California, groups representing
low-income household successfully opposed recent state legislative land reform efforts. See, e.g.,
Gabrielle Canon, California’s Polarizing Housing Bill SB 50 Has Died in the State Senate, USA TODAY
(Jan. 30, 2020, 5:11 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/30/californiascontroversial-housing-bill-sb-50-fails/4614387002 [https://perma.cc/LGP8-J84P] (describing efforts
by “a diverse group of advocates” in California to defeat SB 50).
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from urban development. The increasing wealth of cities is an attractive
target for interests that exercise outsized power in state capitols.
At the same time, even in the absence of local land use authority, wealthier
neighborhoods within the city or in suburban jurisdictions would likely find
ways to protect their advantage. Privatizing restrictive land use is one way
that could occur. As Christopher Serkin has argued recently, the wealthy tend
to have better means to protect themselves through covenants, homeowners
associations, or nuisance litigation. Even in “unzoned” places, the retreat to
homeowners associations does most of the work that zoning would otherwise
accomplish.160 Another way that a wealthy suburban community can avoid
compliance with affordable housing rules would be to go slow on development
processes—easily done when local officials are tasked with the
implementation of state mandates.
As the history of the Mount Laurel litigation illustrates, even aggressive
statewide efforts to undermine suburban exclusionary tactics are likely to
produce only modest results.161 But the costs in terms of the loss of local
authority are high. Anti-zoning reformers may have their sights set on the
rich suburbs, but to the extent that their reforms are accompanied by antihome-rule rhetoric, their arrows will likely fall disproportionately on
progressive cities or struggling suburbs seeking to address affordability
concerns.162 Those communities are generally responsive to affordable
housing proposals, including increasing supply, and many would do more if
permitted by state law. Indeed, as a strategic matter, this political moment

160 See Serkin, supra note 9, at 754 (arguing that banning zoning will only induce increased
privatization of land use); David Montgomery, HOAs Are Popular Where Prejudice Is Strong and
Government Is Weak, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (June 4, 2019, 11:22 AM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2019-06-04/do-homeowners-associations-replace-local-law
[https://perma.cc/93WF-MD8N] (suggesting that individuals prefer HOAs, and are willing to pay
costly fees, because HOAs can operate as a form of exclusionary “private government.”).
161 Cf. BEN METCALF, DAVID GARCIA, IAN CARLTON & KATE MACFARLANE, TERNER CTR.
FOR HOUS. INNOVATION, WILL ALLOWING DUPLEXES AND LOT SPLITS ON PARCELS ZONED
FOR SINGLE-FAMILY CREATE NEW HOMES? 2 (2021) (“Relatively few new single-family parcels are
expected to become financially feasible for added units as a direct consequence of [SB9].”).
162 John Infranca has argued that some forms of land use exclusion, namely those practiced by
low-income communities of color as compared to wealthier enclaves, may be normatively justifiable.
Infranca, supra note 13. at 1323-24. A targeted state law could arguably distinguish the exclusion
practiced by those more “sensitive” or “vulnerable” communities, as one modified version of
California’s S.B. 50 sought to do after low-income tenant groups raised objections. Infranca, as well
as others who favor market-based reforms, however, oppose differential entitlements to exclude,
favoring some form of compensation instead. Id. at 1317. Though Infranca emphasizes distributional
justice concerns, most proposed payment schemes are focused on inducing locals to support
development by giving them a financial stake in its success—a kind of bribe for not opposing new
development. For a description of various proposals, see id. at 1319-26.
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appears similar to the Progressive Era insofar as it points toward increasing
local power across the board, not decreasing it.163
III. THE LIMITS OF DEREGULATION
In the current land use reform discourse, arguments for land use
centralization are regularly linked with calls for deregulation. Land use
protectionism is understood as a necessary feature of localism (“in my
backyard”); from the perspective of reformers, NIMBY and YIMBY
represent opposites: localism, regulation, and parochialism versus
centralization, deregulation, and cosmopolitanism. This part turns to the
second pillar of the zoning reform consensus—deregulation—and urges
caution as well. To be sure, some anti-zoning reformers recognize that lifting
supply constraints is not sufficient to provide affordable housing.164
Nevertheless, the major thrust of state law housing proposals in those states
considering them is directed toward increasing supply by eliminating barriers
to market-rate development, and the current land use reform movement
strongly emphasizes local supply constraints and the supposedly beneficial
impact of a deregulated housing market on regional housing prices.165
Is this faith in markets generally—and the housing market in particular—
warranted? The theory of land use deregulation is that it will lead to the
construction of more housing, which will lower prices for all housing
consumers.166 But recall that in 1970’s Mount Laurel, eliminating the local
ban on multi-family housing did not on its own provide housing to the
township’s low-income, minority residents.167 Mount Laurel’s restrictive
zoning laws were redundant for low-income households, who could never
afford market-rate housing in that location regardless of land use restrictions.
Those plaintiffs required subsidized housing, not market-rate housing.168
Likewise, eliminating exclusionary zoning in Mount Laurel did little to help
stabilize the neighboring city of Camden or assist the vast bulk of its lowincome, minority residents.

163 Cf. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 5
(2020), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Home-Rule-Principles-ReportWEB-2-1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/C9AG-FENP] (“At this critical juncture, the need to empower cities, towns
and villages is clear . . . .”).
164 See Been et al., supra note 11, at 26.
165 See infra Section III.A.
166 See infra Section III.A.
167 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
168 See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J. 1975) (describing the plaintiffs as low-income
and noting that they “still cannot afford the only kinds of housing realistically permitted in [Mount
Laurel] . . . .”).
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These observations are important for two reasons. The first is that the
supply-lowers-cost argument does not effectively address the problems of the
lower half of the housing market. And second, in asserting that supply should
always follow demand, the supply-lowers-cost claim does not address the
relationship between high-demand and low-demand places but rather
reinforces existing regional, inter-city hierarchies—again to the detriment of
lower-income communities.
A. Location, Location, Location
As to the first point, the housing market, even in the absence of legal
restrictions, does not usually (and may never) respond to the needs of lowincome or even moderate-income consumers in high-demand cities or
regions.169 Market advocates argue that increasing the supply of market-rate
housing will lower or at least stabilize housing prices overall, but at what price
point? The construction of more luxury housing in New York City may arguably
hold down or reduce luxury housing costs in New York City (though the
reductions might be small). But the claim that opening the door to more marketrate housing (i.e., very expensive housing) in an already high-demand city will
generate more “affordable” housing depends on a filtering theory of housing that
provides limited assurance to those who are displaced by market processes.170
The problem is that the effects of filtering can be quite attenuated while
the housing market generates market-rate units. In downtown San Diego, for
example, an estimated 10,000 units of affordable housing were lost while the
amount of market-rate housing stock doubled over the course of the last
decade.171 Indeed, the problem of housing expense is not at the high-end;
studies show that housing costs in high-demand areas have fallen for the top
quartile of the national income distribution but have at the same time risen
rapidly for the bottom half.172

169 The Mount Laurel court recognized this as well. Id. at 729, 722 n.8 (noting that some form
of subsidy is required to build affordable housing).
170 For a critique, see Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, supra note 99, at 240 (“There is also virtually
no evidence that substantially lower costs trickle down to the lower two-thirds of households or
provide quality upgrading of their neighborhoods.”). See also Laura S. Underkuffler, In Search of
Affordable Housing: How Deregulatory Strategies Fail the Poor, 9 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J.
227, 237 (2020) (“Despite their reputation as ‘affordable housing’ initiatives, zoning abolition
schemes generally contain no guarantee that they will result in the creation of any truly affordable
units for the urban poor.”).
171 See MURTAZA BAXAMUSA, A NEW MODEL FOR HOUSING FINANCE 7-8 (2020).
172 See Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, supra note 99, at 240 (“Housing costs have actually fallen for
the top quartile of the national income distribution in virtually all metro areas, but they have strongly
risen for the bottom half.”); see also Jared Brey, Housing in Brief: Rents Rise for the Poor, Drop for the Rich,
NEXT CITY (Mar. 26, 2021), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/housing-in-brief-rents-rise-for-the-poor-
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Moreover, the filtering process is unlikely to address affordability in a
particular location, even if it might eventually work its way across the regional
housing market. The filtering theory asserts that new market-rate housing will
be filled by those leaving older housing which in turn will become available to
those in lower income brackets, as housing moves down the income line.173 But
consider a study by Miriam Zuk and Karen Chapple finding that it would take
fifteen years for a moderate-income unit to filter down to a low-income
household in the San Francisco Bay area, and close to fifty more years for such
a unit to filter down to a very-low-income household.174 Even the most
optimistic filtering models take years to show effects.175
There are also mixed studies on the effects of new market-rate housing on
rents in specific locations. Some studies indicate a decrease in overall rents
from increased market-rate housing,176 but there are others that indicate the
opposite or very limited effects overall.177 Yonah Freemark’s oft-cited study
drop-for-the-rich [https://perma.cc/6JWR-GNPA] (describing a pattern in various metropolitan areas
of rents increasing for low-income households and decreasing for wealthier households).
173 See John M. Quigley & Steven Raphael, Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn’t It More
Affordable?, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS. 191, 205 (2004) (describing the filtering process); JOHN C.
WEICHER, FREDERICK J. EGGERS, & FOUAD MOUMEN, THE LONG-TERM DYNAMICS OF
AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING 159-60 tbl.6-3 (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.
org/files/publications/AffordableRentHousing2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NHC-MJG3] (identifying
between 20-50% of affordable housing in eight major metro areas as having filtered); Stuart S.
Rosenthal, Are Private Markets and Filtering a Viable Source of Low-Income Housing? Estimates From a
“Repeat Income” Model, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 687, 691-92 & tbl.1 (2014) (presenting data supporting
the filtering theory); Liyi Liu, Doug McManus, & Elias Yannopoulos, Geographic and Temporal
Variation in Housing Filtering Rates 1 (Mar. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (finding significant
geographic differences in filtering rates).
174 MIRIAM ZUK & KAREN CHAPPLE, BERKELEY INST. OF GOV’TAL STUD., HOUSING
PRODUCTION, FILTERING AND DISPLACEMENT: UNTANGLING THE RELATIONSHIPS 4 (2016),
https://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/udp_research_brief_052316.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FEL-BEJW] (estimating 15 years for units to filter to people earning 80% of the
median income, and 50 years to filter to those at 50%).
175 See Been et al., supra note 11, at 29 (citing WEICHER ET AL., supra note 173) (arguing that
filtering effects on housing value occurs over the long run and citing a study showing a filtering
effect occurring over roughly 30 years). But see Evan Mast, The Effect of New Market-Rate Housing
Construction on the Low-Income Housing Market 24 (W.E. Upjohn Inst. for Emp. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 19-307, 2019), https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1334&context=up_
workingpapers [https://perma.cc/2MWG-E4JD] (describing how this shift may occur in less than
five years); Cristina Bratu, Oskari Harjunen & Tuukka Saarimaa, City-Wide Effects of New
Housing Supply: Evidence from Moving Chains 3 (VATT Inst. for Econ. Rsch. Working Papers,
Paper No. 146, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abtract=3929243 (describing shift in under two years).
176 See, e.g., Brian J. Asquith, Evan Mast & Davin Reed, Supply Shock Versus Demand Shock: The
Local Effects of New Housing in Low-Income Areas 1 (W.E. Upjohn Inst. for Emp. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 19-316, 2019) (“[N]ew buildings lower nearby rents by 5 to 7 percent relative to trend . . . .”).
177 Compare XIAODI LI, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., DO NEW HOUSING UNITS IN YOUR
BACKYARD RAISE YOUR RENTS? 2 (2019), https://72187189-93c1-48bc-b596-fc36f4606599.filesusr.
com/ugd/7fc2bf_2fc84967cfb945a69a4df7baf8a4c387.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S5C-M3CL] (finding that, for
every 10% increase in the housing stock within 500 feet, rents are held down by a mere 1%), and

2021]

The Perils of Land Use Deregulation

165

concludes that a neighborhood upzoning in Chicago increased the price of
existing nearby units.178 Upzonings generally raise land values by unlocking
development potential. If the high cost of land is the primary impediment to
affordable housing, as some commentators argue,179 then adopting policies
that increase underlying land values, rather than decrease them, is a mistake.
Reducing land use restrictions in an already moderately priced suburb
may be a more plausible way to increase regional affordability—there is
evidence that increasing supply across a region lowers regional house prices
(though the evidence on rents is less well established).180 Builders of
Elliot Anenberg & Edward Kung, Can More Housing Supply Solve the Affordability Crisis? Evidence
from a Neighborhood Choice Model, 80 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON., Jan. 2020, at 1, 2 (finding that
increasing housing stock in expensive cities by 5% at most reduces rents by 0.5%), with Divya Singh,
Do Property Tax Incentives for New Construction Spur Gentrification? Evidence from New York
City 2 (Jan. 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://asit-prod-web1.cc.columbia.edu/econdept/
wp-content/uploads/sites/41/2019/07/Singh_JMP.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y8L-RCRC] (arguing that,
as new development increases average neighborhood income, it also “increases local amenities, such
as sidewalk cafes, and allows incumbent landlords to charge higher rents”), and Anthony Damiano
& Chris Frenier, Presentation on Housing Submarkets and the Effects of New Construction on
Existing Rents 23 (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.tonydamiano.com/project/new-con/supply-ppt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7EN-N928] (finding that new development decreased rents for high-priced rental
units marginally, but increased rents for nearby lower-priced rental units significantly).
178 Yonah Freemark, Upzoning Chicago: Impacts of a Zoning Reform on Property Values and Housing
Construction, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 758, 783 (2020); see also Nicolás González-Pampillón, Spillover
Effects from New Housing Supply, 92 REG’L. SCI. & URB. ECON. 103759, at 2 (2022) (new housing
supply increased local house prices by 12%).
179 See, e.g., CONDON, supra note 157, at 38 (arguing that the housing prices continue to rise
despite new development because of the cost of land).
180 The literature on the regional effects of land use restrictions is large and points to a positive
correlation between land use regulation and average or median home values, though it cannot
identify causal effects and there is less certainty about how land use regulation affects rents. See
Raven Molloy, The Effect of Housing Supply Regulation on Housing Affordability: A Review, 80 REG’L
SCI. & URB. ECON., Jan. 2020, at 1, 2 (2020) (“A large volume of empirical research documents a
positive correlation between regulation and average or median house values.”); see also Been et al.,
supra note 11, at 28 (stating that land use restrictions cause units affordable to lower-income residents
to actually filter up rather than down). One of the earliest and most influential studies is Edward L.
Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability, 9 FRBNY
ECON. POL’Y REV. 21, 23 (2003) (describing zoning regulations as one of the causes of higher
housing prices); see also Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, & Raven Saks, Why Is Manhattan So
Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J. L. & ECON. 331, 361-66 (2005) (tracing the
role of zoning regulations in driving up prices). That work has been more recently criticized for
vastly overstating the impact of land use regulations on land values. See Cameron K. Murray,
Marginal and Average Prices of Land Lots Should Not Be Equal: A Critique of Glaeser and Gyouko’s
Method for Identifying Residential Price Effects of Town Planning Regulations, 53 ENV’T & PLAN. A:
ECON. & SPACE 191, 194 (2021) (“Major problems with [Glaeser and Gyourko’s] method involve the
theoretical assumptions they rely upon to interpret the gap between the average land prices of a
housing lot as being due to taxes on new housing or restrictions on land subdivision.”) According to
Glaeser and Gyourko, the share of residential land value due to land use restrictions is incredibly
high (close to 90% in some cases) and the land value in Detroit attributable to restrictive land uses
(91%) is higher than that of San Francisco (88%). Those findings are puzzling. Detroit is
experiencing a long-term population decline with average land values of $5.10 per square foot; it has
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moderate-income housing do not generally attempt to build housing in highdemand cities anyway.181 It can be more expensive to build in urban areas
regardless of the zoning rules, in large part because of higher land values, but
also because greenfield development is often easier.182
But here too, there will likely be a mismatch between supply and demand,
as those outlying areas with developable land are going to be farther from the
urban core. Such housing may have little effect on prices in more centrally
desirable locations, such as downtown San Francisco or Manhattan. Those
locations are scarce to begin with, even setting aside land use restrictions.183
That is because each central city location is unique; there is no real substitute
for San Francisco or New York City. Demand for place cannot be solved by
simply increasing housing capacity when that demand is a function of the
numerous attributes that make a place uniquely desirable.
Housing shortages are all about (in the old realtor’s saying) “location,
location, location.”184 This leads to another important caveat concerning the
effects of encouraging market-rate housing by eliminating local land use
regulations: housing is a bundled good, collectively consumed. The housing
unit itself is not all-that-important in relation to the other features of the
too much housing. By contrast, San Francisco is experiencing a population boom with average land
prices of $63.72 per square foot. See id. at 205 tbl.4.
181 See WILLIAM H. LUCY & DAVID L. PHILLIPS, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN DECLINE:
STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR METROPOLITAN RENEWAL 38 (2000) (describing how developers
tend to be risk-averse investors, thus affordable housing is difficult to find in high-demand areas);
TONY BIDDLE, TONY BERTOIA, STEPHEN GREAVES & PETER STOPHER, INST. TRANSP. &
LOGISTICS STUD., THE COSTS OF INFILL VERSUS GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT—A REVIEW
OF RECENT LITERATURE 1 (2006) (noting that greenfield development provides low-cost housing).
182 See WILLIAM H. LUCY & DAVID L. PHILLIPS, TOMORROW’S CITIES, TOMORROW’S
SUBURBS 11-12 (Routledge 2017) (2006) (noting that greenfield sites facilitate “easy development
decisions”); Jenny Schuetz, Who’s to Blame for High Housing Costs? It’s More Complicated than You
Think, BROOKINGS (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/whos-to-blame-for-highhousing-costs-its-more-complicated-than-you-think [https://perma.cc/6HHS-MLU4] (noting that
large housing construction firms primarily build in exurban areas).
183 See J.K. Dineen, Scarce Land in SF Forces City to Seek Creative Housing Solutions, S.F. CHRON.
(May 13, 2017, 5:36 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Scarce-land-in-SF-forces-cityto-seek-creative-11144317.php [https://perma.cc/R9RF-DSNM] (referring to the “scarcity of land” in
San Francisco and the “high cost of purchasing it”); Diana Sabau, Does NYC Still Have Room for
Growth? A Study on Undeveloped Land in Major US CBDs, PROPERTYSHARK (June 21, 2018),
https://www.propertyshark.com/Real-Estate-Reports/2018/06/21/does-nyc-still-have-room-forgrowth-a-study-on-undeveloped-land-in-major-us-cbds [https://perma.cc/3GAU-GUJ3] (reporting
that New York City has approximately sixteen acres of undeveloped land left).
184 Harold Samuel is often credited with coining the famous phrase, though this origin story
is apocryphal at best. See William Safire, Location, Location, Location, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/magazine/28FOB-onlanguage-t.html [https://perma.cc/2BAWS27X]; cf. Greg Howard & Jack Liebersohn, Why is the Rent So Darn High? The Role of Growing
Demand to Live in Housing-Supply-Inelastic Cities, 124 J. URB. ECON., July 2021, at 1, 13 (arguing that
location demand explains a large portion of nationwide rent increases and that “local expansions of
housing supply will have negligible effects on local rents in the long run”).
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housing’s location: access to jobs, family, amenities, transportation, safety, and
schools—not to mention one’s neighbors.185
Consider the not-so-hypothetical demand for an integrated neighborhood
with decent schools, a relatively low cost of living, moderate density (a small
yard), and walkable amenities. That few places meet those specifications might
indicate that there is limited demand for such locations. Alternatively, the absence
of supply might indicate that it is very hard, if not impossible, to coordinate all
those aspects of a given housing bundle.186 Construction alone cannot induce the
creation of a neighborhood, town, or city that meets even some of the most basic
features of a community that are important to housing consumers. To supply those
characteristics requires significant coordination, a form of coordination that is
beyond the capacity of the housing market to supply.187
Indeed, the very features of a neighborhood or city that attract housing
consumers are easily undermined by increasing the supply of housing.188
Places with a relatively low cost of living may lose that attribute once enough
wealthier people move in, thus causing prices across a range of goods and
services to increase: the Army Navy store closes and is replaced with the highend restaurant.189 Open Alexandria, Virginia to skyscraper development and
the features that made that place attractive to housing consumers may well

185 See Lee Anne Fennell, Co-Location, Co-Location, Co-Location: Land Use and Housing Priorities
Reimagined, 39 VT. L. REV. 925, 926 (2015) (“Your home encompasses a profusion of elements that
surround the property itself and affect its value.”).
186 For example, integrated communities are difficult to find. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 135-66 (2006) (detailing how individual preferences to
have neighbors of the same race can lead to segregated populations).
187 That the value of land is a result of collective enterprise and should be shared with the
community is the basis for Georgist economics and present-day efforts to limit speculative increases
in land value by taxing the “unearned increment.” See generally CONDON, supra note 157 at 9-10, 6364 (describing the 19th-century Georgist movement); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An
Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 115-19 (1981) (proposing a
method to capture the “unearned increment” of land value appreciation).
188 Positional goods are responsible for attracting high-income demand and (arguably) driving
up housing prices. See Imbroscio, supra note 100, at 230 (noting that these goods are “inherently
scarce” as overcrowding diminishes their quality). Unlike material goods, positional goods can only
be provided to a limited number of individuals. Id. Scarcity is a feature rather than a bug of
positional goods, since overabundant supply would place a strain on the qualitative advantages
positional goods have. More importantly, the quality of positional goods is closely tied to both its
scarcity and exclusiveness, so an increase in supply should undermine the quality of the positional
good. Id.; cf. Heather Schwartz, Integrating Schools Is a Matter of Housing Policy, SHELTERFORCE
(Mar. 30, 2011), https://shelterforce.org/2011/03/30/integrating_schools_is_a_matter_of_housing_policy
[https://perma.cc/4ZC3-X29W] (“As anticipated, the academic returns from economic integration
diminished as school poverty levels rose.”).
189 See, e.g., Serena Solomon, Rent Hike Could Force Houston Street Army Navy Store to Close,
Manager Says, DNAINFO (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:11 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20130828/lowereast-side/rent-hike-could-force-houston-street-army-navy-store-close-manager-says [https://perma.cc/
LA4L-TGU8] (“Other tenants along the block include the pricey new restaurant Preserve 24 . . . .”).
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be eliminated.190 Supply arguments often treat housing demand as an
accurate proxy for location demand, but they are not the same.
Moreover, supply-side solutions to housing shortages cannot differentiate
between legitimate and illegitimate consumer demands. If housing
consumers want to live among neighbors who look like them or who consume
public and private goods in similar ways, then the location market will put a
premium on socioeconomic and racial homogeneity—as it already seems to
do.191 As observed in Part I, restrictive land use rules are themselves a
response to consumer demand.192
The housing market, even in the absence of legal barriers, tends toward
racial and socioeconomic segregation and has historically embraced it.193
Market-rate development will reflect that phenomenon and exacerbate it.194
Indeed, the filtering process itself appears to require neighborhood decline as
older housing becomes occupied by lower-income groups: Camden’s formerly
middle-class housing is “filtered” to the poor as new middle-class housing is
built in Mount Laurel. That process invites income and racial homogeneity
by neighborhood, as existing housing ages, especially to the extent that race

See also infra Section IV.A.
See W.A.V. Clark, Residential Preferences and Neighborhood Racial Segregation: A Test of the
Schelling Segregation Model, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 1 (1991) (noting neighborhood composition preferences
as a “critical variable” explaining segregation); Randall P. Walsh, Segregation and Tiebout Sorting: The
Link Between Place-Based Investments and Neighborhood Tipping, 74 J. URB. ECON. 94 (2013) (finding
that group-based sorting across communities increases when public goods in each community are
comparable); Patrick Bayer & Robert McMillan, Tiebout Sorting and Neighborhood Stratification 5 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 17364, 2011) (suggesting that Tieboutian sorting can lead
to increased segregation).
192 See supra Section I.A; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential
Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 492 (2006) (“The presence of strong and broad consumer demand
for segregated environments will, by the same token, reward developers who cater to that demand.”).
193 See SCHELLING, supra note 186, at 147-55 (modelling a “self-forming neighborhood” which
segregates over time based on individual preferences). Indeed, one could make the even stronger
claim that the market itself is constituted by race. See DAVID M.P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY:
STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA 399 (2007) (arguing that
approaching segregation as a problem of market access “assumes a model of analysis in which a pure,
discrete market for housing exists, a market that operates outside of people’s assumptions about
color and property”).
194 That legal barriers to housing market access are the primary cause of racial and
socioeconomic segregation has been newly popularized by ROTHSTEIN, supra note 81, and others.
This view may overstate the effects of regulation on housing markets, which already embrace racial
and socioeconomic separation. “[W]ould the market have allocated housing differently in the United
States without state intervention?,” asks Jeff Spinner-Halev. The Trouble with Diversity, in CRITICAL
URBAN STUDIES: NEW DIRECTIONS 107, 110 (Jonathan S. Davies and David L. Imbroscio eds.,
2010). His answer, “not by very much,” id., suggests the limits of deregulatory, market access
approaches to racial integration. But cf. RICHARD H. SANDER, YANA A. KUCHEVA, JONATHAN M.
ZASLOFF, MOVING TOWARD INTEGRATION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING 42344 (2018) (advocating access strategies to encourage mobility and facilitate integration).
190
191
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and income are correlated or that housing consumers believe that race and
income are correlated.195
Recall again that when Mount Laurel was decided in the mid-1970s, the supply
of housing (and the white population) was increasing as its lowest-income (and
Black) residents were being priced out.196 Again, this is unsurprising. Marketrate development pressure without stabilization efforts can easily displace lowincome housing in a particular neighborhood, even if the new construction may
eventually modestly lower prices across a region.197 That is why some cities have
adopted construction and rehabilitation moratoria: to prevent the continued loss
of affordable housing units to higher-end redevelopment.198
Consider also the effort to legalize accessory dwelling units (ADUs) in
high-cost cities. While ADUs are heavily promoted by supply-side advocates,
in Vancouver—where the ADU experiment is furthest along—many of the
195 We might expect socioeconomic and racial segregation to decrease during periods of
transition as low-income communities gentrify. See Ingrid Gould Ellen & Gerard Torrats-Espinosa,
Gentrification and Fair Housing: Does Gentrification Further Integration?, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 835,
844 (2018) (“[I]n some instances, gentrification leads to racial integration in the short term”). But
that state of affairs seems likely to be short-lived unless low-income housing preservation, rent
stabilization, or other renter protection efforts are adopted. Id. at 836.
196 See supra Section I.A.
197 The literature on the effects of new market-rate housing on displacement is extensive, see
Infranca, supra note 13, at 1290-92 (collecting studies), and reveals mixed results, see N.Y.U. FURMAN
CTR., GENTRIFICATION RESPONSE 5 (2016) (“Evidence is mixed on the question of
displacement . . . .”). Much depends on whether the introduction of market-rate housing reduces or
increases nearby rents and over what time frame. See supra note 177. Market-rate housing may induce
gentrification, but it also seems plausible that market-rate housing construction is a response to, rather
than a cause of, gentrification. Compare Dubin, supra note 9, at 742-43 (arguing that construction of
higher-cost housing causes gentrification and involuntary displacement of low-income residents), and
J. Revel Sims, Measuring the Effect of Gentrification on Displacement: Multifamily Housing and Eviction in
Wisconsin’s Madison Urban Region, 31 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 736, 753 (2021) (finding that new
multifamily housing development is associated with increased eviction rates in Madison
neighborhoods), with Infranca, supra note 13, at 1288-89 (noting research suggesting new market-rate
housing “tends to follow,” rather than catalyze, neighborhood change). If market-rate housing is
erected on the site of previously existing low-income housing, the displacement effect seems obvious.
A recent study of New York City found “no difference in mobility rates between those living in
gentrifying neighborhoods and those living in persistently low-SES [socioeconomic status] neighborhoods,”
see Kacie Dragan, Ingrid Gould Ellen, & Sherry Glied, Does Gentrification Displace Poor Children?
New Evidence from Medicaid Data in New York City, 83 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 1, 7 (2020), though
there are substantial caveats. See id. at 6, 9 (acknowledging New York City’s robust tenant protections
and rental regulations, as well as the already-high mobility rates of the low-income children being
studied). A more apt comparison would be between gentrifying and less transient low-income
neighborhoods, but low-SES, low mobility neighborhoods just do not seem to exist for poor
children. It also seems plausible that displacement pressure will increase over time, as transition from a lowincome neighborhood to a higher-income neighborhood accelerates. See Infranca, supra note 13, at 1290.
198 Haisten Willis, Building Bans and Affordable Housing: A Construction Conundrum, WASH. POST
(Sept. 3, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/building-bans-and-affordablehousing-a-construction-conundrum/2020/09/01/132c63fc-e93f-11ea-970a-64c73a1c2392_story.html
[https://perma.cc/SVD7-7V8M] (describing moratoria in Atlanta and Chicago).
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new units are simply adding to the already expensive rental and AirBnB
market.199 So, too, the attack on single-family zoning may have untoward
effects in places where the affordable housing stock consists of predominantly
small single-family residences.
Increasing the supply of market-rate housing in a high-demand location
can benefit some home seekers, but without limits on market processes, those
who benefit are likely to be the ones who already enjoy high incomes.
Moreover, the scale—neighborhood, citywide, regional, statewide—at which
supply-side efforts will reduce housing costs has to be identified with
specificity. Otherwise, the distributional consequences of new supply in any
given neighborhood, city, or region will be obscured.200
B. Accounting for High and Low Demand Places
That housing is a bundled good leads to another important caveat to the
supply-lowers-costs logic: the supply/demand story does not account for the
reasons that a neighborhood, city, or region is experiencing increased housing
demand. Why a particular neighborhood, city, or region is high demand
while other neighborhoods, cities, or regions are low demand is often left
undertheorized. Once consumer preferences are assumed, then the answer to
problems of increased demand seems obvious: increase supply.
In order to understand the effects of restrictive land use on housing costs,
however, one needs an account of why cities grow and decline that is not
simply a recitation of the heightened demand for housing. Such an account
is likely to be location specific.
Consider first a jobs-driven account of why cities grow or decline. On
such a theory, in-migration of the residential population follows employment
opportunities,201 and housing costs reflect the underlying labor market. Urban
economists Andres Rodríguez-Pose and Michael Storper adopt this account,
arguing that San Francisco’s high housing costs are attributable to demand
199 See Alan Ehrenhalt, Is Our Love Affair with the Single-Family Home Over?, GOVERNING (Oct.
16, 2020), https://www.governing.com/assessments/Is-Our-Love-Affair-with-the-Single-Family-HomeOver.html [https://perma.cc/EQ6Q-GSDR] (noting that of 2,000 ADUs built between 2010 and 2016,
many wound up as “posh and profitable rentals”).
200 See, e.g., Keith A. Spencer, Despite Thorough Debunking, Neoliberal Housing Politics Prevail in the Bay
Area, SALON (Nov. 4, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2018/11/04/despite-thorough-debunkingneoliberal-housing-politics-prevail-in-the-bay-area [https://perma.cc/K8GK-E87G] (noting that despite
an overall increase in the San Francisco housing supply, several districts saw net losses in affordable
housing units, and that resulting drops in housing cost accrued mostly to wealthier renters).
201 Although such a theory seemingly undergirds most agglomerationist critiques of local land
regulations, it is seldom made explicit. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 32, at 111-14 (attacking local regulations
that reduce inter-state mobility without endorsing or supporting a jobs-driven theory of city growth). For a
general jobs-driven account, see MICHAEL STORPER, KEYS TO THE CITY: HOW ECONOMICS,
INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL INTERACTION, AND POLITICS SHAPE DEVELOPMENT 224-25 (2013).
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driven by highly skilled and educated labor.202 They observe that a different
employment picture is presented by cities like Orlando and Phoenix,203 two
places that are also growing rapidly but without the same rapid rise in housing
prices,204 and they conclude that increasing the supply of market-rate housing
in a high-demand, high-skills market is unlikely to improve affordability
because it will not alter the underlying features of the labor market.205
According to Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, upzoning in a place like San
Francisco may make rich cities marginally more affordable at the high end but
will increase prices for housing at the moderate to low end.206 The benefits of
zoning reform will thus accrue mainly to the already wealthy and wealthy-tobe, who are being driven to the region by its particular employment portfolio;
meanwhile, land use deregulation will likely encourage gentrification and
displacement of poorer communities, who can be easily outbid for favorable
locations.207 They conclude that “policies such as blanket upzoning principally
unleash market forces that serve high-income earners, therefore reinforcing
the effects of income inequality rather than tempering them.”208
Rodríguez-Pose and Storper’s conclusions have sparked a contentious
debate, one that has tracked the polarized tenor of the YIMBY-NIMBY
debate more generally.209 For my purposes, two features of the jobs-driven
account are attractive: (1) the recognition that not all urban housing demand
is created equal, and (2) the emphasis on the nature of the regional labor
market as a driver of land price inflation. It seems unsurprising that highincome, high-productivity places will have higher housing costs, while lowincome, low-productivity places will have the opposite, notwithstanding the
202 Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, supra note 99, at 234-35; cf. Josh Gordon, The ‘Supply Crisis’ in
Canada’s Housing Market Isn’t Backed up by the Evidence, GLOBE & MAIL (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-supply-crisis-in-canadas-housing-marketisnt-backed-up-by-the [https://perma.cc/B8HT-ZG77?type=image] (“Housing form is basically
irrelevant to the affordability challenges in an urban area.”).
203 Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, supra note 99, at 230 (“The difference . . . is the type of jobs
and the point in industrial maturity that generated them.”).
204 Id. at 230-32.
205 Id. at 231, 234 (citing David H. Autor, Work of the Past, Work of the Future, 109 AEA PAPERS
& PROC. 1 (2019)).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 239-42.
208 Id. at 240.
209 See, e.g., Michael Manville, Michael Lens, & Paavo Mönkkönen, Zoning and Affordability: A
Reply to Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2020 URB. STUD. J. 1, 2 (contesting Rodríguez-Pose and Storper’s
findings and suggesting that they “pick many fights”); Andres Rodríguez-Pose & Michael Storper,
Dodging the Burden of Proof: A Reply to Manville, Lens, and Mönkkönen, 2020 URB. STUD. J. 1, 3-4
(describing the vitriolic response to their article); see also Richard Florida, How Housing Supply
Became the Most Controversial Issue in Urbanism, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (May 23, 2019, 11:49 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-23/why-urbanists-are-arguing-about-housingsupply [https://perma.cc/RRA3-YUH9] (summarizing the debate).
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stringency of their land use regulations.210 Indeed, high-demand cities in
countries throughout the world are experiencing housing affordability
challenges regardless of density, urban form, history of racial segregation,
nature of local government authority, or current stringency of land use
rules.211 That U.S. cities are not unique in this regard suggests that U.S.-style
land use regulations are less important than other factors in explaining the
cost of housing in those places.212
Consider, along these lines, another theory of city growth and decline that
may drive demand for specific places. This account begins with amenities
first, with jobs following in-migrants who move to a city because of its various
attractive attributes—its climate, natural beauty, nightlife, density, or cultural
offerings.213 Importantly, amenity-driven city growth by definition favors
those in the housing market who are already mobile, and certainly not the
immobile poor. Increasing housing supply in such a place will only increase

210 For example, the New Haven region’s housing prices are below the national median despite
highly restrictive land use laws while Austin’s housing prices are above the national median despite
Texas’s more favorable development climate. See Ellickson, supra note 70, at 7 (noting land use
restrictions); id. at 51 (noting housing prices). Even absent zoning, Houston saw house prices
increase twenty-seven percent between 2013 and 2018. CONDON, supra note 157, at 48.
211 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 202 (describing Canada’s housing crisis); Choe Sang-Hun, ‘The
Den of Thieves’: South Koreans Are Furious Over Housing Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/23/world/asia/korea-housing-lh-scandal-moon-election.html
[https://perma.cc/HBA9-BGQJ] (describing the housing crisis in the Seoul metropolitan area).
Vienna, one of the few high-demand cities that has successfully pursued housing equity, has notably
not adopted a free market strategy, but rather embraces strict rent control and the provision of social
housing on a scale unimaginable in the U.S. See CONDON, supra note 157, at 87-96 (arguing that
Vienna is the only “advanced city” to have solved its housing equity problem and noting the use of
rent control, public housing, and regulatory policy).
212 Measuring land use stringency is itself quite difficult. Commentators have noted that leading
measurements of local land use restrictiveness in the U.S., such as the Wharton Residential Land Use
Regulatory Index, are flawed in important ways, either dramatically overstating the level of local building
restraint, Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, supra note 99, at 237, or understating it, Christopher S. Elmendorf, Eric
Biber, Paavo Mönkkönen, & Moira O’Neill, State Administrative Review of Local Constraints on Housing
Development: Improving the California Model, 64 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7 n.23, 11),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3614085. See generally Joseph Gyourko, Jonathan S.
Hartley, & Jacob Krimmel, The Local Residential Land Use Regulatory Environment Across U.S. Housing Markets:
Evidence from a New Wharton Index, 124 J. URB. ECON. 103337 (2021) (presenting the most recent Wharton
Index survey results).
213 See Edward L. Glaeser, Growth: The Death and the Life of Cities, in MAKING CITIES WORK:
PROSPECTS AND POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA 22, 52-58 (Robert P. Inman ed., 2009)
(describing the importance of amenities to attracting skilled workers); Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua
D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275, 1275 (2006) (noting raising
demand for high-end urban amenities driving growth). But see STORPER, supra note 201, at 224
(arguing that “[c]ities are workshops, not playgrounds,” and describing the “playground” model as
misguided).
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the population of amenity-seekers, a group that already has some degree of
choice about where to live.214
Alternatively, if housing demand is driven by a location’s amenities, then
local land use rules might be important to sustaining that demand. A city’s
decision to create a waterfront park, to set aside downtown land for small
businesses, restaurants, or artist lofts, or to adopt mixed-used zoning that
limits housing in favor of commercial space, would all arguably influence
amenities-induced demand. Restrictive land use laws—indeed, all the various
developmental decisions made by a city—are not exogenous to housing
demand. Those land use decisions may in some cases create demand. And
those decisions will likely track the “market” to the extent that cities generally
seek to offer amenities that appeal to housing consumers. Consider that, one
year after Minneapolis reformed its zoning laws to allow property owners to
construct duplexes or triplexes by right, only three triplexes had been
approved in the city.215 This suggests that the general demand for housing did
not necessarily translate into the specific demand for triplexes. It should not
be surprising that existing zoning laws reflect consumer demand.
Whether city population growth is driven by jobs or amenities, both, or
neither,216 those same forces might also be responsible for reducing demand.
Reduced housing demand—i.e., population loss—has been the main
characteristic of old-line industrial and Rust Belt cities during the mid- to
late-twentieth century; those cities have not lost population because of high
housing costs, but because migration patterns changed, as people moved to
the suburbs and to the West and South.217 So, too, the more recent urban
214 Cf. Rebecca Diamond, The Determinants and Welfare Implications of US Workers’ Diverging
Location Choices by Skill: 1980-2000, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 479, 480 (2016) (arguing that amenity
improvements further fueled the sorting of highly skilled, college-educated workers into high skill
cities further increasing rent pressures).
215 See Ehrenhalt, supra note 199 (citing Daniel Takash, The Great Suburban Showdown, Part I: The
Lay of the Land, NISKANEN CTR. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.niskanencenter.org/the-great-suburbanshowdown-part-i-the-lay-of-the-land [https://perma.cc/G4ME-7TCP]. For another account of the
Minneapolis zoning change, see CONDON, supra note 157, at 112-13, pointing to the city’s failure to loosen
density restrictions and to require affordable units as reasons for the lackluster results.
216 On different theories of city growth, see SCHRAGGER, supra note 57, at ch.1, ch.7. See also
Michael Storper & Michael Manville, Behaviour, Preferences, and Cities: Urban Theory and Urban
Resurgence, 43 URB. STUD. 1247, 1249-61 (2006) (highlighting various theories and their shortcomings).
217 See Michael B. Sauter, These 5 Cities Have Lost Half or More of Their Populations Since 1950, USA
TODAY (June 11, 2019, 3:15 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/06/11/5-cities-have-losthalf-or-more-of-their-populations-since-1950/39557461 [https://perma.cc/NJN6-5J95] (reporting that St.
Louis, Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh—all former industrial hubs—have lost over half of
their populations since 1950); see also Michelle Wilde Anderson, Needing and Fearing Billionaires in Cities
Abandoned by Wealth, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 236-38 (2016) [hereinafter Needing and Fearing
Billionaires] (describing population loss and property foreclosure in Detroit after automakers moved to
the suburbs); Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1138-39 (2014)
[hereinafter New Minimal Cities] (describing population loss in Cleveland, Detroit, and Hamtramck,
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resurgence has not occurred because of the comparative costs of housing in
the suburbs and cities. Neighborhoods in many cities had and continue to
have relatively low-cost housing compared to the suburbs; other
neighborhoods in newly resurgent cities have consistently had higher-cost
housing than the suburbs even before the more recent spike in demand.
Housing supply and demand are often out-of-whack in both directions:
there is too much housing in depopulating places and too little in populating
ones.218 Instead of increasing supply in popular places, one could instead
engage in policy interventions that increase demand in unpopular ones.219
Migration patterns are responsive to the availability of economic
opportunities at home in comparison with those opportunities elsewhere.
Housing costs certainly figure in any given mover’s economic calculus. But it
is good to remember that those movers are coming from somewhere: outmigration and in-migration are two sides of the same coin.
Recall that the suburban explosion that gave rise to demand in Mount
Laurel was in part a function of the lack of demand in nearby Camden. When
Mount Laurel was decided, Camden had plenty of inexpensive (if sometimes
low quality) housing; New Jersey similarly had a large supply of cheap land
for building.220 California currently has sufficient land for housing
construction, as does the country as a whole.221 In fact, like Camden, many
declining cities have too much housing; those cities are struggling with how
to shrink their housing footprints, not expand them.222

Michigan); Jeremy Nemeth, Justin B. Hollander, Eliza D. Whiteman, & Michael P. Johnson, Planning
with Justice in Mind in a Shrinking Baltimore, 42 J. URB. AFFS. 351, 356-57 (2020) (noting suburbanization
leading to population loss in Baltimore).
218 See New Minimal Cities, supra note 217, at 1138-39 (describing the burden of excess housing
in depopulating cities as a “self-perpetuating cycle” that lowers tax revenues).
219 This—as is to be expected—is rejected out of hand by anti-zoning commentators as
“inefficient” or even wasteful. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Wealth of Cities:
Agglomeration Economies and Spatial Equilibrium in the United States 36-37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 14806, 2009) (arguing that government policy should not induce
movement to disadvantaged areas); Patrick Kline & Enrico Moretti, People, Places and Public Policy:
Some Simple Welfare Economics of Local Economic Development Programs 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 19659, 2013) (“Subsidizing poor or unproductive places is an imperfect
way of transferring resources to poor people.”).
220 About 41.2% of New Jersey’s land was still developable over a decade after Mount Laurel I was
decided. Tim Evans, New Jersey’s Supply of Developable Land is Shrinking—As a Result of Both Development
and Preservation, N.J. FUTURE BLOG (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.njfuture.org/2020/02/17/new-jerseyssupply-of-developable-land-is-shrinking-as-a-result-of-both-development-and-preservation [https://
perma.cc/S23U-VLD2]. In 2015, about 14% of New Jersey’s land was still developable. Id.
221 See Dave Merrill & Lauren Leatherby, Here’s How America Uses Its Land, BLOOMBERG
(July 31, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-us-land-use [https://perma.cc/E3BPAD3P] (illustrating that “urban areas make up just 3.6 percent of the total size of the 48 contiguous
states,” while “41 percent of U.S. land in the contiguous states revolves around livestock”).
222 See supra note 217.
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Theoretically, a growth boundary that prevented the development of an
alternative to Camden would have forced residents to stay there. But housing
options in the suburbs gave those out-migrants a place to go. Today, resurgent
cities are arguably having the same effect on declining rural areas and inner-ring
suburbs, many of which are losing their populations.223 If that is so, then
encouraging more construction in high-demand places will just further depopulate
low-demand ones. Building more housing in the city will injure the declining
suburbs by giving their residents a place to flee, just as building more housing in
Mount Laurel in the 1970s contributed to the depopulation of Camden.
I am not advocating restricting supply to lock people into certain
geographies. My point is simply that “demand” is a function of available
alternatives. Providing better public services in one place is going to have
effects on housing demand in others. Equalizing tax burdens and public
services across jurisdictions, especially in areas like education and public
safety, would eliminate some of the forces inducing residents to relocate.224
Instead of “build, build, build,” why not “invest, invest, invest” to eliminate
the “push” factors inducing significant geographical dislocation?225
Indeed, the supply-side market solution to the problem of uneven housing
demand is quite myopic when considering the range of alternatives. And its
consequences for low- and moderate-income housing provision are at best
uncertain and in many cases negative.226 The emphasis on lifting supply
constraints in high-demand areas will enforce the current regional hierarchy of
poor and rich places and may just as readily exacerbate inequality as ameliorate it.
IV. THE LIMITS OF MOBILITY
This critique of deregulation leads naturally to a consideration of the third
leg of the anti-zoning stool: the argument for mobility. Opening the suburbs to
223 See Richard Florida, The New Suburban Crisis, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (May 2, 2017, 10:05
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-02/inside-the-new-suburban-crisis [https://
perma.cc/U58K-GNC6] (reporting on shrinking inner-ring suburbs and growing cities and
suburban peripheries). But see Whitney Airgood-Obrycki, Are the Suburbs Losing Status?, JOINT CTR.
FOR HOUS. STUD. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/are-the-suburbs-losing-status
[https://perma.cc/KE3L-YDYZ] (“[The] common narrative overstates the nature and extent of
suburban decline.”).
224 See SCHRAGGER, supra note 57, at 247-59.
225 Anenberg & Kung, supra note 177, at 2, for example, argue that improving amenities in
lower-priced neighborhoods will do more to reduce rents in higher-priced neighborhoods than
increasing housing supply in higher-priced neighborhoods. See also Sitaraman et al., supra note 23,
at 1765-72 (advocating federal policy to ameliorate geographical inequality as an alternative to
mobility-favoring policies).
226 Cf. CONDON, supra note 157, at 97 (describing failures of supply-side efforts); Underkuffler,
supra note 170, at 247 (“[T]he redevelopment that [zoning-abolition] laws accomplish is less likely to
benefit [poor] communities, than to hurt them.”).
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low-income housing has long been a goal for those concerned with
socioeconomic and racial segregation; the argument is that exclusionary zoning
increases housing costs and raises barriers to entry, thus reducing mobility.227
Mobility, it is further claimed, is a chief mechanism for reducing socioeconomic
and racial segregation, for getting poor people access to better municipal
services, and for increasing their access to jobs in productive places.228
It is helpful to distinguish two kinds of mobility claims. The first argument
for mobility—what I have called the moving to opportunity argument against
zoning—attacks local land use rules that prevent people from moving from
high poverty, low service jurisdictions into lower poverty, higher service
jurisdictions.229 This claim is based on the commonsense notion that
individuals living in jurisdictions with better access to public goods, like public
safety and schools, will have better life outcomes. So, too, this argument is
based on the old idea that living in a segregated neighborhood with high levels
of poverty itself undermines life chances.230 Traditional objectors to
exclusionary zoning have long argued that the problem with local land use
restrictions is that they contribute to racial and socioeconomic segregation.231
The second mobility claim is what I describe above as the productivity
argument against zoning. This argument attacks restrictive local land use laws
on the ground that they prevent people from moving out of low-productivity
places into high-productivity places—from rural to urban communities or
from small towns to the big city.232 This type of claim assumes a connection
between urbanization and productivity;233 it asserts that the co-location in
See REEVES, supra note 101, at 103.
See, e.g., SANDER ET AL., supra note 194, at 423-35 (advocating mobility policies as a
solution to economic and racial segregation). Much research has been done on spatial mismatch. See
generally Fredrik Andersson, Job Displacement and the Duration of Joblessness: The Role of Spatial
Mismatch, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 203 (2018) (finding support for the hypothesis); Edward L.
Glaeser & Naomi Hausman, The Spatial Mismatch Between Innovation and Joblessness, 20
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 233 (2020) (connecting spatial mismatch to rates of joblessness);
Laurent Gobillon, Harris Selod, & Yves Zenou, The Mechanisms of Spatial Mismatch, 44 URB. STUD.
2401 (2007) (describing the theory); John F. Kain, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades
Later, 3 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 371 (2010) (reviewing the literature on spatial mismatch).
229 See supra Section I.A.
230 Douglas S. Massey, Gretchen A. Condran, & Nancy A. Denton, The Effect of Residential
Segregation on Black Social and Economic Well-Being, 66 SOC. FORCES 29, 53 (1987) (“At least partly
because of racial segregation, and possibly largely because of it, middle class blacks are subjected to
higher rates of crime, less healthy environments, and more dilapidated surroundings than their white
counterparts.”). See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
231 See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 230; infra Section IV.A.
232 See supra Section I.B; infra Section IV.B.
233 Sometimes there is not such a link. See Remi Jedwab & Dietrich Vollrath, Urbanization
Without Growth in Historical Perspective, 58 EXPLS. IN ECON. HIST. 1, 18 (2015) (cautioning against
presuming “that urbanization and industrialization or development are synonymous”); Marianne
227
228
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space of industries, businesses, and residents—agglomeration—is a chief
driver of economic innovation and growth.234
The opportunity and productivity claims are not the same, though they
share a commitment to mobility as an anti-poverty strategy. That
commitment implicitly depends on an assumption that economic growth is a
tide that lifts all boats. But there are a number of reasons to worry about an
anti-poverty or opportunity program that emphasizes cross-border mobility.
The demands of mobility are inherently unequal: mobility policies require
certain people to move to obtain basic life opportunities but do not make the
same demand on others. And mobility exacerbates the challenges faced by the
places, neighborhoods, and people who are left behind.
A. Moving to Opportunity
Consider first the emerging consensus that state-level land use reform is
necessary to permit individuals and families to “move to opportunity”—to
access quality housing and improved municipal services, like schools and
public safety. This approach, modeled on the “Moving to Opportunity”
(MTO) pilot project sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in the mid-1990s,235 focuses on inter-jurisdictional barriers to
Fay & Charlotte Opal, Urbanization Without Growth: A Not-So-Uncommon Phenomenon 2 (World
Bank, Pol’y Rsch. Working Paper No. 2412, 2000) (exploring Africa’s urbanization without growth).
See generally MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS (2017).
234 See, e.g., GLAESER, supra note 97, at 116; MASAHISA FUJITA, PAUL KRUGMAN &
ANTHONY J. VENABLES, THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 4 (1999) (“[S]patial concentration itself creates the favorable economic development that
supports further or continued concentration.”); Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 139, 140 (1998) (listing ways in which cities are more productive than other areas); Robert
E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3, 38 (1988)
(positing productivity benefits from proximity to others).
235 The program provided housing vouchers to assist low-income families in moving from highpoverty housing to low-poverty housing. See LISA SANBONMATSU, JENS LUDWIG, LAWRENCE F.
KATZ, LISA A. GENNETIAN, GREG J. DUNCAN, RONALD C. KESSLER, EMMA ADAM, THOMAS W.
MCDADE, & STACY TESSLER LINDAU, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH., MOVING TO
OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIR HOUSING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM: FINAL IMPACTS EVALUATION
(2011), https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/MTOFHD_fullreport_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3MG4WNC] (describing the program). Initial analysis of the MTO program indicated mixed results. Id.
at xv-xvi (finding that ten to fifteen years after families enrolled in the MTO program, families
experienced lower poverty and better health outcomes and felt safer in their neighborhoods, but they
experienced no better education, employment or income outcomes); Xavier de Souza Briggs &
Margery Austin Turner, Assisted Housing Mobility and the Success of Low-Income Minority Families:
Lessons for Policy, Practice, and Future Research, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 25, 45-46, 51 (2006) (finding
that the MTO program provided low-income families gains in health, but not in employment, income
or education attainment; yet noting that families who lived longer in low-poverty housing experienced
better outcomes in work and school); see also Sheila R. Foster, The Limits of Mobility and the Persistence
of Urban Inequality, YALE L.J. F. 480, 491 (2017) (describing how federal programs like the MTO
program “produced decidedly mixed results”). More recent studies indicate that while adults do not
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entry, mainly the city/suburb divide. That divide has long been a target of
anti-poverty reformers. The Kerner Commission Report famously described
the “two societies”236 that divided Black people and white people into separate
geographic spheres; President Johnson’s War on Poverty sought to dismantle
the ghetto.237 Today there is little doubt that economic inequality is
exacerbated by spatial isolation and unequal access to public services.238
Preemptive land use laws that target suburban exclusion and emphasize
mobility across jurisdictional lines, however, are likely to have limited effect. As
already noted above, the politics of land use are such that it is difficult to make
a “fair share” housing regime stick, even in places like New Jersey and Minnesota
that have adopted progressive land use regimes.239 But there are other reasons
that a mobility approach to economic inequality is likely to be unavailing.
A basic problem, which a number of commentators have pointed out, is
that an anti-poverty program that emphasizes relocation requires
demographic shifts on an enormous scale.240 Granted, the federal
government’s MTO pilot program saw some mixed successes giving a small
number of families vouchers to move to low-poverty neighborhoods.241 But
what is possible in a pilot project and what can occur across a large population
are two different things. Scaling-up mobility programs is an almost

generally gain from moves from high to low poverty neighborhoods, their children do, particularly if
they move before age thirteen. See Chetty, supra note 91, at 141. For a critical discussion of the Chetty
study, see EDWARD G. GOETZ, THE ONE-WAY STREET OF INTEGRATION: FAIR HOUSING AND
THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA CITIES 44-46 (2018).
236 KERNER REPORT, supra note 80, at 1. See generally Susan T. Gooden & Samuel L. Myers Jr.,
The Kerner Commission Report Fifty Years Later: Revisiting the American Dream, 4 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND.
J. SOC. SCIS. 1, 1-2 (2018) (providing a retrospective overview of the Kerner Commission Report).
237 See generally DAVID ZAREFSKY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON’S WAR ON POVERTY: RHETORIC
AND HISTORY 21-56 (1986).
238 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 230, at 149-53 (exploring relationships between social
and spatial mobility). The classic work on this is WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
239 See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting increasing segregation in Minneapolis);
Dantzler, supra note 76, at 657-64 (discussing the “shortcomings” of Mount Laurel I); Mallach, supra
note 76, at 851-56 (explaining the backlash to the affordable housing push in New Jersey); Meyler,
supra note 76, at 240-47 (noting that affordable housing efforts “aroused the ire of many New Jersey
municipalities”); see also Byrne, supra note 45, at 2279-84 (describing the backlash that Mount Laurel
engendered). See generally MASSEY, supra note 45, at 184-96.
240 Imbroscio, Urban Policy as Meritocracy, supra note 16, at 91-92 (objecting to the “dispersal
consensus” on the grounds that it would require “many people, including many of the most
vulnerable urban residents . . . to move from their current neighborhood”); see also PATRICK
SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD
RACIAL EQUALITY 11, 172 (2013) (raising a similar objection); Anderson, supra note 25, at 526-32
(“Why keep putting resources into an area where people are getting more poor, and more stuck, as
time goes by? The biggest answer, I think, is that we do not have a serious alternative—too many
people live in such areas.”).
241 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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insurmountable challenge. Certainly, citizens should have the ability and
right to live in every community in the metropolitan area, should they choose
to do so. But for many residents of poor communities, relocation is not
desirable or even feasible in light of existing attachments to family, home,
neighborhood, and community.242 And there is certainly little political
appetite for the “massive sociospatial reordering of the urban population”243
that would be required to move significant numbers of residents out of poor
communities and into richer ones.
To be sure, the concept of “moving to opportunity” is appealing.
Suburban land use restrictions that lock poor families into underperforming
places are undoubtedly problematic. But the mobility project is also
invariably accompanied by a narrative of uplift, focused in large part on giving
poor children access to better educational opportunities.
As David Imbroscio has argued, this “meritocratic paradigm” misses the
point.244 By focusing on reducing barriers to opportunity, reformers place far
too much demand on an already overburdened education system to remedy
profound structural economic ills. And reformers misidentify the source of
urban poverty as inadequate social services or weak social ties when the
origins of economic inequality run much deeper. Imbroscio agrees that
resources are inequitably distributed, but he criticizes the emphasis on giving
individuals in poor places the ability to achieve upward mobility by “dint of
their own merit.”245 As already noted, moving to opportunity policy
experiments have had mixed success.246 But more importantly, while they
may produce a few “merit-worthy” winners—the “deserving poor”—these
interventions do not help to restructure an economy that continues to
produce much larger swaths of economic losers.
Another reason to doubt a land use reform project targeting suburbanstyle land use barriers is that—as noted above—even affordable housing is
out of reach of many of the urban poor. As recent work on evictions has
shown, housing instability is an almost permanent state of affairs for a
significant portion of urban residents.247 Land use barriers are not the main
242 See Naomi Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of Place, 127 YALE
L.J.F. 458, 464-74 (2017) (arguing that policies encouraging mobility overlook its human costs).
243 Imbroscio, Urban Policy as Meritocracy, supra note 16, at 93.
244 See id. at 82-83.
245 Id. at 79.
246 See supra note 235 and accompanying text; Imbroscio, Urban Policy as Meritocracy, supra note
16, at 88-92 (“Studies of mixed-income communities seem to suggest . . . that benefits for their
disadvantaged inhabitants may not materialize.”). See generally ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT
AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 424-25 (2012) (arguing
that community place-based policies are more likely to be successful than individual mobility policies).
247 See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
20-31 (2016) (describing the effects of urban deindustrialization on housing instability).
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cause for the eviction crisis, and eliminating suburban land use restrictions is
not going to change the underlying causes of housing instability. Uneven
employment; lack of housing, mental health, addiction, and other forms of
government support; the absence of public transportation; inadequate legal
representation; and urban fiscal decline are all determinative factors.248
Moreover, a mobility strategy that hinges on access to the suburbs
assumes that the suburbs are currently or will remain relatively economically
stable over time. But that is simply not true: many suburban areas are
struggling economically. The suburban decline has long been in the making,
even prior to the recent urban resurgence—especially in old line suburbs.249
Regionalists have long argued that city/suburb unification can reduce fiscal
and public service gaps.250 But as cities have become somewhat richer and
suburbs have become somewhat poorer, that prescription has become less
appealing. Moreover, regional governments are no panacea for racial
education gaps, which persist in unified school districts.251
To be sure, migration can be a solution to a lack of local opportunity. But
the costs of migration can be high both for those who move and those left
behind, who may be made worse off from the out-migration.252 The beneficial
effects of migration can also dissipate as the numbers of movers increase,
either because the original benefits were a function of deconcentration or

See id.
BERNADETTE HANLON, ONCE THE AMERICAN DREAM: INNER-RING SUBURBS OF
THE METROPOLITAN UNITED STATES 1-11 (2010) (“[M]any older inner-ring suburban
communities . . . have declined into places of desolation and decay.”); ELIZABETH KNEEBONE &
ALAN BERUBE, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN POVERTY IN AMERICA 1-12 (2013) (“[T]he
suburbanization of poverty has redrawn the contemporary American landscape.”).
250 See Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 70-83 (2012)
(describing a potential model for regional governance); Georgette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal
Framework for Regional Redistribution of Poverty-Related Expenses, 47 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 2429 (1995) (“To counteract fiscal inequality and to match regional revenue with regional expenditures,
a model must link the suburban tax base with the city budget.”); see also Nestor M. Davidson &
Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 63, 115 (2013) (advocating
for regionalism as a response to Tieboutian sorting).
251 See Kristen E. Murray, The Problem of Intradistrict Inequality, 5 BELMONT L. REV. 85, 86101 (2018) (describing the existence and causes of inequality within school districts); The Education
Opportunity Monitoring Project, STAN. CEPA, https://cepa.stanford.edu/educational-opportunitymonitoring-project/achievement-gaps/race/#first [https://perma.cc/475P-Y4Y2] (last visited July 21,
2020) (providing figures on “racial achievement gaps—differences in the average standardized test
scores of white and black or white and Hispanic students”).
252 Anderson, supra note 25, at 531-32 (describing the costs of long-term population loss in
Flint, Michigan); Foster, supra note 235, at 482-87 (discussing costs that low-income and
disadvantaged groups experience when they relocate); Imbroscio, Urban Policy as Meritocracy, supra
note 16, at 90-92 (same).
248
249
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because inward migration induces outward migration by existing residents.253
This may make it impossible to “move to opportunity.”254
There is also a very limited guarantee of success. Studies show that the
original MTO program had only a 48% “lease-up” rate, meaning less than
half of the recipients of vouchers were able to use them to move to another
neighborhood.255 So too, when given the opportunity, poor residents often
relocated to neighborhoods similar in socioeconomic make-up to the ones
they left or returned to their old neighborhoods over time.256 A recent study
has shown (unsurprisingly perhaps) that Black boys will enjoy better
outcomes as adults if they grow up in low-poverty neighborhoods with high
rates of stable families and low levels of racial bias.257 But there are not enough
of those neighborhoods; even if there were, moving the 95% of Black boys
who do not currently live in such places258 is simply not plausible. Those
neighborhoods have to be made.
In other words, while “opportunity hoarding”259 in the suburbs or other
high service jurisdictions should not be ignored, for many residents of lowproductivity and low-opportunity places, the effort to break down mobility
barriers is secondary to addressing economic decline, social dislocation, and
affordable housing in place. Robert Sampson, in his magisterial study of
Chicago, cautions against the methodological individualism that underpins a
moving to opportunity strategy, arguing that in important ways

253 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 188 (“As anticipated, the academic returns from economic
integration diminished as school poverty levels rose.”); Ellora Derenoncourt, Can You Move to
Opportunity? Evidence from the Great Migration 35-36 (Jan 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/elloraderenoncourt/files/derenoncourt_jmp_2018.pdf [https://perma.
cc/7L2Y-GNRX] (finding that gains from Black people moving from the South to Northern cities in
the twentieth century were offset by the policies adopted by the host cities).
254 See Derenoncourt, supra note 253, at 35-36 (“[T]he persistent gap in upward mobility among
black and white boys . . . raises the question of whether [MTO] policies can be effective at reducing
racial gaps . . . .”).
255 GOETZ, supra note 235, at 45.
256 See id. at 45-46 (noting that many MTO study participants returned to higher-poverty
neighborhoods); Jae Sik Jeon, Moving Away from Opportunity? Social Networks and Access to Social
Services, 57 URB. STUD. 1696, 1710-11 (2020) (examining factors that cause voucher recipients to
relocate to their original or other high-poverty neighborhoods); see also SAMPSON, supra note 246,
at 377 (“[T]he city can thus be said to possess an enduring higher-order structure of stratification
and accompanying processes of social organization that are quite persistent despite individual
fluidity and neighborhood change.”).
257 Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones, Sonya R. Porter, Race and Economic
Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective, 135 Q.J. ECON. 711, 711 (2020).
258 See id. (finding that only 5% of Black boys grow up in favorable neighborhoods).
259 ”Opportunity hoarding” is a sociological concept first introduced by Charles Tilly to
describe “when members of a categorically bounded network acquire access to a resource that is
valuable, renewable, subject to monopoly, supportive of network activities, and enhances by the
network’s modus operandi.” CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY 16 (1998).
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“neighborhoods choose people,” not the other way around.260 Sampson
emphasizes immobility policies to keep social capital inside low-income
neighborhoods—the “collective efficacy” that appears essential to lowincome, minority neighborhoods that are stable and have positive
outcomes.261 Patrick Sharkey, after reviewing the long-running debate over
the merits of mobility versus place-based anti-poverty policies, concludes that
“moving families out of the ghetto, en masse, . . . would likely have harmful
consequences for many eligible families and would have unanticipated
consequences for urban communities.”262
Instead of contributing to collective efficacy, mobility-enhancing policies
place the burden of uplift on individuals and families and undercut efforts to
strengthen the neighborhoods that are integral to improving individuals’ life
chances. Mobility policies also generally treat poor Black neighborhoods as
inherently inferior and require that Black people integrate into white
neighborhoods to gain basic municipal services instead of providing those
goods directly.263
In other words, MTO is an old-fashioned dispersal and deconcentration
approach to poverty alleviation. While it may provide benefits to a select few,
it is unlikely to result in long-term, stable low-income communities.264 A set
SAMPSON, supra note 246, at 377.
Robert J. Sampson, Individual and Community Economic Mobility in the Great Recession Era:
The Spatial Foundations of Persistent Inequality, in ECONOMIC MOBILITY: RESEARCH & IDEAS ON
STRENGTHENING FAMILIES, COMMUNITIES & THE ECONOMY 259, 283 (Alexandra Brown,
David Buchholz, Daniel Davis, & Arturo Gonzales eds., 2016), https://www.stlouisfed.org/
~/media/Files/PDFs/Community-Development/EconMobilityPapers/EconMobility_Book_508.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/CTB4-H5UP] (discussing organizational capacities and community knowledge
that is left intact when people stay in their community); see also SAMPSON, supra note 246, at 377;
Kenneth A. Stahl, Mobility and Community in Urban Policy: An Essay on Great American City by
Robert J. Sampson, 46 URB. LAW. 625, 626-27 (2014) (highlighting arguments in favor of place-based
policies using empirical evidence).
262 SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE, supra note 240, at 172; see also Timothy Bartik, Using PlaceBased Jobs Policies to Help Distressed Communities, 34 J. ECON. PERSPS. 99, 113 (“Subsidizing outmigration from distressed communities may often create as many problems as it solves.”).
263 See, e.g., GOETZ, supra note 235, at 10-11 (pointing out that integrationist policies are often
dependent upon limiting the mobility of Black people); cf. Mary Pattillo, The Problem of Integration,
N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. (Jan. 2014), https://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/the-problem-ofintegration [https://perma.cc/XXB3-9YR2] (discussing how the integrationist narrative stigmatizes
Black people and Black spaces); Edward G. Goetz, Anthony Damiano, & Rashad Williams,
Opportunity Areas Shouldn’t Just be Places with a Lot of White People, SHELTERFORCE (Jan. 4, 2021),
https://shelterforce.org/2021/01/04/opportunity-areas-shouldnt-just-be-places-with-a-lot-of-whitepeople [https://perma.cc/Z4KR-35JK] (describing the “White Proximity Model” which found that
opportunity was often associated with whiteness).
264 Importantly, statewide land use reform might also undermine the wealth of Black
homeowners in majority-Black suburbs. Those suburbs are likely to bear the brunt of the state-wide
elimination of single-family zoning, as they already tend to absorb more poor minorities than white
suburbs further afield. Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 755-62 (2001).
260
261
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of policies that encourages the poor to chase the rich around in an unending
cycle of growth and decline is not very promising. It seems to be premised on
the view that there are few means to remedy local economic instability or to
obtain basic public goods other than moving. And it accedes to a permanent
state of spatial inequality.
B. Moving to Productivity
The productivity argument against restrictive land use practices is also
premised on individuals and families moving—but on an even larger scale.
That argument maintains that by raising housing prices, supply constraints
like zoning prevent individuals from moving from less productive regions of
the country to more productive regions, thus depressing overall economic
growth.265 At bottom, this is an argument for increasing national labor
mobility. According to this account, housing prices reflect regional
productivity, labor should follow capital, and land use deregulation will
encourage large-scale internal migration.
Similar to the moving to opportunity approach, the productivity argument
favors mobility as a solution to economic opportunity. The same objections,
already outlined above, apply as well. The demand that labor follow capital
wherever it decides to invest is not a recipe for economic or political stability.
But whether increasing overall labor mobility is a good or bad idea, there
is a prior question concerning the assumed link between agglomeration and
local land use constraints. Agglomeration theorists argue that economic
growth is a function of density, of people co-locating in productive places like
lower Manhattan or its nearby environs.266 Urban growth, on this account,
represents productivity gains; those gains are limited when land use barriers
raise housing costs, thus preventing beneficial co-location.267 If people cannot
afford to move into Manhattan or San Francisco or the metropolitan areas
within commuting distance of those places, they and the economy as a whole
will be less productive.268
This account, however, might be wrong about what causes innovation and
therefore economic growth. The productivity claim assumes that co-location
in space is the most important feature of agglomeration: getting people
together in denser places will generate economic gains.269 But what if the

See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 32, at 150.
See id. at 150-51; see also supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
See Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 95, at 1 (explaining how housing constraints lowered
aggregate productivity growth).
269 GLAESER, supra note 97, at 116.
265
266
267
268
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gains from agglomeration turn on the nature of the uses of the urban land,
not merely their co-location?
Jane Jacobs argued in The Death and Life of Great American Cities that it is
the character of the built environment, not simply its density, that produces
economic gains.270 Agglomeration theorists like to cite Jacobs for the idea that
cities are fertile places for the transmission of knowledge across industries on
account of their density and diversity.271 But the density claim that underpins
the opposition to local land use ignores her more important insight: it is the
diversity of urban land uses, not mere co-location, that produces knowledge
spillovers and thus contributes to innovation and ultimately to growth.272
Throughout her work, Jacobs argues that economic growth is a function
of a specific kind of urbanism. The city flourishes because of the diversity of
land uses in space, block by block, and neighborhood by neighborhood.273 To
this end, Jacobs argues that cities can and should use local land use regulations
to preserve a variety of types of uses of urban land: “zoning for diversity.”274
This form of zoning is fine-grained and in many cases requires limiting
development, controlling density, and preserving historical structures.275 In
addition, land use controls are necessary because of a central problem that
occurs when a neighborhood becomes too popular: it loses the character that
made it economically and socially vital in the first place, what Jacobs calls the
“self-destruction of diversity.”276 “Self-destruction” occurs when the features
of a location that create housing demand are eliminated by fulfilling that
demand—as when new high-rise residential construction replaces smaller,
older mixed-used buildings.277
Indeed, some would say that Jacobs was the consummate NIMBY, famous
for her opposition to development in lower Manhattan, including the building
of a highway through Washington Square Park and the razing of older buildings

270 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 143-51 (1961)
[hereinafter JACOBS, DEATH AND LIFE] (describing how the diversity of enterprise in cities, rather
than mere density, is the driver of their growth and sustainability).
271 See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 233, at 38-39 (1988) (arguing for the theories of human capital
discussed in JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 50 (1970)). See also SCHRAGGER, supra note
57, at 24-25 (discussing “Jane Jacobs’s externalities,” the benefits of sharing across industries which
occurs in cities).
272 JACOBS, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 270, at 143-51, 241-56 (describing how the diversity
of streets in major American cities contributes to enterprise and productivity).
273 Id. at 250-51.
274 Id. at 252.
275 Id. at 252-53.
276 Id. at 242.
277 Id. at 253-55.
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there.278 To critics, nostalgia drove Jacobs’s vision of the urban environment.279
But she turned out to be right when she organized to prevent the destruction of
Washington Square and its environs, for both aesthetic and economic reasons.280
Jacobs’s emphasis on the diversity of uses leads to another reason to
question the moving to productivity argument against local land use. In Death
and Life and her later works, Jacobs sought to describe and defend the features
of urbanism that provide for social and economic stability.281 That effort is
mostly rejected by productivity theorists. For those theorists, some
geographies are unproductive and others are productive; policy should
encourage those living in the former to move to the latter.282 This reification
of “productive” and “unproductive” geographies fails to recognize—and even
promotes—economic and spatial cycling. The agglomeration literature often
is too quick to counsel abandonment of cities, suburbs, and rural locations
that are in decline, urging individuals and families to “move to productivity”
and counseling against trying to improve economic opportunities in place.283
To be sure, the flow of economic activity to high-productivity places is
often overwhelming. As I have counseled elsewhere, competitive businessattraction strategies adopted by low-productivity places in an effort to
increase local growth are mostly unavailing.284 But abandonment of the
278 See Nolan Gray, How Should We Interpret Jane Jacobs?, MKT. URBANISM (July 30, 2018),
https://marketurbanism.com/2018/07/30/how-should-we-interpret-jane-jacobs [https://perma.cc/3YCE2N5C] (noting that some have argued that Jacobs created the framework for modern NIMBYism).
279 See Libby Nelson, Jane Jacobs Believed Cities Should Be Fun—And Changed Urban Planning
Forever, VOX (May 4, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/4/11583342/jane-jacobs-100thbirthday [https://perma.cc/QH3X-PA4D] (“[Jacobs’] love for old buildings can turn into a fetishization
of historic preservation that stops new construction . . . .”).
280 Jonathan Glancey, The Woman Who Saved Old New York, BBC: CULTURE (May 12, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20170509-the-woman-who-saved-old-new-york
[https://perma.cc/MQF4-V5LY] (detailing Jacobs’s opposition to Robert Moses’s projects that could
have destroyed Washington Square Park).
281 See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 205 (1984) (discussing how cities promote access to jobs and play an important
role in the economy); JACOBS, supra note 271.
282 See GLAESER, supra note 97. See generally Schleicher, supra note 32, at 149-54 (providing
policy suggestions for reviving labor mobility).
283 See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 32, at 82-84; see also Kline & Moretti, supra note 219, at 32
(“Subsidizing poor or unproductive places is an imperfect way of transferring resources to poor
people.”). This suggestion has not escaped critique. See Anderson, supra note 25, at 530 (“Proponents
of mobility too rarely acknowledge . . . difficult quandaries about what to do for the land and people
in struggling regions, and the questions of whether and how to stimulate and protect investment
there.”); Schoenbaum, supra note 242, at 461 (arguing that the “aim of moving people from lowproductivity to high-productivity places relies on mistaken premises about the significance of both
mobility and place” in terms of social ties and happiness); cf. MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE,
ROOT SHOCK: HOW TEARING UP CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT 52-107 (2009) (describing the significant social costs of displacement).
284 Schragger, supra note 28, at 232-33 (2013) (arguing that pro-growth policies that attract
developers and business reinforce existing inequalities); see also Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization
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residents who live in lower productivity places is not a viable social welfare
strategy for large swaths of the population, nor does it anticipate the
possibility of cyclical return.285
This latter point is centrally important when considering the YIMBY
“build, build, build” demand. Our inability to see the future leads us to
assume that current housing demand predicts future housing demand.286 But
consider the dramatic shifts in housing patterns in the past century. In 1900,
most Americans lived in rural areas or small towns.287 By 1920, a large
percentage were living in the growing industrial cities, mainly in the
North.288 That was followed by significant population shifts to Sunbelt cities
and the suburbs, and the rapid decline of industrial cities.289 In the last two
decades, however, out-migration from central cities has reversed and many
central city populations have rebounded.290
Cyclical changes in the nature of employment and in the tastes of housing
consumers suggest that migration patterns (especially within metropolitan
areas) are unpredictable.291 Consider, for instance, the effects of a large-scale
and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837, 1894 (2010) (“Attempts by cities or regions to jump-start their
economies are likely to fail if the city or region is already running against the tide of agglomeration forces.”).
285 Indeed, the most influential study in the productivity genre predicts that if all housing
restrictions were removed, New York would gain 787% in employment, San Francisco’s employment
would increase fivefold, and Flint, Michigan, would lose 98% of its jobs. Rodríguez-Pose & Storper,
supra note 99, at 238. According to Hsieh and Moretti’s model, the economic gains of land use reform
are a result of millions of people relocating primarily to three large metropolitan areas and
abandoning most others. See id. at 238-39 (describing the implications of Hsieh & Moretti’s model).
286 MICHAEL STORPER, supra note 201, at 28-29 (2013) (“The geography of production drives
the geography of urban development today . . . .”); see also SCHRAGGER, supra note 57, at 41-43
(noting the difficulty in predicting the success or decline of given places).
287 Rural Life in the Late 19th Century, LIBR. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/teachers/
classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/riseind [https://perma.cc/4Z874JZA] (last visited Sept. 20, 2021) (“Still, a majority of Americans lived in rural areas in 1900.”).
288 Urban and Rural Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/
programs/geography/urban_and_rural_areas.html [https://perma.cc/JTP9-XWCX] (last visited Sept.
20, 2021) (“The 1920 census marked the first time in which over 50 percent of the U.S. population
was defined as urban.”).
289 EDWARD L. GLAESER & KRISTINA TOBIO, A. ALFRED TAUBMEN CTR. FOR STATE &
LOC. GOV’T, PB-2007-5, THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT 1 (2007) (explaining the boom in internal
migration to the Sunbelt).
290 See EHRENHALT, supra note 71, at 3-4 (chronicling this rebound); Mario Polèse, Why
(Some) Downtowns Are Back, CITY J., Winter 2014, https://www.city-journal.org/html/why-somedowntowns-are-back-13622.html [https://perma.cc/R79B-LRSJ] (stating that many central cities
have experienced population growth between 2000 and 2010).
291 The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted local housing markets around the country, for
example. Justin Fox, Covid Has Made Orlando Less Affordable than San Francisco, BLOOMBERG (May
6, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-06/covid-has-made-orlandoless-affordable-than-san-francisco [https://perma.cc/WAK9-F9UL]; see also Debra Kamin, The
Market Tectonics of California Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/05/28/realestate/california-real-estate.html [https://perma.cc/V3HD-5DST] (describing how internal
migration patterns in California, amplified by the pandemic, have created unpredictable changes in real
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pandemic-induced shift to remote work, which would certainly reduce
housing demand in coastal cities.292 That housing and other features of the
built environment are durable makes planners’ jobs even more difficult. If an
undersupply of housing today could turn into an oversupply tomorrow (a
story that describes Detroit’s twentieth century trajectory293) what should a
city’s present-day housing policy attempt to accomplish? Increasing supply
may be a short-term solution that causes long-term damage.
Finally, it is not at all clear that moving to a highly productive region will
increase social mobility and decrease inequality.294 Moving to productivity
assumes that the problem for the unskilled is the location of employment.
Unskilled laborers (janitors seem to be the favorite example295) are supposed
to follow skilled labor into productive regions. But what if the problem for
unskilled labor is not barriers to moving to productive places but rather a lack
of jobs once they get there? Silicon Valley has lots of coding positions, but
far fewer janitorial positions, and obtaining them may be difficult for all kinds
of reasons, including skills gaps, automation, racial and other forms of
discrimination, or competition from international immigrants.296
Or consider again Camden and Mount Laurel, which are part of the same
Philadelphia-centered regional job market. Camden residents already live in a
productive region, just as the working class and poor who live in Chicago, New
York, or Detroit already live in economically productive regions. Those
residents do not suffer from being excluded from a productive regional labor
estate markets). Climate change, too, is significantly affecting migration. See Jayla Lundstrom,
Climate Change Is Altering Migration Patterns Regionally and Globally, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec.
3, 2019, 9:04 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2019/12/03/478014/
climate-change-altering-migration-patterns-regionally-globally [https://perma.cc/C654-HJ7W] (arguing
that climate change is a driving increased immigration from Central America to the United States).
292 Derek Thompson, The Remote Work Revolution Will Be Bigger than We Think, ATLANTIC,
(Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2021/02/remote-work-revolution-will-be-biggerwe-think/171761 [https://perma.cc/HP73-QPD8] (predicting that long-term shifts to remote work
prompted by the pandemic will reduce housing demand in coastal cities).
293 Timeline: A Brief History of Detroit’s Fiscal Problems, REUTERS (July 18, 2013, 8:48 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-detroit-timeline/timeline-a-brief-history-of-detroits-fiscal-problemsidUSBRE96I02420130719 [https://perma.cc/74JC-B9LR] (showing that a period of development in
Detroit preceded a collapse of the city’s economy); Scott Beyer, Why Has Detroit Continued to Decline?,
FORBES (July 31, 2018, 11:58 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2018/07/31/why-has-detroitcontinued-to-decline [https://perma.cc/DJQ5-SPB9] (emphasizing the role of existing, unused
infrastructure in making Detroit’s recovery more difficult).
294 Cf. Derenoncourt, supra note 253, at 36 (discussing how the migration of Black Americans
to the north did not necessarily lead to decreases in inequality).
295 See Ganong & Shoag, supra note 98, at 78 (discussing how janitors even in productive
locations still face vast disparities in quality-of-life compared to their skilled counterparts).
296 Cf. Eric Chyn & Lawrence F. Katz, Neighborhoods Matter: Assessing the Evidence for Place
Effects 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28953, 2021) (observing that adults do
not appear to benefit from intra-metropolitan moves to high-opportunity neighborhoods and
suggesting that macroeconomic policies are required to address those challenges).
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market,297 but more likely suffer from a lack of unskilled jobs or other barriers
to employment. Moving to productivity does not address the precipitous decline
in industrial employment, the prevalence of racially discriminatory hiring
practices, or the systematic over-incarceration of the Black male population. If
a spatial mismatch between jobs and housing for these groups is not the
problem, then land use reforms are not going to solve it.298
For skilled and educated labor, moving from a small town to a big city can
generate productivity gains, which should redound to the benefit of the
mover.299 But for others, inequality could increase. High-productivity
regions, like coastal metropolitan areas, can, and do, have many
neighborhoods with high levels of poverty.300 New York City, the most
economically productive place in the U.S. by GDP, appears to have a
bifurcated economy: a highly skilled workforce that is serviced by a much less
skilled service class.301 In New York, as in almost all global cities, high levels
of productivity coincide with high levels of inequality.302 And while low-skill
workers have traditionally enjoyed a wage premium by moving to a denser
and more productive urban area, that effect seems to be weakening in many
places. High rates of population growth in metropolitan areas have not been
linked with reductions in poverty among metropolitan-area minority
populations.303
297 An implicit mismatch theory appears to underlie the moving to productivity argument. However,
there is mixed evidence on whether spatial mismatch actually occurs. See Michelle D. Layser, How PlaceBased Tax Incentives Can Reduce Geographic Inequality, TAX L. REV. 16-18 (forthcoming) (“[S]ome
researchers [have] fail[ed] to find evidence that special mismatch exists in poor communities.”).
298 See id.
299 But see Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, supra note 99, at 234-35 (“[T]he hourly wages of lessskilled adults in the US, which formerly rose steeply with density, no longer do so . . . .”); Richard
Florida, Why Americans Are Moving Less: New Jobs Aren’t Worth It, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Apr. 28,
2014, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-28/why-americans-are-movingless-new-jobs-aren-t-worth-it [https://perma.cc/WR2Y-6SFV] (describing the findings Raven
Molloy, Christopher L. Smith, & Abigail Wozniak reached that Americans are moving less due to
negative economic outcomes in Declining Migration Within The U.S.: The Role of the Labor Market
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20065, 2014)).
300 See Aimee Picchi, 9 American Cities with the Worst Income Inequality, CBS NEWS (Feb. 8, 2018,
5:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/media/9-american-cities-with-the-worst-income-inequality
[https://perma.cc/ERD5-826J] (listing New York City, Boston, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and San
Francisco among the cities with the worst level of income inequality).
301 Id.
302 Katie Honan, New York City’s Income-Inequality Gap Hasn’t Changed, Report Says, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 11, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-citys-income-inequality-gaphasnt-changed-report-says-11568174460 [https://perma.cc/USL9-B684].
303 See SHARKEY, supra note 240, at 171 (“[H]igh rates of economic growth are no longer linked
with reductions in poverty among minority populations . . . .”); see also J.B. Wogan, Population Growth
Means a City is Thriving, or Does It?, GOVERNING (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.governing.com/archive/govpopulation-city-growth-thriving.html [https://perma.cc/WNC7-G5HN] (arguing that the growth in a
city does not necessarily mean prosperity for all).
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In other words, moving to productivity assumes that housing demand and
productivity are synonymous—but they might not be. Population growth need
not be accompanied by increases in productivity, but rather by decreases.304 If
that is the case, then inviting market-rate housing construction will only
further help those who are already productive and relatively well-paid.305
The conclusion is fairly obvious: mobility strategies favor the mobile.306
The opportunity ideology works in conjunction with a productivity regime
to generate a certain kind of housing, especially in extremely desirable
markets: housing for those who participate in the knowledge economy. For
those who are relatively unproductive from an economic perspective or who
do not have the wherewithal to take advantage of the opportunities provided
by good schools, the mobility strategy is irrelevant. Such is certainly the case
for the elderly, disabled or mentally ill, as well as the chronically homeless.
But it is also the case for the relatively low-skilled, including the non-collegeeducated working class, immigrant laborers, the Black poor, and rural whites.307
For those groups, moving to opportunity or productivity is not a particularly
robust option. For them, state-level land use reform is somewhat beside the point.
V. THE CASE FOR CITY POWER
The critique of the anti-zoning consensus is driven by skepticism of the
three legs of the land use reform stool: centralization, deregulation, and
mobility. To this point, I have argued that whatever the gains of state law land
use reform, they will be offset by significant costs, will have limited effects on
the housing crisis for the least well-off, and will likely exacerbate economic
inequality more generally.
There is a positive case for maintaining city power over land use, however,
informed by the same economic inequality concerns. As already noted, Jane
Jacobs made one such argument, arguing that urban land use regulation could
be used to preserve a diversity of uses, encourage economic innovation, and
allow the poor to grow into the middle class while remaining in place.308
This Part extends those claims, arguing that reformers should focus less
on what the suburbs should be forbidden from doing and more on what the
304 See supra note 233; cf. Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, supra note 99, at 234-35 (noting that
increases in density no longer correlates to increased hourly wages for low-skill workers).
305 See Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, supra note 99, at 235 (indicating that addressing housing
prices is a boon for skilled labor and does not necessarily benefit the poor).
306 See Sitaraman et al., supra note 23, at 1770 (criticizing the mobility consensus).
307 But cf. Gaetano Basso & Giovanni Peri, Internal Mobility: The Greater Responsiveness of
Foreign-Born to Economic Conditions, J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2020, at 77, 78 (2020) (confirming
declining internal mobility overall but noting that foreign-born natives with less than ten years in
the United States are much more mobile than natives).
308 See supra Section IV.B.
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city can do. The regulation of land use is one of the few remaining tools
available to cities to pursue meaningful redistribution, especially in those
places experiencing a dramatic influx of development capital.309 By regulating
capital in-flows, the city can pursue economic equality goals and avoid the
pitfalls of unregulated growth.
A. Extracting Concessions from Mobile Capital
First, consider land use as a bargaining tool. Because cities are highly
vulnerable to market fluctuations and often have limited taxing authority, their
capacity to redistribute is constrained.310 The land use development process
can be an alternative means to redistribute the city’s locational wealth from
mobile residents and firms to relatively less mobile residents and labor.311
Examples have proliferated, including what I have elsewhere called “land
use unionism”: the deployment of the land use permitting process to hold
specific developers or incoming industries to higher wage and labor
standards.312 Benjamin Sachs describes some instances of this kind of “local
labor law.”313 He recounts how hospital employees working for the Yale-New
Haven Hospital system used the hospital’s building expansion as leverage to
extract a deal granting a union election outside of federal guidelines.314 The
hospital’s expansion plans required numerous city land use approvals,
including permits for demolition and construction and the creation of a new
city zoning category.315 That process required mayoral and city council
approval, which could be leveraged into a series of agreements exchanging

309 For a list of such tools, which include rent control, exactions, development fees, and other
efforts to tax land value, see CONDON, supra note 157, at ch. 6. Many of these tools are rejected by
market-oriented anti-zoning advocates.
310 GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN
INNOVATION 75-83 (2008) (emphasizing that cities often lack the fiscal autonomy that is normally
attributed to them).
311 Consider, for instance, the concept of Land Value Capture (LVC)—common in England—
whereby developers regularly pay for public goods through taxes on the increased value of upzoned land.
See, e.g., Alexander Lord, Chi-Wan Cheang & Richard Dunning, Understanding the Geography of Affordable
Housing Provided Through Land Value Capture: Evidence from England, 2021 URB. STUD. 1, 2-3 (discussing
cash contributions provided by development firms in exchange for local resident cooperation).
312 See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City,
123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 517-18 (2009) (listing means by which incoming businesses may be restricted
when opening in a new location); cf. Andrew Elmore, Labor’s New Localism 35-49 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (describing how a shifting focus to city-level lawmaking has
improved labor conditions, even in regions historically hostile to unions).
313 Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1153, 1173 (2011) (outlining four examples of tripartite labor lawmaking involving local government).
314 Id. at 1174-79.
315 Id. at 1175 (describing the required permits and approvals).
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land use permissions for labor concessions.316 Scott Cummings’s recent book
describes similar processes in Los Angeles where the local labor movement
has leveraged the land use developmental process to push pro-labor
agendas.317 Similar efforts have been made to use the land use process to gain
wage, labor, or health care concessions from big-box and chain stores seeking
development go-aheads.318
Urban labor movements have resorted to the municipal planning and
zoning process for two reasons. The first reason is that cities cannot adopt their
own labor laws—federal law preempts state and local laws.319 State law in many
cases also preempts local wage, hours, or employee-friendly regulations.320 The
second reason is that cities are increasingly desirable locations for investment.
The land use process provides groups like the Yale-New Haven hospital
employees some traction in pursuing labor-friendly ends.321
The rise of community benefits agreements (CBAs) is another example
of the use of the land use process to pursue redistributive ends. CBAs are
individually negotiated deals with developers seeking land use approvals;
community support is often a necessary precondition for such approvals.322
A CBA can include a range of commitments, such as agreements to limit
displacement, provide resettlement support, add additional low-income units,
pay a living wage, hire locally, or provide for sustainable or environmentally
friendly development practices.323 CBAs began informally, as agreements
between community groups and developers made in the shadow of the
leverage that the local land use process provides.324 However, a handful of

Id. at 1174-79.
See SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, AN EQUAL PLACE: LAWYERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LOS
ANGELES 9-12 (2021) (describing organizing of low wage workers in Los Angeles).
318 See Schragger, supra note 312, at 516-18 (describing one such attempt in Chicago); Richard
C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive
Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1091 n.466 (2005) (discussing how local legislatures
used influence on land use policy to address the development of chain stores).
319 See generally Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–97 (regulating the labor
force); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (regulating employee collective
bargaining rights); Machinists v. Wis. Emp’ Rel. Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (establishing that
federal law preempts state policy in regulating the labor force); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959) (indicating that the Supreme Court has long held that the federal
government has exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes).
320 See supra Section II.B.
321 This is especially important as other legal avenues have narrowed or failed. See, e.g., Cynthia
L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1569-87 (2002)
(describing state preemption and the “deconstitutionalization” of labor law).
322 See Schragger, supra note 312, at 509 (explaining that CBAs are agreements that trade
community support for resident benefits).
323 Id.
324 Id.
316
317
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cities have themselves adopted community benefit ordinances, including
Detroit, Houston, Ypsilanti, and Pontiac.325
CBAs have been highlighted as potential mechanisms for addressing
structural economic inequality through community control of productive
capital.326 But they are only possible in those cities that retain significant
powers over land use. In the absence of local land use authority, developers
have very little reason to agree to a CBA.327 The city’s authority over land use
is one of the few ways that locals can control the cross-border movement of
mobile capital.
That authority is increasingly important as global finance capital moves
rapidly into both rising and declining cities. Consider the growing concern
about the global “financialization of housing”: the use of housing as an
investment vehicle by large-scale investors who hold urban land for

325 Anne Choike, A New Urban Front for Shareholder Primacy, 9 M ICH . B US . &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 79, 110-18 (2019).
326 K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control, 108
CAL. L. REV. 679 (2020) (summarizing the main community control movements in U.S. cities).
327 It is instructive to compare CBA processes with more recent proposals to compensate locals
for housing development in their neighborhoods. See Infranca, supra note 13, at 1319-24 (providing
examples of financial benefits to local residents, such as vouchers, loans, and tax increment transfers).
For some, compensation is simply a payoff, a political strategy to make locals less adverse to
incoming development; those advocates would prefer to preempt restrictive land use rules
altogether. See, e.g., David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L. J. 1670, 1727 (2013) (discussing
how compensation to local residents can reduce resistance to development).
For other scholars, however, compensation is meant to capture the increased wealth generated
through upzonings by distributing some portion of that wealth to the community—an
acknowledgement that land use permissions regularly result in higher land values. See Infranca, supra
note 13, at 1319 (discussing how compensation relates to the value of the land under development);
Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Auctioning the Upzone, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 513,
532 (2020) (proposing a method of value capture of parcel auctions). Compensation may also be
intended to off-set negative externalities associated with new development, rising house prices
attributable to gentrification, or the costs of displacement. See Infranca, supra note 13, at 1322 (explaining
how a transferrable development rights program could ameliorate the negative ramifications of land
development). The concept of land value capture is not new. See supra note 187 (discussing Georgism).
This leads to two observations related to the scale of decision-making. The first observation is
that local governments already bargain over growth, either by using rezonings and property tax
incentives to “buy” development or by using exactions, impact fees, proffers, and CBAs to extract
concessions from it. See Edward W. De Barbieri, Lawmakers as Jobs Buyers, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
15, 25 (2019) (listing some of the tools state and local governments can use to “buy” jobs); Rahman
& Simonson, supra note 326, at 681 (suggesting that economic development is a priority for many
communities). Whether one favors these existing exercises of local power or more recent proposals
to “sell” or “auction” local land use regulations depends on what one believes local governments
should be buying or selling (e.g., jobs, development, housing, public goods). The second observation
is that in circumstances when costs to locals are very high, such as is the case with displacement,
compensation is likely to be insufficient. See, e.g., THOMPSON FULLILOVE, supra note 283, at 52-107
(citing national priorities as justification for significant displacement resulting from economic
development).
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speculative purposes.328 In Detroit, capital has rapidly flowed into the
distressed housing market, not with the aim of renting or selling those
properties in the short term, but as an investment vehicle awaiting the next
economic upturn.329 These purchases—and the holding of foreclosed
properties by banks that do not sell or rent them—take housing off the
market. Between 2011 and 2013, hedge funds purchased more than 350,000
properties nationally.330 In Detroit alone, nearly 25% of all properties have
passed through speculation-related sales pipelines in the last decade.331 Many
of those units are empty,332 even as rents have increased for those who can
least afford them.333
The parking of global finance capital in unused or “ghost” luxury
apartments is another feature of the financialization of housing; the
construction of mostly unoccupied luxury housing units in high-demand
cities does little to increase the supply of affordable housing.334 Similarly,

328 For a more extensive definition, see MANUEL B. AALBERS, THE FINANCIALIZATION OF
HOUSING: A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 1-2 (2016) (attempting to define the term). See also
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, ¶¶ 1-10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007) (prepared by
Miloon Kothari, Special Rapporteur) (describing the implementation of the right to adequate housing);
cf. CONDON, supra note 157, at 71-86 (providing a history of financialization of land in the U.S.).
329 See Margaret Dewar, Reuse of Abandoned Property in Detroit and Flint: Impacts of Different
Types of Sales, 35 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH. 347, 353-54 (2015). See generally John Accordino & Gary
T. Johnson, Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned Property Problem, 22 J. URB. AFFS. 301 (2002)
(addressing the problem of property abandonment and the efforts by cities to remedy this problem).
330 Joshua Akers & Eric Seymour, The Eviction Machine: Neighborhood Instability and Blight in
Detroit’s Neighborhoods 5 (Poverty Sols. U. of Mich., Working Paper No. 5-19, 2019).
331 See id. at 3.
332 Dewar, supra note 329, at 353-54 (“Nearly 80 percent of this property remained vacant lots
with no evidence of use.”).
333 JULIE CASSIDY, MICH. LEAGUE FOR PUB. POL’Y, DETROIT: THE EVOLUTION OF A HOUSING
CRISIS 1-2 (2019), https://mlpp.org/detroit-the-evolution-of-a-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/853U63SW] (“[T]he average rent in Detroit increased by 26% from 2005 to 2016.”); see also Julie Mah,
Gentrification-Induced Displacement in Detroit, Michigan: An Analysis of Evictions, 31 HOUS. POL’Y
DEBATE 445, 447 (2020) (“[A] weak housing market, with high vacancy rates does not necessarily
mean increased housing affordability for residents, especially low-income residents . . . . Revitalization
efforts to improve the housing stock can create even more housing precarity, as these efforts typically
attract wealthier in-movers and result in increased competition . . . .”).
334 See Jake Wegmann, Residences Without Residents: Assessing the Geography of Ghost Dwellings in
Big U.S. Cities, 42 J. URB. AFFS. 1103, 1104 (2020) (describing the ghost dwelling phenomenon and
noting that “[i]n 37 of the 50 largest U.S. cities, ghost dwelling growth has outpaced housing
growth”). Estimates have put the number of ghost apartments in New York City at over 4,000.
N.Y.C. CHAPTER OF THE RIGHT TO THE CITY ALL., PEOPLE WITHOUT HOMES & HOMES
WITHOUT PEOPLE: A COUNT OF VACANT CONDOS IN SELECT NYC NEIGHBORHOODS 5-6
(2010). A similar phenomenon seems to be occurring in Los Angeles. See ALEXANDER FERRER,
TERRA GRAZIANI, JACOB WOOCHER & ZACHARY FREDERICK, THE VACANCY REPORT: HOW
LOS ANGELES LEAVES HOMES EMPTY AND PEOPLE UNHOUSED at vi, https://www.
acceinstitute.org/thevacancyreport [https://perma.cc/X8ZP-T3YJ] (asserting that 97% of new rental
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cities that have experienced high demand in short-term rentals have witnessed
increased housing costs;335 in certain cities and certain neighborhoods, the
short-term rental demand is high enough to crowd out other land uses.336
In some cases, that process could be accelerated by eliminating singlefamily zoning. Apartment units may be more marketable for short-term
rentals. And accessory dwelling units—as already noted—may become forprofit short-term rentals rather than permanent moderate-income housing.337
Indeed, where demand is overwhelming, as it might be in places like New
York and other tourist destinations, many additions to the housing supply
will never become permanent housing.338
B. The False Choice Between Growth and No-Growth
The problem of housing financialization leads to a more general point
about the efficacy of growth as a strategy for both poverty alleviation and
affordable housing provision. As previously observed, U.S.-style growthoriented development policy339 does not have a very good track record.340
Urban renewal was a massive subsidy to downtown real estate interests that
ended up destroying numerous low-income, minority neighborhoods,
providing little housing in return.341 Tax increment financing (TIF) is
housing construction in Los Angeles is luxury housing, that 46,000 units are held in a state of “nonmarket vacancy,” and that 67% of residential units are owned by investment entities).
335 See Dayne Lee, Note, How Airbnb Short-Term Rentals Exacerbate Los Angeles’s Affordable
Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 229, 234-40 (2016)
(noting a 7.3% rent increase in Los Angeles in 2014 and tracing the impact of short-term rentals on
housing prices); Hans R.A. Koster, Jos van Ommeren & Nicolas Volkhausen, Short-Term Rentals and
the Housing Market: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Airbnb in Los Angeles, 124 J. URB. ECON. 103356,
at 1, 18 (2021) (finding impacts of Airbnb on rents and property values in Los Angeles).
336 See Junfeng Jiao & Shunhua Bai, Cities Reshaped by Airbnb: A Case Study in New York City,
Chicago, and Los Angeles, 52 ENV’T & PLAN. A: ECON. & SPACE 10, 12 (2020) (detailing the role of
short-term rentals in driving out other forms of land use).
337 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
338 Tom Vanderbilt, Did Airbnb Kill the Mountain Town?, OUTSIDE (July 11, 2017),
https://www.outsideonline.com/2198726/did-airbnb-kill-mountain-town [https://perma.cc/4RAAXWAF] (describing the negative impact of short-term rentals on housing supply in tourist
destinations).
339 See generally Tore Sager, Neo-Liberal Urban Planning Policies: A Literature Survey 1990–2010,
PROGRESS PLAN., Nov. 2011, at 147, 152 (2011) (outlining the history of American neo-liberal urban
planning policies and their underlying goals).
340 For city-level case studies, see Julia Conte & Janet Li, Neoliberal Urban Revitalization in
Chicago, U. CHI. ADVOCS. F. 19 (2013), studying Chicago; Ute Lehrer & Jennefer Laidley, Old MegaProjects Newly Packaged? Waterfront Redevelopment in Toronto, 32 INTL. J. URB. & REG’L RSCH. 786
(2008), studying Toronto; and Christopher Mele, Neoliberalism, Race and the Redefining of Urban
Redevelopment, 37 INTL. J. URB. & REG’L RSCH. 598 (2012), studying Chester, Pennsylvania.
341 See Public Menace, supra note 125, at 47-52 (describing bipartisan critiques of urban
renewal). Perhaps for this reason, poor, minority residents tend to be skeptical of market-rate,
supply-side housing proposals and have pointed out that YIMBYs are predominantly young, white,
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intended to subsidize urban revitalization efforts, but in Chicago, where TIF
has been deployed extensively, developers have used the monies to construct
luxury housing that would likely have been built regardless of any subsidy.342
Opportunity Zones, the most recent version of federally-funded, place-based
financial assistance, has been criticized on the grounds that it is a giveaway to
real estate interests343—unsurprising considering the “pro-gentrification”
history of federal placed-based tax incentives.344 Meanwhile, Amazon’s highprofile auction of its second headquarters to the highest government bidder
is only the most visible example of a subsidy competition that underwrites
real estate markets in cities across the country.345 CBAs and other local efforts
to control capital flows seem like a small but necessary corrective to these
much larger forces favoring developmental capital—a mechanism for
ensuring what Olatunde Johnson and others have called “accountable
development.”346
The anti-zoning debate tends to obscure this “accountability” alternative,
as it often seems to present only diametrically opposed options: growth or
no-growth, free markets or protectionism, cosmopolitanism or parochialism.
NIMBYism has been equated with the local political economy of the
“homevoter”—home-owning residents resistant to development out of

and well-educated. See Fernando Marti, YIMBY, White Privilege, and the Soul of Our Cities,
SHELTERFORCE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://shelterforce.org/2019/02/19/yimby-white-privilege-andthe-soul-of-our-cities [https://perma.cc/74HA-KY88] (criticizing YIMBYs for ignoring diverse
activists, especially activists of color); Dillon, supra note 27 (“The scene of predominantly white
protestors shouting over people of color fed a criticism that has dogged backers of recent legislative
efforts to boost home building.”); Underkuffler, supra note 170, at 243-46 (describing how
predominantly minority and poor communities in New York and Boston have objected to upzoning
plans, arguing in some cases that rezoning is “ethnic cleansing”).
342 SCHRAGGER, supra note 57, at 212; see also Jared F. Knight, Note, Is Tax Increment Financing
Racist? Chicago’s Racially Disparate TIF Spending, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1681, 1712 (2016) (“TIF dollars
sometimes fund projects like car dealership relocations, luxury condominiums, and tourist attractions.”).
343 Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor Communities Became a
Windfall
for
the
Rich,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
27,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/LAZ6-FJWT] (“[T]he Trump administration’s signature plan to lift them—a
multibillion-dollar tax break that is supposed to help low-income areas—has fueled a wave of
developments financed by and built for the wealthiest Americans.”).
344 See Layser, supra note 129, at 747-48 (arguing that the gentrifying effect of Opportunity
Zones and other place-based incentives is a “feature” rather than a “flaw”).
345 Derek Thompson, Amazon’s HQ2 Spectacle Isn’t Just Shameful—It Should Be Illegal, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 12, 2018, 10:10 AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/amazons-hq2-spectacleshould-be-illegal/575539 [https://perma.cc/2PJX-GNCU] (decrying Amazon’s leveraging its economic
benefits to cities to extract vast tax and regulatory concessions and linking it to a broader phenomenon
of municipal subsidies to corporate interests).
346 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Unjust Cities? Gentrification, Integration, and the Fair Housing
Act, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 835, 865 (2019) (defining accountable development as asking for concrete
public benefits in exchange for pro-development municipal policies).
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concern for protecting their property values and exclusive public services.347
These homevoter interests are contrasted with an alternative local political
economy—that of the “growth machine”348—representing the interests of
developers and city boosters in generating wealth through urban
development.349 Though often treated as opposing forces, these two accounts
are actually variations on a theme: they represent different strategies for
enhancing and preserving land-based wealth.
Consider first the city as a “growth machine,” a socio-political claim about
who benefits from urban development and economic growth generally.350 In
his original formulation, Harvey Molotch famously observed that
[t]he desire for growth provides the key operative motivation toward
consensus for members of politically mobilized local elites, however split they
might be on other issues, and that a common interest in growth is the
overriding commonality among important people in a given locale—at least
insofar as they have any important local goals at all.351

Consistent with this original account, urban theorists have explained the
dominance of business interests in city politics as a function of the city’s
dependence on private economic activity.352
Importantly, Molotch’s original growth machine thesis noted the
drawbacks of economic growth for non-elites and less economically mobile
residents. He pointed out that job growth in cities is potentially associated
with unemployment; because urban growth induces regional in-migration,
current residents may face competition from newcomers.353 Though the
benefits of growth are touted as broadly lifting all boats, Molotch observed
that those benefits are not evenly distributed.354 Growth machine interests

347 FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 4 (2001); see Vicki Been, Josiah Madar, & Simon McDonnell,
Urban Land Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 227, 231-33 (2014) (summarizing Fischel’s hypothesis and describing the economic and racial
implications of the theory).
348 Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 AM.
J. SOCIO. 309, 309-10 (1976) (coining the term).
349 Been et al., supra note 347, at 230-34 (summarizing and contrasting the “growth machine”
and “homevoter” theories).
350 Molotch, supra note 348, at 309-10.
351 Id. at 310.
352 See, e.g., CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA 1946-1988
(1989) (describing the business-city regime in Atlanta).
353 See Molotch, supra note 348, at 320-21 (“[T]he tendency is for rapid growth to be associated
with higher rates of unemployment.”). Molotch specifically refuted the idea that growth leads to
more jobs, often touted as the primary reason for courting private investment and unfettered
economic (and housing) development. Id. at 320.
354 Id. at 320 (“[L]ocal growth is a transfer of quality of life and wealth from the local general
public to a certain segment of the local elite.”).
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also explain the city’s subsidization of the already-rich. Though it has been
repeatedly shown that they rarely work, location incentives in the form of tax
breaks and direct cash subsidies are regularly distributed to corporations,
developers, and owners of professional sports teams—all while being sold to
voters as necessary to maintain the city’s economic and fiscal health.355
The “homevoter hypothesis,” by contrast, describes the microeconomic
incentives of homeowners and their relationship to the financing of local
public goods. William Fischel’s original formulation is a modification of
Charles Tiebout’s concept of the consumer voter: the citizen resident
“shopping” for a local government that fits her preferred tax-and-spend
bundle and whose location decision turns on how well the local government
delivers local public goods.356 Fischel’s contribution was to add
homeownership as the mechanism by which the consumer voter might gain
from her “investment” in a particular local government.357 The homevoter’s
primary asset is the family home; she will therefore act to defend that home’s
value, purportedly by favoring local government investments (such as
schools) that increase the value of that asset while disfavoring municipal
policies that might decrease that value. The key assumption here is that local
taxing and spending decisions are capitalized into the value of the home.358
Local government leaders in jurisdictions dominated by homevoters will thus
limit newcomers so as to keep costs down, but not enough to undermine the
local tax base on which existing services depend.359
Thus, while the growth machine and the homevoter appear to represent
contrasting political economies roughly corresponding to “growth” and “nogrowth,” they are both concerned with protecting and maximizing land-based
wealth.360 In the case of an urban jurisdiction with a mixed economy, the need
for ongoing investment in the local economy leads to policies favoring mobile
capital: keeping the economy strong and stable requires “growth.”361 In the
case of a suburban jurisdiction, the preservation of wealth—keeping relatively
mobile homeowners from fleeing—may take precedence. In both cases,
355 See Andrew Zimbalist & Roger Noll, Sports, Jobs, & Taxes: Are New Stadiums Worth the Cost?,
BROOKINGS (June 1, 1997), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/sports-jobs-taxes-are-new-stadiumsworth-the-cost [https://perma.cc/89PR-CPGK] (explaining how team and corporate relocations are
often detrimental to municipal finances).
356 Tiebout, supra note 53, at 419-20; see also FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 70-71.
357 FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 39-51.
358 Id. at ch.3.
359 Id.
360 Cf. CONDON, supra note 157, at ch. 2 (connecting the issues of political power and capital
to land-based wealth).
361 See SCHRAGGER, supra note 57, at 118-20; Molotch, supra note 348, at 313 (“[T]he organized
effort to affect the outcome of growth distribution is the essence of local government as a dynamic
political force.”).
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however, the relatively well-off, or at least somewhat mobile (be they
residents or businesses) exercise outsized influence in local politics.
Growth-oriented YIMBYism and homevoter-oriented NIMBYism thus
share convergent interests. Both require local jurisdictions to chase and then
retain land-based investment. Both favor the skilled and relatively wealthy
over the unskilled and relatively poor. Instead of focusing on providing for
the public service or social welfare needs of existing residents, both growth
and no-growth politics are concerned mainly with the characteristics of
newcomers and whether they bring a positive or negative return to the local
economy. The commonality is the local jurisdictions’ subservience to mobile
capital—the need ultimately to encourage in-migration or prevent outmigration of mobile wealth, whether in the form of residents or businesses.362
That subservience means that the embrace of growth will likely reproduce
existing metropolitan-area inequalities. As I have already observed, the antizoning moment arrives on-cue historically, as cities become increasingly
desirable places and a new generation of relatively mobile home-seekers
begins to move back to the cities from which their parents or grandparents
once fled. An economic inversion whereby cities are newly popular and
suburbs stagnate is not going to be addressed by embracing a state-wide
growth agenda. Declining suburbs will still decline despite their low housing
costs, just as Camden declined fifty years ago despite its low-cost housing. If
mobile capital dictates local fiscal health, a land use reform agenda that
primarily embraces the market will simply accelerate the cyclical processes of
spatial disinvestment.
More importantly, in a political economy driven by the imperative of
economic growth, the community’s interest in economic stability or the
individual’s interest in remaining in place is subsumed by the national interest
in macro-economic efficiency. Capital is utterly footloose. Labor chases capital
around the country. In this ideal of frictionless movement, the geographic
allocation of capital is presumed to be efficient. Encouraging labor to become
more mobile—to physically follow that allocation—becomes the goal of
national policy regardless of the destabilization costs to local communities.363
As previously noted, those costs are high. A peripatetic and uprooted
labor force provides some obvious benefits to capital. But as a matter of
political economy, a service class that is required to relocate every generation
or so is a recipe for extreme political instability. Neither the growth machine

362 See Schragger, Cities, supra note 8, at 1096 (noting that cities can be “both too protectionist
and not protectionist enough” in relation to mobile capital).
363 See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 32, at 84, 135-39 (disfavoring homeownership and other
practices that limit mobility, and suggesting that new housing stock be built so that it can be easily
demolished to facilitate the “graceful” decline of unproductive cities).
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nor the homevoter interrogates why capital goes where it does, nor demands
that capital assume obligations to the places in which it locates or leaves.364
Growth is identified with locational preferences as reflected in the market for
land—which is another way of saying with the preferences and choices of
those who are mobile.
C. Rebalancing Public and Private Power
The alternative to a strategy of chasing growth is to provide cities with
the capacity to respond to their citizens’ economic and social welfare needs
in place. Local housing, land use, and development policies need not only be
deployed to either enable or restrict mobile capital; local policies can also be
deployed to alter the terms on which capital invests and disinvests, especially
in low- and moderate-income communities.
Political opportunities are available. Increasing evidence suggests that
urban constituencies are willing to adopt local redistributionist policies.365
Affordable housing coalitions are not shut out of municipal politics—they are
already exercising power there.366 What they and other housing reformers
often need is independence from hostile state legislatures.
The municipal living wage movement provides a template. In the absence
of state and federal action, cities were among the first governments to respond
to the demand by labor activists to embrace a living wage.367 Numerous cities
have done so.368 Skeptics believed, and continue to argue, that local minimum
wages will lead to capital flight.369 Not only have cities that have adopted local

364 Joseph Singer makes such a claim, however. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 640-41 (1988) (arguing that industrial siting decisions should be
constrained by community reliance interests in stable employment).
365 Michael Craw, Deciding to Provide: Local Decisions on Providing Social Welfare, 54 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 906, 918 (2010) (“[L]ocal governments facing lower exit costs are significantly more likely to
provide social welfare functions.”); Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Representation in
Municipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 605 (2014) (describing liberal cities as having
less regressive tax systems and larger social welfare expenditures).
366 See, e.g., CONOR DOUGHERTY, GOLDEN GATES: FIGHTING FOR HOUSING IN AMERICA
(2020) (describing pro-housing coalitions in San Francisco).
367 Kamal Muilenburg & Gangaram Singh, The Modern Living Wage Movement, 39 COMP. &
BENEFITS REV. 21, 26 (2007) (describing pioneering living wage laws in Baltimore; Sonoma,
California; Sacramento; Santa Monica; and elsewhere); David Reynolds, Living Wage Campaigns as
Social Movements: Experiences from Nine Cities, 26 LAB. STUD. J. 31 (2001) (discussing the impact of
grassroot campaigns on local living wage legislation).
368 Minimum Wage Tracker, ECON. POL’Y INST., https://www.epi.org/minimum-wage-tracker
[https://perma.cc/BGJ7-C28S] (last visited Sept. 21, 2020) (listing forty-five localities with
minimum wages above the state minimum).
369 See generally DONALD DEERE, KEVIN M. MURPHY, & FINIS WELCH, SENSE AND
NONSENSE ON THE MINIMUM WAGE (1990).
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minimum wages not seen significant outflows of capital or jobs, but research
suggests that such ordinances reduce urban poverty.370
The living wage movement provides some important lessons to affordable
housing advocates. The first lesson is that despite the dominant race-to-thebottom narrative, cities are willing to, and capable of, engaging in significant
social welfare provision and labor-friendly redistribution. The conventional
view has been that the redistributive functions of government are
appropriately undertaken at the federal or state scale and that local
governments must, by necessity, adopt a relatively low-tax and nonredistributive approach.371 The urban resurgence, however, has altered the
relative economic strength of cities—at least in certain parts of the country.
Because of their locational advantages, high-demand cities have more
capacity to charge the wealthy without encouraging capital flight. For this
reason, cities have become important sites for organizing low-wage workers,
especially in the healthcare, hospitality, and service industries.372
The second lesson is that city power is a necessary predicate for the
success of urban economic equality movements. Twenty-five states prevent
cities from adopting local minimum wage ordinances.373 As previously
discussed, state and federal laws also prevent cities from adopting family leave
policies, health care mandates, wage theft and fair hours laws, labor
protections, and employment anti-discrimination laws.374 Cities can adopt
their own fair- and affordable-housing plans, impose taxes to fund those
plans, and can use their land use and zoning authority to implement them,375
but only if they have the legal authority to do so. It is for that reason that
many policy reformers have come to the same realization that animated the
Progressive Era push for home rule early in the last century:376 building local

370 David Neumark & Scott Adams, Do Living Wage Ordinances Reduce Urban Poverty? 28 (Natl.
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7606, 2000) (“Our findings indicate that living wage
ordinances boost wages of low-wage workers.”).
371 See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 112526 (1999) (“[S]uch programs are not well suited to use at decentralized levels of government, [and]
are best employed by higher levels of government.”).
372 See, e.g., CUMMINGS, supra note 317, at 9-10 (describing the city as a “tool . . . of struggle”
for the low-wage worker movement in Los Angeles).
373 LAURA HUIZAR & YANNET LATHROP, NATL. EMP. L. PROJECT, FIGHTING WAGE
PREEMPTION: HOW WORKERS HAVE LOST BILLIONS IN WAGES AND HOW WE CAN RESTORE
LOCAL DEMOCRACY 3 (2019), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Fighting-Wage-PreemptionReport-7-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3LY-RFVC].
374 Id. at 10 (describing the growth of state preemption statutes across a number of subjects).
375 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 346, at 858-61 (2019) (describing Los Angeles’ Assessment of
Fair Housing (“AFH”), enacted pursuant to HUD requirements, presenting a framework for the
city to address affordable housing).
376 See generally FREDRIC C. HOWE, THE CITY: THE HOPE OF DEMOCRACY (1905) for such
an account.
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reform coalitions is useless if state power can readily override local gains.
Combating state law preemption is thus a necessary precondition for
pursuing an economic reform agenda.377 Progress on substantive policy
changes first requires municipal independence. 378
City independence is necessary for another reason. The lack of affordable
housing is just one symptom of an era of increasing and persistent economic
inequality. High-demand cities with average housing prices in the millions have
become embodiments of that inequality. But cities are also repositories of enormous
land-based wealth that can be more fairly distributed if given the opportunity.379
The city’s status as a subordinate government, however, serves as a barrier
to effective structural economic reform. As Gerald Frug observed over four
decades ago, the city’s economic and political weakness is a function of the
nineteenth century distinction between public and private corporations and
the dominance of the latter over the former.380 Municipal corporations are
understood to be creatures of the state, limited in the exercise of their
autonomy, and in need of restraint lest they invade private rights, especially
of property. By contrast, the private business corporation is understood to be
an association of like-minded citizens, expansive in its sphere of authority,
and protected in its rights from invasion by the government.
The list of city disabilities is long.381 A city cannot generally run
businesses or operate banks; it cannot regulate mortgage lenders.382 Often it
cannot dictate what should be done with its own property. The city is
responsible in the first instance for its residents’ basic needs but the city’s
ability to tax and spend is highly constrained. The city cannot readily develop
revenue sources beyond its borders or even within them;383 it often cannot
expand its territorial footprint; and it cannot effectively resist disinvestment

377 Cf. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 163, at 5 (“At this critical juncture, the need to
empower cities, towns and villages is clear . . . .”).
378 For the original, Progressive Era version of this argument, see generally HOWE, supra note 376.
379 See CONDON, supra note 157, at ch. 6, for proposals to do so, including a land value tax.
380 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1107 (1980) (describing
this bifurcation).
381 For a list of city disabilities, see id. at 1062-67 (“American cities today do not have the power
to solve their current problems or to control their future development.”); SCHRAGGER, supra note
57, at 78-79 (arguing that federalism deeply marginalizes and constrains cities and municipalities
from wielding power effectively).
382 See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 823-28 (Cal. 2005)
(reserving the right to regulate mortgage lending to state legislatures).
383 Christine, Yuanshuo Xu, Yunji Kim, & Mildred E. Warner, Starving Counties, Squeezing
Cities: Tax and Expenditure Limits in the US, 23 J. ECON. POL’Y REFORM 101, at 9-13, 19 (2020)
(providing data on how state-imposed local Tax and Expenditure Limits (TELS) restrict local
government’s revenue raising ability).
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except by promising tax incentives to “footloose” corporations.384 Cities must
justify most of their policies with reference to a grant of state authority, or
else restrict their operations to a narrow sphere. And ultimately, whatever the
city chooses to do is subject to state override, except in extremely narrow
circumstances. The city’s capacity to control its economic fate turns in large
part on what the state permits it to do, and that is very little.385
A core concern for reformers during both the Progressive Era and again
during the decline of the industrial city in the late twentieth century was how
to bring public, democratic power to bear on private actors’ decisions to
(dis)invest in the city—to make mobile capital responsive to public power.386
In the wake of the suburban century, as old-line cities entered a steep
economic decline, those concerns shifted to suburban exclusion.
As Frug and others have argued, however, city power need not be
synonymous with defensive land use-based localism.387 Advocates of city
power seek to champion the exercise of pubic, democratic power, not to
support a privatized version of local autonomy in a suburban enclave not
appreciably different from a homeowners’ association.388 Understood as an
alternative to corporate control, city power is distinguishable from suburban,
defensive homeowner-based localism.389
Importantly, state constitutional home-rule grants only address state-local
relations. They have no bearing on this one-sided relationship between public
and private power. Critics of localism are right to raise concerns about what
kind of local autonomy is protected by those grants. But in doing so, they
have jettisoned the pre-suburban conception of home rule that animated the
Progressive Era reformers—the version of home rule that sought to right the

384 FRUG & BARRON, supra note 310, at 148-49 (noting that state-imposed limits and the threat
of capital flight lead global cities to offer tax and other incentives); see SCHRAGGER, supra note 57,
at ch. 4 (providing further examples of incentives used by cities, with a particular emphasis on land
use, as well as encouraging “footloose” capital).
385 See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 310, at 75 (“[S]tate law exerts significant control over
nearly every aspect of the local budget.”); Frug, supra note 380, at 1144 (“[N]either corporations nor
cities in their current form are truly organized to protect property rights.”); SCHRAGGER, supra
note 57, at 247.
386 For a summary of the literature, see SCHRAGGER, supra note 57, at 56-65.
387 GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 54-61, 143-64 (1999) [hereinafter FRUG, CITY MAKING] (advocating regional negotiations
going beyond land use to education, crime, and municipal services).
388 Compare Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1519 (1982) (criticizing Frug’s The City as a Legal Concept for not considering the private homeowners
association as the “obvious private alternative to the city”) with Gerald E. Frug, Cities and
Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589, 1591 (1982) (responding to and rejecting
Ellickson’s critique).
389 See FRUG, CITY MAKING, supra note 387, at 59-60 & ch. 6 (making this distinction clear
throughout an extended discussion of city power).
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imbalance between private and public power390 and provide the city with the
means to promote ends other than the promotion of private capital.391
To be sure, city leaders may not act to do so. They may in fact act contrary
to their citizens’ interests across a range of policies. Or, more accurately, city
politics might be pluralistic,392 reflecting the tensions and interest coalitions
that form for good and for ill. If one is skeptical of the exercise of local power,
land use policy in this respect is not unique. One would oppose most forms of
local power in favor of centralized policymaking, or perhaps no policymaking
at all. Not much can be said about the blanket dismissal of city power if one
deems the exercise of government power generally to be unattractive.
If, however, one is sympathetic to the notion that cities are appropriate—
and in many cases, superior—sites for the exercise of participatory, democratic
governance,393 the problem of local land use parochialism should not dictate
the scope of that governance. This is certainly so if one understands city power
as a potential counterweight to private-side economic domination.
CONCLUSION
Land use regulation can be deployed in pernicious ways. But the current
attacks on the local zoning power, which emphasize preempting local power,
deregulating housing markets, and encouraging mobility across jurisdictional
lines to access basic public goods, have significant drawbacks.
To be sure, renewed attention to the spatial barriers that exacerbate racial
and socioeconomic inequality is welcome. The identification of those barriers
with local power, however, may have the unfortunate effect of undermining
the city’s potential role in building economic resilience. Inviting state
preemption of local land use laws removes a useful tool in the city’s toolkit—
one of the few that remain at a time of increasing state hostility to the exercise
of city power, including city efforts to redistribute. At the same time,
Frug, supra note 380, at 1128-36.
A growth-centered regime tends to treat cities as platforms for private economic activity.
Paul Peterson famously associated the health of the city with the health of its export industries. See
PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 22-24 (1981) (“[E]conomists have gone so far as to suggest that
the welfare of a city is identical to the welfare of its export industry.”).
392 See ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
89-98 (2008) (offering an account of pluralistic municipal politics).
393 See, e.g., SCHRAGGER, supra note 57, at 247-55 (summarizing how city power can be a means
to democratic governance); Nicholas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of Self-Government, 130 YALE
L.J. 1652, 1740-45 (2021) (discussing the ways in which a city could reasonably justify expanding its
power to act on behalf of its citizens); Robert Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 953, 963-67 (advocating for the city as an advantageous unit for democratic government);
Frug, supra note 380, at 1149-50 (advocating for the city as an “alternative form of decentralized
power” necessary to achieve “public freedom,” or the right to participate in social decisions that
affect one’s life).
390
391
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eliminating or reducing suburban land use controls is likely to yield relatively
limited and likely temporary benefits, as the rich flee further afield or adopt
private agreements that take the place of zoning. The declining suburbs will
not be aided by eliminating local land use controls. And in high-demand
cities, market-oriented reforms—which tend to increase land values—can
lead to higher, not lower, prices, especially for those outside the top third of
the housing market.
This is not an argument against land use reform, which is in many cases
essential. It is instead an argument against imposing land use reform from
above. The YIMBY movement has already shown that affordable housing
coalitions can exercise power in cities. Whether advocates of fair and
affordable housing can agree on an approach is a matter of local politics. The
interests served by a “build, build, build” program will be contested. Hardcore YIMBYs, who urge a deregulatory approach that emphasizes lowering
costs, will not readily welcome anti-displacement provisions or environmental,
historic preservation, or inclusionary zoning mandates that could potentially
raise costs. Opening the door to market-rate housing will conflict with other
values, in particular the value of stabilizing low-income communities.
The history of land use reform in the U.S. is instructive. The current antizoning moment is a product of the global urban resurgence. As such, it is the
mirror image of the pro-zoning moment that preceded it, which facilitated
the massive influx of population into the suburbs. In both instances, housing
demand is a function of regional economic development. And in both
instances, market-rate development contributes to displacement. The New
Jersey Supreme Court’s Mount Laurel decision is normally understood as a
case about racial and socioeconomic exclusion. It is certainly that. But it is
also a case about the right to remain in place, to be poor in a developing
metropolitan region.
Centralized deregulation in aid of market-led growth while urging
families and workers to “move to opportunity” is a peculiarly American
response to addressing uneven economic development. That approach has
never been congenial to the poor and working class, even as the middle-class
American housing market has been heavily subsidized by the federal
government. Meanwhile, equitable regional economic growth has been
elusive. In the U.S., cities, towns, and suburbs—entire regions—rise and fall,
boom and bust. Cities are left to fend for themselves once the economic train
has passed; abandonment seems to be the default policy response to decline.
But internal migration is not a long-term solution to local social and economic
failure. It discounts the harms of social dislocation, produces an unmoored
and weakened labor force, leaves behind “unproductive” places, and
contributes to political polarization.
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Housing is too scarce in many places. In other places, however, housing is
too plentiful. The growth imperative does not address this underlying
imbalance, and state-mandated land use reform will not fix it. Both the
NIMBY and YIMBY movements are expressions of economic vulnerability:
to changes in consumer preferences, large-scale dislocations in the labor
market, and rapid shifts in the location and concentration of productive
enterprises. Further restricting the city’s power to address those larger
vulnerabilities is a mistake.
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